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Summary
This thesis consists of four chapters. Each chapter is self-contained and can be
read independently. The rst chapter presents a general equilibrium model of the
gender wage gap. The following three chapters study issues of natural resources
and economic growth. A summery review of each chapter is provided below.
Chapter 1, An Equilibrium Analysis of the Gender Wage Gap, presents a static
general equilibrium model. It combines issues of household division of labor and
issues of labor compensation in order to study how their determination is linked.
In this model, spouses, who are generically identical except for gender, divide their
labor between a formal sector and a home sector. Due to indivisibility e¤ects,
productivity of labor in the formal sector is negatively related to labor used in the
home; at the same time labor inputs are complementary in home production.
We show that initial beliefs about a gender wage gap are self-fullling, and a
central result is multiplicity of equilibria. Spouses allocate their labor equally, if
they expect to earn the same wage rates. This labor allocation reinforces equal
wage rates. In contrast, spouses allocate their labor di¤erently, if they expect to
earn di¤erent wage rates. The latter situation manifests itself in a gender wage
gap. Based on this result, we argue that the apparent inertia in the reduction of
the gender wage gap can be explained by inertia in the e¤acement of traditional
gender roles, and that the latter inertia is not puzzling in that such gender roles are
self-fullling and therefore correspond to economic outcomes.
By use of numerical examples, we show that welfare is highest when spouses
allocate labor equally. As a general discussion, we relate this nding to how policies
can be improved. Specically, we argue that e¤ective policies are policies that
change norms of society.
Chapter 2, Empirics of Economic Growth and Natural Resources, surveys 17
studies on the so-called resource curse, which describes a negative relationship be-
tween natural resources and, typically, growth performance.
During recent decades, the idea of a resource curse has become increasingly
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widespread among economists. Yet endogenous growth theory generally suggests
that greater endowments provide better opportunities for economic growth. Theory
alone, however, cannot tell us a priori if, or when, natural resources are a curse. We
therefore examine empirical work to answer the following questions: How is natural
resource abundance related to economic growth? Especially, does natural resource
type matter, and does it matter how natural resources are measured? What are the
pathways through which natural resources and growth potentially are correlated?
Based on our survey, we conclude that the type of the natural resource matters.
There seems to be more evidence of a negative correlation between point resources
(resources with a high value concentration) and growth, than between di¤use re-
sources (resources with a scattered value concentration) and growth. It also matters
how natural resources are measured. Measured in relative terms, such as relative to
the overall size of the economy, natural resources seem consistently negatively cor-
related with growth performance. In contrast, there is little empirical evidence to
support that absolute levels of natural resources have a negative impact on growth.
Pathways that link natural resources and economic growth are numerous. Point
resources appear to cast their curse through weakened human capital accumulation,
damaged institutional quality, increased debt, and worsened terms of trade, but, at
the same there is also evidence that point resources bless growth though better
institutional quality. Also di¤use resources are found to both harm and benet
institutional quality. Studies which use an interaction term between natural re-
sources and institutional quality generally nd that natural resources are a blessing
for growth if intuitional quality is good.
As a supplement to the survey, we provide additional data. By means of a simple
cross sectional regression we examine the relationship between the size of natural
resource industries relative to GDP and economic growth. We nd that the relative
size of both the mining and the shing industry has no impact on economic growth
averaged over 1991-2003, whereas the relative size of the combined agricultural and
forestry industry is signicantly negatively correlated with growth. These results
are in conformity with a few studies included in the survey, but seem to diverge from
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the general pattern.A general pattern in how various types of natural resources
impacts growth, however, is not easily established.
The two subsequent chapters take a theoretical approach. Their overall pur-
pose is to contribute to the understanding of the channels through which natural
resources and growth can be related, and of why some countries seem to su¤er from
the resource curse, while others seem to escape it. Chapter 3, Spending Natural
Resource Revenues in an Altruistic Growth Model, examines how revenues from a
natural resource interact with both growth and welfare in an overlapping gener-
ations model with altruism. In this model, revenues from the natural resources
are allocated between public productive services and direct transfers to members
of society by spending policies. We analyze how spending policies inuence the
dynamics of the model, and how the dynamics are inuenced by abundance of the
natural resources. We consider a range of spending policies: exogenous policies,
growth maximizing policies, policies determined by the young generation, and poli-
cies determined by the old generation.
We nd that an increase in the resource revenues may harm growth for two
reasons: either because spending policies favor the old generation, and consumption
smoothing leads the young to decrease their saving, or because a new growth path
with a lower growth rate maximizes welfare. Hence, we also show that growth and
welfare can be oppositely a¤ected by changes in resource abundance.
Due to externality issues, we provide also the socially optimal policy. Along
an optimal growth path both growth and welfare benet from higher resource rev-
enues. Overall, the analysis suggests that variation in the strength of altruism and
in spending policies may explain why natural resources seems to a¤ect economic
performance across nations di¤erently.
The fourth and last chapter, Labor Mobility, Household Production, and the
Dutch Disease, introduces issues of gender-based labor market patterns into a Dutch
disease model with learning by doing. The idea is to study how labor mobility, and
labor immobility, impact economic adjustment to altered resource abundance.
We model an economy of three sectors: a traded sector, a non-traded sector, and
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a household sector. Only women work in the households. Since it seems that there
is a large variation across nations in how labor markets are structured, especially,
with respect to gender-segmentation, we analyze both economies with mobile labor
and economies with gender specic sectors. In the latter type of labor market,
in addition to working in the household, women work in either the traded or the
non-traded sector, and men allocate all their labor to the sector not occupied by
women.
The e¤ect of enhanced natural resource abundance on factor allocation, the real
exchange rate, wage rates, production, and growth are worked out for each case.
By considering the di¤erent types of labor markets, our model predicts manifold
economic outcomes. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that considering labor
market types jointly with issues of natural resource abundance explains variation
of societal patterns within similar types of labor markets. For instance, our model
predicts that if women, besides in the household, work in traded sectors, women
in natural resource rich countries will allocate less labor to the labor market than
women in otherwise identical natural resource poor countries. On the other hand, if
women work in non-traded sectors, besides in the household, their labor allocation
is una¤ected by altered natural resource abundance.
5
Chapter 1
An Equilibrium Analysis of the Gender Wage
Gap
Elisabeth Hermann Frederiksen
University of Copenhagen, EPRU,yand FAMEz
February 2007
Abstract
This paper studies the gender wage gap within a general equilibrium
model in which spouses divide their labor between a formal sector and a
home sector. Due to indivisibility e¤ects, productivity of labor in the formal
sector is negatively related to labor used in the home; at the same time labor
inputs are complementary in home production. We show that beliefs about
the gender wage gap are self-fullling, and a central result is multiplicity of
equilibria. Spouses allocate their labor equally, if they expect to earn the
same wage rates, which ex post reinforces equal wage rates; whereas they
allocate their labor di¤erently, if they expect to earn di¤erent wage rates.
The latter situation manifests itself in a gender wage gap. By use of numer-
ical examples, we show that welfare is highest when spouses allocate labor
equally. We relate this nding to policy recommendations.
Key Words: Gender Wage Gap, Household Models, Household Pro-
duction, Labor Markets.
JEL Classication Codes: D13, J16, J22, J30
I thank Graciela Chichilnisky for suggesting this project and its approach as well as for
many valuable discussions. I also thank Christian Groth, Christian Schultz, Mich Tvede, and
seminar participants in the EPRU seminar at the University of Copenhagen and at the 2004
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Hermann Frederiksen, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, 1455
Copenhagen-K, Denmark. E-mail: ehf@econ.ku.dk
yThe activities of EPRU (Economic Policy Research Unit) are nanced through a grant from
The Danish National Research Foundation.
zThe research was supported by the Centre for Fisheries & Aquaculture Management & Eco-
nomics (FAME) nanced by the Danish Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries and by the
Danish Agricultural and Veterinary Research Council. FAME is a network and resource school
connecting universities, research institutions, and researchers at the University of Southern Den-
mark.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
This paper studies issues of intra-household division of labor, labor productivity,
and labor compensation within a general equilibrium model. The purpose is to
contribute to our understanding of the current seemingly persistent gender wage
gap situation in modern society as well as of its welfare properties.
One strand of the gender wage gap literature explains the gender wage gap by an
inherent source of di¤erence between men and women, which causes women to earn
lower wages. For example, Elul et al. (2002) suggest that gender-di¤erences in wages
can be attributed to demographic reasons. Men marry younger women, and men
therefore, before getting married, have the opportunity to settle where they receive
maximal compensation. Women, on the other hand, marry at younger age and
are accordingly more likely to settle where their compensation is not at maximum.
Siow (1998) attribute di¤erences in earnings to a biological factor: di¤erences in
fecundity. Women are only able to have children in a limited period of their lives,
whereas men are not subject to this restriction. Men therefore need extra income
to have children when old, and thus have an incentive to work more than women.
This leads to higher male human capital accumulation and, consequently, higher
male wage rates relative to female wage rates.
This paper, in contrast, builds on the strand of literature which includes Beckers
(1985) seminal work on sexual division of labor, Chichilnisky (2005), Chichilnisky
and Eisenberger (2005), as well as Albanesi and Olivetti (2006). This literature con-
siders an economy in which men and women, who constitute couples (households),
are ex ante generically identical except for gender.
In Becker (1985), as a result of specialization gains in at least one sector, spouses
gain from a division of labor between employment and household work: one spe-
cializes in employment and the other specializes at home. Such a division raises
the productivity of both persons in both sectors. Furthermore, a gender wage gap
is Pareto e¢ cient. Chichilnisky (2005) and Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2005)
also argue that there are specialization (learning by doing) e¤ects, but, in contrast
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to Becker (1985), they invoke a logistic production function, which changes from
convexity to concavity through an inection point. Chichilnisky and Eisenberger
(2005) show that for the concave part of the production function, to which highly
skilled societies belong, equal wage is e¢ cient, whereas for the convex part of the
production function, to which unskilled societies belong, e¢ ciency requires special-
ization. In order to explain the current unequal labor allocation between men and
women in highly skilled societies, in which, within the logistic model, e¢ ciency re-
quires equal wages, Chichilnisky (2005) argues that missing contracts between the
family and the workplace, and absence of private property rights to labor input
within households, lead to an outcome with an unequal division of labor between
husband and wife. Firms and families play a Prisoners dilemma game, and the
outcome is a Pareto ine¢ cient gender wage gap outcome. Chichilnisky (ibid., 15)
argues that there is a cooperative solution that is better for all, involving equity
at home and in the workplace, but it seems riskier.
Another closely related but independent paper is Albanesi and Olivetti (2006).
Albanesi and Olivetti focus on labor market attachment. Household members
choose both e¤ort and home hours, and rms face incentive problems. The pa-
per examines two situations: the situation with an initial di¤erence in mens and
womens productivities, and the situation without. In the latter, which resembles
the assumptions in our model, the authors nd two types of equilibria: One equi-
librium involves equal wages and the other equilibrium involves unequal wages.
To complement this literature, this paper modies the household sector in an
economy otherwise comparable to Beckers (1985) model by changing the home
production function. We introduce complementarity of labor in home production
(using a Cobb-Douglas specication) and maintain an assumption of specialization
gains, which we refer to as indivisibility e¤ects, of labor in the workplace. Indivisi-
bility e¤ects of labor in the workplace imply that one employee working 2T hours
a day produces more than two employees each working T hours a day.1 A conse-
1It can be argued that the gap in hourly wages between part-time and full-time jobs to some
extent reects di¤erences in e¤ectiveness between short and long hours. Such a gap has been
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quence of this e¤ect is that the less labor a worker puts into home production, the
more productive the worker is at the workplace.
Households are described by a standard unitary household model and labor is
allocated as to achieve intra-household e¢ ciency. If spouses expect to earn di¤erent
wage rates, they allocate their labor di¤erently. On the other hand, if spouses
expect to earn the same wage rate, they allocate their labor identically. Firms are
non-discriminating,2 competitive, and hire workers taking as given the supply of
labor (in terms of hours)3 of each worker. They hire workers until the marginal
productivity of a worker equals her marginal costs (her salary). Firms are therefore
willing to hire both low and high productivity workers, if the workerswage rates
vary accordingly. In equilibrium, a worker, who works long hours, earns a high
wage, and a worker who works short hours earns a low wage.
As in Chichilnisky (2005) and in Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), we nd that
there exist both an equilibrium in which spouses di¤er in their labor allocation, and
earn di¤erent wages, and an equilibrium in which all workers have identical labor
allocations, and earn the same wage. A gender wage gap occurs when there are
gender-di¤erences in labor allocation. In turn, gender-di¤erences in labor allocation
occur if the beliefs about wages are stereotype.4 If indeed beliefs are stereotype,
the labor market dictates a wage rate for women and a wage rate for men.5
reported repeatedly, e.g., by the U.S. Department of Labor (2005). In 2004, a full-time worker
in the US earned about $19 per hour, whereas part-time workers earned only $10. A portion of
the di¤erence, however, may be accounted for when occupational di¤erences. Hirsch (2000) nds
that the part-time wage gap diminishes considerably by controlling for age, gender, skill level, and
other variables. Also Bonke et al. (2005) discuss how increasing hours in household production are
correlated with wages. They nd that household work has a negative e¤ect on female wages. The
same is not completely true for men: low-end male wages are positively correlated with household
work.
2Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) nd that, within Sweden, men and women doing the same
work for the employer are paid the same salary. In academic labor markets, however, evidence of
discrimination has consistently appeared (Blackaby et al. 2005).
3This assumption at rst may seem to contradict the conventional assumption that labor
demand is decreasing in wages. This would be true if we did not distinguish between the number
of workers and number of hours worked. Indeed, we postulate that workers and hours are not
perfectly substitutable (see, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for a discussion).
4By stereotype, we mean traditional patterns of sex roles.
5We stress that this mechanism is conceptually di¤erent from discrimination since, in our
model, the wage rate for men and women coincides when initial beliefs are unisex.
9
Chapter 1
We nd by use of numerical examples that welfare in society is highest when
spouses labor allocation and wage rates are the same. This result supports the
Pareto e¢ ciency result of Chichilnisky (2005). In particular, we show that Beckers
result does not hold when productivity of labor input of each family member in
household production is dependent of the other. How, then, can the seemingly
persistency of the gender wage gap in modern society be explained? We suggest
that the self-fullling nature of traditional gender roles impedes their e¤acement.
There is also a large body of empirical literature which analyzes the gender wage
gap. Explanations include the so-called family gap: women who marry and have
children experience a higher wage gap than unmarried women with no children
(Ginther 2004; Waldfogel 1998; Winder 2004), job segmentation, i.e., men and
women are allocated di¤erently to occupations that di¤er in the wages they pay
(Meyersson Milgrom et al. 2001), and self-selection of women into sectors that
have experienced a relatively lower wage growth (Rosholm and Smith 1996). Other
explanations suggest that family-friendly policies may have adverse e¤ects on female
wages (Gupta et al. 2006), or that evidence of a glass ceiling e¤ect6 prevents women
from being paid the same as men (Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen 2006). Finally,
Blackaby et al. (2005) suggest that discrimination causes women to be underpaid.
Still, however, a large fraction of the gender wage gap seems to remain unaccounted
for (Blau and Kahn 2006).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide some evidence
that motivates our model. Section 3 develops a model in full generality by describing
the representative two-person family, the representative rm, and the equilibrium.
In section 4, we solve our model and present the results. In section 5, we discuss
the welfare aspects of equilibria, and in section 6, we discuss policy implications.
The nal section provides some concluding remarks.
6The glass ceiling e¤ect refers to a situation within rms in which there is a rank or level
beyond which women are rarely promoted.
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2 Background
Female labor force participation has increased substantially during the last half
century in advanced economies.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
La
bo
r F
or
ce
 P
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n
Men
Women
Figure 1: US labor force participation for men and women, 1950-98. (Data from
Fullerton 1999, table 1.)
As an illustration, g. 1 shows how men and womens labor force participation
rates have evolved in the US since the 1950s. The female labor force participation
rates rose from 34 percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 1998. In the same period, the
male labor force participation rates declined from 86 percent to 75 percent. As a
result, the di¤erence in labor force participation rates went down from 53 percent
in 1950 to 15 percent in 1998 (Fullerton 1999). In addition, womens educational
achievements are rising. In the US, women have overtaken the role as the most
educated sex since the mid-90s (Freeman 2004). Yet despite these advancements of
womens position in the labor force, and despite equal work equal payregulations
in many countries,7 women do not seem to be making the same salaries as men.
7ILOs Equal Remuneration Convention no. C100 has, since its enactment in 1951, been ratied
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After women entered the labor force, the gender wage gap8 has been closing.
In the US, the gap converged in the 1980s after a stable period in the 1960s and
1970s (Blau and Kahn 2000). Since then the convergence has slowed. Fig. 2 shows
how the gender wage gap has evolved since 1979. The slope in the rst part of the
period is signicantly9 di¤erent from the slope of the second period.
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Figure 2: The US gender wage gap, 1979-2004. (Data from U.S. Department of
Labor 2005, table 16.)
Indeed, Blau and Kahn (2006) nd that in the US, the gender wage gap has
remained almost constant since the early 1990s. Similar ndings are presented for
other advanced economies, such as those of Sweden (Edin and Richardson 2002) and
Denmark (Gupta et al. 2006). In the OECD countries, on average, women earn 84
percent of male hourly earnings (OECD 2002). There is some evidence, however,
that new cohorts of women fare better than previous ones (Blau and Kahn 2000).
by 162 countries, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm.
8In general, the gender wage gap is a rough estimate that includes both di¤erences in earnings
across male and female occupations as well as di¤erences in male and female earnings within
the same occupation. One should therefore be careful when comparing wage gap estimates from
di¤erent sources.
9The null hypothesis of a common slope is rejected at the 1 percent level by use of a f-test.
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We also base our theory on another empirical regularity; namely, that todays
division of labor between spouses within the household seems surprisingly tradi-
tional. Numerous time-use studies show that wives spend relatively more time in
home production than husbands, and that husbands spend relatively more time in
the workplace than wives. Table 1 shows the results from di¤erent surveys of which
most are sampled in the early 1990s.10 It presents hours spent on household work
and labor market work on a working weekday.
Table 1 Allocation of Daily Work Hours between the Home and the Workplace
Market Home Total
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Canada 8.5 9.6 2.8 1.7 11.3 11.3
Netherlands 4.1 6.7 4.0 2.0 8.1 8.7
Norway 7.2 8.7 3.4 2.1 10.6 10.8
UK 6.9 8.8 3.3 1.3 10.2 10.1
US 8.4 9.3 2.5 1.5 10.9 10.8
Italy 6.5 7.9 4.0 0.9 10.5 8.8
Austria 7.9 9.8 3.7 1.3 11.6 11.1
Source: Data from Freeman and Schettkat 2005, table 7.
The table shows that for a range of developed economies, women do relatively
less market work and men do relatively less work in the home. Yet in total (with
the exception of Italy), men and women roughly spend the same amount of time
on the two activities. In conformity with these ndings, Short (2000) reports that
in 1999, still British men used less time in household production than did British
women, and British men used more time on paid work than did British women.
Bonke et al. (2005) nd similar results in Danish data.
This pattern in labor allocation is in accordance with the fact that women occupy
68 percent of all part-time jobs. About half of those women are married, whereas
the share of part-time workers, who are married men, is as low as 9 percent (U.S.
Department of Labor 2005, table 4).
In summary, it seems that despite women and men roughly share same initial
10Freeman and Schettkat (2005) contains a full specication of the sampling years.
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educational levels, their labor allocation patterns diverge. In particular, this diver-
gence manifests itself as unequal labor allocation between the home and the labor
market, and as gender-di¤erences in wages. We proceed to suggest how this pattern
can be rationalized.
3 The Model
The economy consists of two sectors, a formal sector and a home sector. Each
sector is constituted by a number of identical rms and families. The home sector
produces household services and the formal sector produces a market commodity.
The constant N denotes the number of families. Families consist of a husband
and a wife, who are identied by an index i 2 f1; 2g. Family members are ex ante
identical except for gender. They supply labor to the rm, li; and to the family, ti;
and have constant labor endowments, T : We think of the labor endowment as the
daily number of hours used for work activities (cf. table 1); thus,
li + ti = T ;
11
and henceforth, li and ti are in the following expressed in number of hours as a
share of total daily labor endowment. Family members do not derive utility from
leisure and personal time.
3.1 Families
The representative family consumes the market commodity, x; and household ser-
vices, z; which we think of as including activities such as food preparation, dish
washing, household up-keeping, care for clothes, child care, shopping, do-it-yourself
work, gardening, and so forth. The market commodity is purchased from the mar-
ket. The household service, on the other hand, is produced and consumed entirely
within the home.12
11We shall refer to any combination (ti; li) = (ti; T   ti) as the family members labor (or time)
allocation between the home sector and the rm sector.
12One could argue that household services are to a certain extent available on a formal market.
Time-use studies, however, show that families produce (at least part of) the service themselves
(Bonke et al. 2005; Freeman and Schekatt 2005; Short 2000).
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We assume strict essentiality and complementarity in home production in the
sense that one family member cannot produce without labor input from her spouse.
Strict essentialty seems justiable for household activities which concern reproduc-
tion. More generally, one can argue that without mutual a¤ection and attention,
there will be no household production by either family member. Specically, home
production is given as
z = (t1t2)

2 ; (1)
where, if z > 0; then t1 > 0 and t2 > 0: Moreover, 0 <   1. We assume there are
constant or decreasing returns to male and female labor input taken together. The
literature shows no strong prior on this point,13 but the constant returns formulation
is often used for its convenience in empirical analysis (Apps and Rees 1997; Aronsson
et al. 2001). Note that the factor shares of female and male labor input are taken
to be identical. This reects the idea that husband and wife are equally productive
if they allocate their labor equally.
Each family member has identical preferences and an equal weight in the family
welfare function in conformity with a conventional unitary household model14 with
household production. The family utility function, u; is for convenience taken to
be linearly additive:
u(x; z) = ax+ bz; (2)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters. For given hourly wage rates, w1 and w2;
the family maximizes its utility
max
t1;t2
u(x; z) (3)
13Becker (1985), Chichilnisky (2005), and Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2005) do not assume
complementarity in home production. Becker (1985) furthermore assumes specialization gains,
whereas Chichilnisky (2005) and Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2005) assume a logistic production
function.
14This aspect of our model could be made more general by using a collective household model
(Chiappori 1988) which allows household members to have di¤erent preferences and to have dif-
ferent weights in the family welfare function.
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subject to its budget, production, and labor constraints:
pxx = w1l1 + w2l2; (4)
z = (t1t2)

2 ; (5)
li + ti = T ; i 2 f1; 2g ; (6)
li  0; ti  0; (7)
by e¢ ciently allocating labor to home production and to earning market wages.
The price, px, of the market commodity is our numeraire.
The household service is not traded, and therefore it has no market price. How-
ever, a price for the household service, pz, can be dened as a shadow price at an
optimum. Using the wage rate as the shadow price of labor input to home pro-
duction, we can, as intra-household e¢ ciency in the family consumption allocation
requires that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals their
price ratio, @u=@x
@u=@z
= px
pz
; derive pz as the ratio ba .
In a solution where li > 0 and ti > 0; an e¢ cient allocation of labor endowments
is reached when the marginal value product of labor in home production equals its
opportunity cost (the hourly wage rate). Specically, the rst order conditions to
the family utility maximization problem in such a solution can be expressed as
b
a
@(t1t2)

2
@t1
= w1; (8)
b
a
@(t1t2)

2
@t2
= w2; (9)
and dividing (8) by (9), we obtain an expression for the gender wage ratio (or gap):
w1
w2
=
t2
t1
: (10)
By (10), the wage ratio equals the inverse ratio of labor input into household pro-
duction; if a family member earns relatively higher wage rates than her spouse, she
allocates relatively less time in home production than her spouse, and vice versa.15
If family members earn the same wage rate, they allocate labor in the same manner.
15This prediction is tested by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) on American data. They nd a
signicant negative correlation between the husband-wife ratio of earnings and their home hours
ratio.
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The rst order conditions, (8) and (9), are in general not satised in case of
boundary solutions, i.e., when li = 0 or ti = 0. Such situations occur if the marginal
cost of the household service is di¤erent from its price for any allocation of labor.
3.2 Firms
The representative rm operates in a competitive market and produces the market
commodity taking labor as input. It decides how many male and female workers,
N1 and N2, to employ taking the hours of labor supplied by each worker and the
hourly wage rates as given.
Each worker produces an output. Let e denote e¤ectiveness of each unit of labor
input at the rm. We assume that e¤ectiveness is unrelated to gender type, but only
a function of labor allocation. In particular, we assume that due to indivisibility
of labor in the workplace, e¤ectiveness is (linearly) increasing in hours per day in
employment:
e = e(li) = li; (11)
so @e(li)
@li
> 0:
Indivisibility e¤ects of labor in the workplace imply that one employee working
2T hours produces more than two employees each working T hours. Arguments
in favor of this relationship include sunk costs such as start-up costs. Moreover, if
more workers are assigned on the same project, they may have to exchange infor-
mation and update one another, which is likely to be costly in terms of decreasing
productivity. The assumption also reects protability of availability. The more
time an employee spends at the job, the more likely the employee is able to act
immediately in case of emergencies and urgent requests. Arguments can further-
more be made in favor of learning by doing e¤ects; the more time a worker spends
producing, the more productive the worker becomes.
Total rm output per day, q; is the sum of output produced by each employee
per day given as
q = A [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2] ; (12)
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where A is a positive productivity term, and @q
@Ni
= Ae(li)li is the marginal produc-
tivity of a worker i; which depends on the number of hours the worker puts into
production. As li is taken as given, from the standpoint of the rm, the rm has
constant returns to scale in employment. An implication of (11) in (12) is that
longer hours worked at the rm lead to higher marginal productivity of labor as
well as of workers.16
The rm decides how many workers to recruit in order to maximize its prots, ;
which are the rms revenues minus its costs. As the price of the market commodity
is the numeraire, the prot maximization problem is to
max
N1;N2
 = fA [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2]  w1l1N1   w2l2N2g : (13)
Taking w1; w2; l1; and l2 as given, in a competitive market, the rm employs workers
until their marginal daily productivity, Ae(li)li; equalizes their marginal daily costs,
wili. Hence,
@
@N1
= Ae(l1)l1   w1l1 = 0, Ae(l1)  w1 = 0; (14)
@
@N2
= Ae(l2)l2   w2l2 = 0, Ae(l2)  w2 = 0: (15)
Since labor, l1 and l2; is measured in hours, the solution to the rms problem
depends on the relationship between hourly wages and e¤ectiveness of an hour of
labor at the rm adjusted by the productivity term A. In the following, we refer
to Ae(li) as the average productivity of labor per hour, i = f1; 2g. We have three
di¤erent situations describing the rms employment demand:
Ni =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if Ae(li) > wi;
[0;1[ if Ae(li) = wi;
0 if Ae(li) < wi:
(16)
If Ae(li) > wi the rm would want to hire an innite amount of type i workers, if
Ae(li) < wi the rm would not want to hire any type i workers, and if Ae(li) = wi
the rm is indi¤erent about the number of type i workers.
16Also in Becker (1985) and in Chichilnisky (2005) is marginal productivity of labor negatively
related to labor used in the home.
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3.3 Equilibrium
The conditions for existence of a competitive17 equilibrium in the economy involve:
(i) the labor market, (ii) the market commodity, and (iii) the household service.
There are two types of equilibria. An interior equilibrium, in which the produc-
tion levels of both x and z are strictly positive,18 and a specialized equilibrium, in
which only one sector is producing.
An interior equilibrium involves a positive price vector, (w1; w2); at which mar-
kets for male and female labor, as well as the market commodity and the household
service clear; and for which the marginal conditions for an optimum given by the
rms and the familys rst order conditions are satised.
There is a market clearing condition for each of the two goods. For every family,
maximization of utility, (3)-(7), yields a labor allocation which satises
pzz =
b
a
(t1t2)

2 ; (17)
so that household services consumed equal household services produced. Also the
market commodity production must equal the market commodity demand. As the
rms production technology is linear homogenous in employment, we can normalize
the number of rms to unity. In this case,
q = Nx (18)
holds, where
q = A [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2] and Nx = N(w1l1 + w2l2): (19)
Finally, the employment clearing conditions are as follows. If there is a solution
with a nite market commodity production, then from (16) we have that
Ae(li) = wi (20)
17The economy is competitive although there is the spillover e¤ect from household service pro-
duction to labor market productivity.
18Due to complementarity of male and female labor input in home production it follows that
when home production is operative then t1 > 0 and t2 > 0. Moreover, as we prove in proposition 2
below, an equilibrium where only one spouse spends all time in home production does not exist. If
instead, the household service could be produced separately by each adult, at least one individual
would completely specialize in this sector. This result resembles Theorem 2.3 in Becker (1991,
34).
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holds.19 Hence, (20) is a necessary condition for an interior competitive equilibrium.
Together with the constant returns assumption on Ni (not on li), (20) implies that
the competitive rm is indi¤erent about the number of workers it employs. In
equilibrium, the number of female and male workers, N1 and N2; equals the number
of families N ; i.e., N1 = N2 = N:
Substituting (11) in (20) gives the following employment clearing conditions
Al1 = w1; (21)
and
Al2 = w2: (22)
In addition, productivity of an hour of labor equals the hourly wage. In the interior
equilibrium, female and male labor supply equals female and male labor demand
when (8) equals (21), and (9) equals (22). Using li = T   ti we can derive two
equations in t1 and t2 :
A(T   t1) = b
a

2
t
 2
2
1 t

2
2 ; (23)
A(T   t2) = b
a

2
t

2
1 t
 2
2
2 : (24)
Eq. (23) and (24) states that in an equilibrium, average productivity of one hour
of labor in the workplace has to equal the marginal value product of labor in home
production.
We can now characterize an interior equilibrium as any combination of t1 and t2
which solves (23) and (24). Such a combination clears markets for male and female
labor, and supports a price vector, (w1; w2); for which also the market for x clears,
and rms earn zero prots.
4 Results
In solving the model, it this useful to dene a labor allocation for which t1 = t2
as symmetric, and one for which t1 6= t2 as asymmetric. Both cases can occur,
19If Ae(li) < wi holds, production of the consumption good is zero, and if Ae(li) > wi holds,
the rm earns positive prots.
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but by (21) and (22), only an asymmetric situation leads to a gender wage gap.
Specically, we have
Proposition 1 (Symmetric equilibrium.) If 0 <  < 1 and b
a

2A
<

T
2 
2 
 (1   )1 ; then there exist two interior symmetric equilibria. If  = 1 and
b
a
1
2A
< T; then there exists one interior symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
When t1 = t2  t; equations (23) and (24) collapse into
A(T   t) = b
a

2
t 1: (25)
In equilibrium, the average productivity of an hour of labor in the rm equals the
marginal value product of labor in home production as illustrated in g. 3.
MVP/Hourly Wage Rate
1b =
T
t
}0 1b< <
W
W
Figure 3: An illustration of symmetric equilibria. Symmetric equilibria exist in
points where the hourly wage (illustrated by the dashed WW line)
equals the marginal value product of labor in home production
(illustrated by the solid lines). Spouses are in the same intersection
point.
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The dashed WW line in g. 3 illustrates the hourly wage rate as a function of
labor used in home production (i.e. t) which satises the zero prot condition in
(16). Due to the negative spillover from household production onto productivity
at the rm, the hourly wage decreases in t. The solid lines illustrate the marginal
value product of labor in home production. The solid horizontal line illustrates
the case where  = 1. The solid curved lines represent examples for 0 <  < 1:
The innermost curved line illustrates b
a

2A
<

T
2 
2 
(1   )1  and the two
intersections with the dashed WW line illustrate the two equilibria. The uttermost
curved line illustrates a situation where b
a

2A
>

T
2 
2 
(1   )1 ; which is an
economy without an interior symmetric equilibrium, as the marginal value product
of labor in home production exceeds the hourly wage rate for all allocations of labor
resources. In this situation, only the home sector is operative.
Assume the hourly wage is such that it corresponds to one of the intersection
points between the dashed WW line and the solid curved line in g. 3. In this
case, the rms are willing to hire workers, since marginal productivity just equals
the marginal costs. Moreover, workers do not want to supply neither more nor less
labor to the rm. If they supply more (i.e., decrease their labor input into home
production), the marginal value product of labor in home production exceeds the
given hourly wage rate. If they supply less (i.e., increase their labor input into home
production), the marginal value product of labor in home production is less than
the given hourly wage rate.
The intuition behind the existence of two symmetric equilibria can be explained
as follows. When the household production function is concave in total labor input
(0 <  < 1), for small ts, the marginal value product of labor in home production
is high and larger than the corresponding average productivity of an hour of labor
in the rm, or equivalently, the hourly wage. As t increases, marginal productivity
of labor in home production decreases to a point where it is exceeded by the hourly
wage rate. As t becomes even larger, however, the negative spillover from home
production onto average productivity at the rm increases further. Eventually, the
spillover damages productivity to an extent that marginal value product of labor in
22
Chapter 1
home production again exceeds the hourly wage rate.
Likewise, in the situation where  = 1; if the hourly wage rate coincides with the
marginal value product of labor used in home production, the family is indi¤erent
as to how much labor they supply to the rm. The rm, however, is only willing to
hire labor when labor productivity is equal to, or higher than, the wage they must
pay. To the left of the intersection point in g. 3, however, rms would demand an
innite number of workers; therefore this cannot be an equilibrium. On the other
hand, when b
a
1
2A
> T; the marginal value product of labor in home production
exceeds the hourly wage for all allocations of labor resources, and all labor is used
in the home.
Similarly, we analyze the asymmetric equilibrium:
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric equilibrium.) If b
a

2A
<

T
2
2 
; then there exist
two interior asymmetric equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix.
The asymmetric solution is illustrated by g. 4. In g. 4, again the dashed
WW line illustrates decreasing hourly wages as a function of labor used in home
production. The uttermost solid line illustrates the situation where b
a

2A
>

T
2
2 
;
the situation without an interior solution. The innermost solid line intersects the
dashed line twice, and illustrates the situation where husband and wife, despite
being completely identical ex ante, allocate their labor endowments di¤erently be-
tween the home and the workplace.
Whereas in the symmetric equilibrium, each spouse allocates the same labor
to home production, and therefore an equilibrium is a situation where household
members are located in the same intersection point of the two curves in g.
3, the asymmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium, in which one family member is
locatedin one intersection point and, simultaneously, the spouse is locatedin
the other intersection point. In general, we have two possible pairings of gender and
location.Household members may allocate labor according to traditional gender
roles, or inversely.
23
Chapter 1
MVP/Hourly Wage Rate
T
t
W
W
Figure 4: Asymmetric equilibria. Asymmetric equilibria are given by the pair of
points where the hourly wage rate (illustrated by the dashed WW line)
equals the marginal value product of labor in home production
(illustrated by the solid lines). Household members are in separate
intersection points.
Proposition 3 (Multiple interior equilibria.) If an interior asymmetric equi-
librium is supported by a positive price vector (w1; w2), there exists another price
vector ( ew1; ew2) 6= (w1; w2) which supports an interior symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
By proposition 3, we establish that for some sub-interval of the parameters A;
a; and b; the model has multiple interior equilibria which results in either gender-
similarities or gender-di¤erences in labor allocation.
This result is important. It mirrors a self-fullling nature of expectations about
gender roles. The familys e¢ cient response to traditional beliefs about earnings is
to actually allocate labor as stereotypical workers. On the other hand, the familys
e¢ cient response to unisex beliefs is to allocate labor identically. Proposition 3
suggests that the persistency in the gender wage gap relates to persistency in the
24
Chapter 1
perception of the patterns of gender roles. We explore this issue further in detail in
section 5, but rst we notice that the model has interesting comparative statics for
the asymmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume the economy is in an asymmetric equilibrium. A
higher productivity level A is associated with a larger gender wage gap.
Proof. See Appendix.
For a given initial asymmetric labor allocation, we consider a situation where A
increases and, consequently, labor productivity in the rm goes up. The person with
the lower t (the most labor allocated to the rm) experiences the highest increase
in hourly wage as average productivity of an hour of labor increases in A at the
rate (T   t).
As is clear from (10), the familys e¢ cient labor allocation response to such a
change in the relative hourly wage rates is that the person, who works most at
the rm, allocates more labor to the rm, and the person, who works most at the
home, allocates more labor to the home. Hence, the person who works most in the
home ends up earning a lower wage than in the original equilibrium. In this way,
increases in A magnify any existing di¤erences productivity.
Assuming that couples predominantly exist within similar occupations,20 Propo-
sition 4 predicts that the gender wage gap is larger within families that work in
sectors with higher wage rates. Fig. 5 is a scatter plot of female/male earnings
ratio against male earnings for di¤erent occupations. Each dot in the scatter plot
represents an occupation like civil engineers, lawyers, photographers, etc. If couples
exist within similar occupations, then g. 5 conrms proposition 4: the correspond-
ing regression21 reveals a statistically signicant negative relationship between male
median weekly earnings and the gender wage ratio.
20Some empirical evidence for educational homogamy, i.e., individuals marry individuals with
similar characteristics such as occupation, education, and religion, is presented in Blossfeld and
Timm (2003).
21The intercept estimate is 92.99 (38.66) and the slope estimate is -0.02 (-5.26), where the
numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics. The fraction of the variation in the wage gap
explained by the regression is above 20 percent (R2 is 0.21).
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Figure 5: An illustration of the gender-di¤erences in earnings across occupations
in the US. The gure shows that higher male earnings within an
occupation are correlated with a larger gender wage gap, i.e., lower
womens earnings relative to those of mens. (Data from U.S.
Department of Labor 2005, table 2.)
Proposition 5. Assume the economy is in an asymmetric equilibrium. A
higher  reduces the gender wage gap if b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


.
Proof. See Appendix.
First, we analyze the situation where b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


is satised. In this case,
increases in  increase the marginal value product of labor in home production
for both household members at given labor allocations. The increase is largest,
however, for the person, who works less in the home. The benet of letting the
outside workingwork more in home production more than compensates for the
loss of home production that the home workingperson sacrices to enable the
reallocation of labor.
Due to changes in the spillover e¤ect from this reallocation of labor, also the
equilibrium wage rates are a¤ected. Since, in response to a high ; the outside
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workingperson works less out, and home workingperson works less at home,
the di¤erences in productivities at the rm diminish, and in an equilibrium, wage
rates are more equal.
The explanation for the opposite case, the situation where b
Aa
< 2

exp

 2


;
follows a similar logic. In this situation, however, the marginal value product
declines instead of increases in response to increased  for the outside working
person.Hence, the outside workingperson works even less in the home. The
home working person, in turn, works more at home, as this persons marginal
value product of labor increases. The outcome is therefore a higher wage gap.
When the weight on the household service in the utility function, b; is low relative
to the weight on the market commodity, a; the wage gap is more likely to increase
in response to higher . In this case, the initial labor allocation across spouses is
already relatively specialized in an asymmetric equilibrium. In the limit, when t of
one spouse approaches zero, increases in  diminish the marginal value product of
this persons labor in home production.
5 Welfare Analysis by Numerical Examples
The general public opinion typically favors gender equality on the labor markets
and in the home (Hakim 2004), but according to Becker (1985), welfare increases
with specialization. This result, however, is challenged in Chichilnisky (2005), as
she nds that in a society with high skill levels, equal labor division across family
members generates the highest welfare.
This section analyzes the welfare properties of the gender wage gap in the context
of the present model. Let overall welfare in society, V; be given by the sum of
household utilities and rm prots
V = Nu(x; z) +  = Nu(x; z); (26)
where the last equality follows from rms earning zero prots in equilibrium. In
the following, we can thus analyze utility levels of the representative family.
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In order to be able to compare welfare levels across di¤erent types of equilibria,
we proceed by use of numerical examples. Table 2 reports simulated symmetric
equilibria, and table 3 reports simulated asymmetric equilibria.
Table 2 Simulated Symmetric Equilibria (T = 10)
ta x z u(x; z)
b
Aa
 tl : th lb : hc l : h l : h
10 0.3 0.07 9.69 197.21 0.19 0.45 1.98 201.71 19.96
10 0.6 0.05 8.74 198.01 3.18 0.17 3.67 199.66 39.90
10 0.9 0.00 6.25 200.00 28.13 0.00 5.20 200.00 80.16
15 0.3 0.12 9.54 195.23 0.42 0.53 1.97 203.17 29.93
15 0.6 0.14 8.05 194.44 7.61 0.31 3.50 199.05 60.03
15 0.9 0.02 4.15 199.20 68.45 0.03 3.60 299.65 122.44
20 0.3 0.18 9.37 192.86 0.79 0.60 1.96 204.82 39.93
20 0.6 0.30 7.26 188.18 15.02 0.49 3.29 197.89 80.72
20 0.9 0.90 1.00 165.62 162.00 0.91 1.00 183.81 182.00
13 0.9 0.01 5.02 199.60 49.60 0.02 4.27 199.81 105.14
a Across the symmetric equilibria, tl and th are the lowand
highequilibrium values, (tl < th), of labor spent in home production
b The label lindicates values which corresponds to tl.
c The label hindicates values which corresponds to th.
The rst two rows in table 2 present di¤erent combinations of the parameters
of the model. In the next columns, labor allocation is indicated by th and tl re-
spectively, where th is the labor allocation in which spouses allocate most labor to
the home production, and tl is the lowest ditto. Also production of the market
commodity, x; of the household service, z, and welfare levels of the representative
family, are indicated for both equilibria.
We notice that the family consumes di¤erent ratios of the household service and
the market commodity across equilibria. Comparing welfare levels, however, we
nd, that utility is highest for the equilibrium in which spouses allocate most labor
to the workplace, i.e., in t = tl. This is partly due to the negative spillover e¤ect of
home production onto labor productivity at the rm. The extra production of the
market commodity more than compensates for the decline in home production.
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In table 3, we report the equilibrium in which women spend most time in the
household.22 Therefore, the gender wage gap, ; is the wife-husband wage ratio. As
in table 2, the rst rows present di¤erent combinations of parameters.
Table 3 Simulated Asymmetric Equilibrium (T = 10)
b
Aa
 ta1 : t2 x z u(x; z) 
10 0.3 9.84 : 0.16 96.85 1.07 107.56 0.00
10 0.6 9.49 : 0.51 90.32 1.60 106.37 0.00
10 0.9 8.10 : 1.90 69.22 3.42 103.43 0.06
15 0.3 9.73 : 0.27 94.75 1.16 112.08 0.00
15 0.6 9.05 : 0.95 82.81 1.91 111.41 0.01
15 0.9 - - - - - -
20 0.3 9.62 : 0.38 92.69 1.21 116.98 0.00
20 0.6 8.47 : 1.53 74.08 2.16 117.21 0.03
20 0.9 - - - - - -
13 0.9 5.42 : 4.58 50.35 4.24 105.51 0.71
a In the asymmetric equilibrium, t1 and t2 denote the labor
allocated to home production by the woman and the man respectively.
In the asymmetric equilibrium, the gender-di¤erence in labor allocation is smaller
when  is high. This is what we expect, since by proposition 5, when b
Aa
>
2

exp

2 


is fullled (which is the case when b
Aa
2 (10; 20)), the wage gap is
increasing in . Table 3 also conrms proposition 4. A higher A increases the
gender wage gap, i.e., decrease the wife-husband wage ratio.
To examine the welfare properties of the gender wage gap, we compare the
asymmetric equilibrium with the symmetric equilibria. We nd that production
of the market commodity is higher everywhere in the symmetric equilibrium in
which t = tl than in the asymmetric equilibrium. At the same time, however,
production of the household service is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium than in
this symmetric equilibrium. Yet the extra production in the formal sector makes up
for the loss of household services and welfare is higher in the symmetric equilibrium.
The simulations thus suggest that for the model presented in the present paper, a
gender wage gap is Pareto inferior in that welfare in the symmetric equilibrium
22The results equally apply to the reversed situation in which men are spending most time in
the household.
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(with least labor used in home production, i.e., t = tl ) is higher everywhere than
welfare in the asymmetric equilibrium.
The explanation for this result is that when the economy is in an interior asym-
metric equilibrium, home production su¤ers a productivity loss as family members
are not allocating identical amounts of labor input. Since labor input of each spouse
has identical factor shares, and since labor input is complementary in production,
clearly the cost minimizing labor allocation in household production is when spouses
allocate identical amounts of labor. Accordingly, in the symmetric equilibrium, to-
tal labor input in home production may be less and the asymmetric case (which is
always equal to T as t1 = T   t2 cf. the proof of proposition 2) and yet produce
more household service.
The last simulation in both tables o¤ers a parameterization which gives a gender
wage ratio which corresponds to the range of typical gender wage ratio estimates,
cf. OECD (2002).
6 Discussion
Albeit the model does not provide a priori insight as to the specic equilibrium
outcome among the possibilities of interior equilibria, a key prediction is that if
families believe that wages are stereotype, the economy will experience a gender
wage gap with women earning less than men. In this sense, the gender wage gap is
explained as a self-fullling prophecy.
A natural way for todays families to decide on labor allocation would be to use
information on yesterdayswages. If, for what could be historical and cultural
reasons, women used to be less educated than men and to participate less in the
labor force (cf. g. 1) it would have been rational that women historically earned
less than men. Hence, even though the premises, which determined the historical
labor market outcome have changed, in that today, women and men share the same
starting point to become equally productive in both the home and in the workplace,
current beliefs about earnings may be historically biased in favor of stereotype
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beliefs. This reasoning leads us to argue that persistence of the gender wage gap in
developed societies can possibly be explained by a self-fullling history biason
beliefs.
An implication of this result is that family reality and family beliefs about
earnings have to change simultaneously for the economy to move from the stereotype
asymmetric equilibrium to a unisex symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, e¤ective
policies are policies that can change norms of society.23 Without such policies
the gender wage gap is likely to persist as a rational reaction to stereotype family
beliefs about gender roles, even when there is no actual gender discrimination or
other initial di¤erences between genders.
In conformity with this analysis, table 4 demonstrates how gender roles are
viewed within British families.
Table 4 Couples Aiming for Symmetric Roles
Dual-earnera Full-time Workersb
Men Women Men Women
Percentage choosing symmetric roles 44 41 44 56
Source: Hakim (2004).
aDual-earner couples refer to households in which either spouse reports being in
employment.
bFull-time workers couples consist of full-time working husbands and wives.
The numbers suggest that the majority of couples aim for traditional gender
roles. Hakim (2004) argues that one explanation is that women regard themselves
as secondary earners, and that employment does not provide them with their central
identity.24
Another explanation of why families do not change their traditional gender role
perception can be that both men and women view equity as a relevant concept in
23Chichilnisky (2005) argues that even if the economy is in the equal wage equilibrium, further
policy measures are needed to prevent a Prisoners Dilemma game between the family and the
rm, which leads to a stereotype equilibrium outcome, from evolving.
24She also nds that families without children have a traditional division of labor.
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the workplace, but neither view the home as a workplace. Roughly speaking, if
housework is a womans labor of love,equity does not come into question. More-
over, men and women may dene certain jobs as feminine and others as masculine.
A woman is less of a woman if she does not keep the house, and the man is less of
a man if he does. If men compare themselves to other men, and women to other
women, and since the majority of households have unequal division of labor, both
the woman or the man are likely to perceive traditional gender roles as normal and
desirable (Hakim 2003; Valian 1999).
7 Concluding Remarks
Inspired by Becker (1985) and Chichilnisky (2005), this paper investigates the gen-
der wage gap. In Becker (1985), spouses gain from a division of labor between
employment and household work: one specializes in employment and the other spe-
cializes at home. Such a division raises the productivity of both persons in both
sectors and a gender wage gap is Pareto e¢ cient. Chichilnisky (2005) uses a logistic
production function specication in both sectors, which changes from convexity to
concavity through an inection point. Within this framework, Chichilnisky (2005)
shows that Beckers Pareto e¢ ciency result only holds for economies that are in the
convex region, i.e., economies with a low skilled labor force. In economies which
belong to the concave region, i.e., advanced economies, equal wages and equal labor
allocation are Pareto e¢ cient.
Like Becker (1985) and Chilchinisky (2005), we study an economy where male
and female workers are ex ante identical except from gender. We show that changing
the properties of the household production, so that it invokes complementarity of
spousal labor in home production, while maintaining Beckers specialization gains
(what we refer to as indivisibility e¤fects) of labor input in the workplace, may also
lead to multiplicity of equilibria in which familiesbeliefs about the gender wage
gap are self-fullling. If family members believe that women earn less than men,
ex post, intra-household labor allocation justies such beliefs. We therefore argue
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that womens past records on the labor market may have severe implications for the
labor market outcome today, which are not easily overcome. Indeed, our welfare
analysis reveals potential welfare gains to closing the gender wage gap. In this way,
we show that the Pareto e¢ ciency result in Chichilnisky (2005), also holds in a
model where home production is Cobb-Douglas even when there are specialization
gains in the rm sector.
Naturally, the approach to explaining the gender wage gap o¤ered by the present
model hopes just to o¤er a small piece of the gender wage gap puzzle. Besides the
large literature that concerns di¤erences in human capital accumulation, a literature
largely initiated by Becker (1985), others have suggested that di¤erences in wages
can be attributed to a theory of male-dominated institutions,or preference theory
suggesting that women prefer to prioritize household tasks (Hakim 2004). Gender
di¤erences in networking (Montgomery 1991), and statistical discrimination (Moro
and Norman 2003, 2004), may also lead to di¤erences in wage rates.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When t1 = t2  t; equation (23) and (24) collapse into
(T   t)t1  = b
Aa

2
: (27)
(This is eq. (25) in the main text.)
In general, a solution to (27) exists when the right hand side, which is para-
metrically given, is smaller than, or equal to, the maximum value of the left hand
side.
When  < 1; the left hand side is an inversely U-shaped polynomial with
a unique maximum that is positively skewed. The maximum is found by rst
di¤erentiating the left hand side with respect to t, then setting this expression equal
to zero, and nally isolate for t : @(T t)t
1 
@t
= 0 ) t  T   2t+ (t  T ) = 0 ,
T

1 
2 

= t: Substituting this expression back into (27) determines the maximum
value of the left hand side as of this equation a function of ; argmax
t
(T   t)t1  =
T
2 
2 
(1  )1 : Hence, in an interior equilibrium b
Aa

2


T
2 
2 
(1  )1 
must be satised. When the equation holds with equality, there is exactly one
solution, otherwise there are two solutions.
When  = 1 the left hand side of (27) is linear and equal to (T   t): Hence, the
maximum is given when t = 0; so argmax
t
(T   t) = T : For an interior equilibrium
to exist, b
a
1
2A
< T: 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
An interior equilibrium is given when (23) and (24) are satised simultaneously.
Dividing (23) and (24) means T t1
T t2 =
t2
t1
must hold. Rewriting this expression yields
Tt1   t21 = Tt2   t22 , T (t1   t2) = t21   t22 , T (t1   t2) = (t1 + t2)(t1   t2) )
t1 + t2 = T for t1 6= t2:
Substituting t1 = T   t2 back into either (23) or (24), rearrange and solve for t2
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gives
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
: (28)
Eq. (28) is a second-order polynomial. By inspection we nd that the shape of the
left hand side is a symmetric parabola for which argmax
t2
(T   t2)t2 =

T
2
2
. The
left hand side is a constant larger than zero. If b
Aa

2
>

T
2
2 
; then there is no
solution to (28), and if b
Aa

2
=

T
2
2 
; then there is one solution (t1 = t2 = T2 );
and if b
Aa

2
<

T
2
2 
; then there are exactly two solutions satisfying t1 6= t2. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By proposition 1, b
Aa

2


T
2 
2 
(1 )1  and b
Aa
1
2
< T are necessary conditions
for an interior symmetric equilibrium when 0 <  < 1 and when  = 1 respectively.
The interior symmetric equilibrium is supported by a positive price vector which
we denote ( ew1; ew2): By proposition 2, bAa 2 < T22  is a necessary condition for an
interior asymmetric equilibrium, which is supported by another price vector which
we denote (w1; w2).
We want to prove that when there exists an asymmetric equilibrium, then there
also exists a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., that
T
2
2 


T
2  
2 
(1  )1  8 0 <  < 1; (29)
and 
T
2

 T 8  = 1: (30)
We prove each in turn. First, simplify (29) to get
1
2
2 


1
2  
2 
(1  )1 :
Let LHS   1
2
2 
and RHS 

1
2 
2 
(1  )1 :We examine LHS and RHS
for  ! 0 and  ! 1 respectively.
LHS
!0
=
1
4
and LHS
!1
=
1
2
;
RHS
!0
=
1
4
and RHS
!1
= 1:
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Hence, in the limits RHS  LHS: In order to study monotonicity, we rst take
logs:
ln(LHS) = (2  ) ln

1
2

;
ln(RHS) = (1  ) ln (1  ) + (   2) ln(2  );
and then we take the derivative with respect to :
@[ln(LHS)]
@
= ln (2) > 0;
@[ln(RHS)]
@
=   ln (1  ) + ln(2  ) > 0:
Hence, both sides of (29) are monotonically increasing. Furthermore,
@2[ln(LHS)]
@2
= 0;
@2[ln(RHS)]
@2
=
1
(1  ) (2  ) > 0:
We can thus conclude, that if an interior asymmetric equilibrium exists, then also
an interior symmetric equilibrium exists for 0 <  < 1:
Second, simplify (30) to get
1
2
 1;
which is true: 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From the proof of proposition 2, we have that an interior asymmetric equilibrium
must satisfy
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
; (31)
where T   t2 = t1:
Di¤erentiate the right hand side with respect to A to get
@
 
b
Aa

2
 2
2 
@A
=

b
a

2
 2
2 
(
2
   2)A
2
 2 1 < 0;
which means that an increase in A shifts down the right hand side of (31).
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The left hand side of (31) is an inverted U-shapedparabola, and therefore the
distance between the values of (T   t2) and t2 which solves the system increases as
A increases.
The wage gap is given as a function of t2 and t1 by (10): w1w2 =
t2
t1
. The more t1
and t2 di¤ers, the higher the gender wage gap. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
From the proof of proposition 2, we have that an interior asymmetric equilibrium
must satisfy
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
(32)
where T   t2 = t1:
In order to analyze the e¤ect of a change in  we take logs on both sides of this
equation:
ln(T   t2) + ln(t2) = 2
2  

ln

b
2Aa

+ ln()

:
The left hand side does not depend on : For the right hand side we nd that
@
n
2
2 

ln
 
b
2Aa

+ ln()
o
@
=
2
2  

1
2  

ln

b
2Aa

+ ln()

+
1


:
As 0 <   1; ln() is non-positive, and ln   b
2Aa

< 0 if b
2Aa
< 1; we can conclude
that
@f 22  [ln( b2Aa)+ln()]g
@
> 0 only if b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


: Again, the left hand side
of (32) is an inverted U-shapedparabola, and therefore the distance between the
values of (T   t2) and t2 which solves the system decreases as  increases when
b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


.
The wage gap is given as a function of t2 and t1 by (10): w1w2 =
t2
t1
. The more t1
and t2 di¤ers, the higher the gender wage gap. 
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Abstract
During recent decades, the notion of a resource curse seems to have be-
come increasingly widespread among economists. Yet endogenous growth
theory generally suggests that greater endowments provide better opportu-
nities for economic growth. Theory alone, however, cannot tell us, a priori,
if or when natural resources are a curse. We examine recent empirical work
to answer the following questions: How is natural resource abundance cor-
related with economic growth? In particular, does it matter what types of
natural resources are considered, and does it matter how natural resources
are measured? What are the pathways through which natural resources im-
pact growth? In addition, we present a simple cross sectional analysis which
suggests that the size of the combined agricultural and forestry industry rel-
ative to GDP is negatively correlated with growth, whereas neither the size
of the mining industry nor of the shing industry relative to GDP seems to
have any systematic relationship with growth.
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1 Introduction
The role of natural resources in economic development and economic growth is the
subject of a large literature that roughly can be grouped into two. One strand is
concerned with neo-Malthusian topics: Can humankind sustain current consump-
tion and welfare levels as the natural environment gets further depleted? The other
strand is concerned with topics that relate to the idea of a resource curse: Can a
diametrical relationship between economic growth and natural resource abundance
be avoided?
The focus of this paper is on the second subject, and, in particular, on what
can be concluded from the growing body of empirical work. It appears, as Wright
and Czelusta (2002, 2) put it, that resource-based economic growth has had a bad
press for some time.Yet the large variation in how natural resources are measured,
in what types of natural resources are considered, and in how natural resources are
suggested to interfere with growth, complicates cross-study comparisons. Therefore,
the purpose of this paper is to o¤er a comprehensive review of recent empirical
results. Especially, we seek to answer the following questions: How is natural
resource abundance correlated with economic growth? In particular, does it matter
what types of natural resources are considered, and does it matter how natural
resources are measured? What are the pathways through which natural resources
and growth are potentially correlated?
We nd, based on a survey of 17 studies, that more studies show evidence that
point resources (resources with a high value concentration) are negatively corre-
lated with growth than evidence that di¤use resources (resources with a scattered
value concentration) are negatively correlated with growth. Almost all studies that
examine non-di¤erentiated resources, i.e., all primary products, nd a negative re-
lationship between growth and natural resource abundance.
An important factor in these results, however, seems to be how natural resource
abundance is measured. Measured in relative terms, such as relative to the overall
size of the economy, natural resources seem consistently negatively correlated with
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growth performance. In sharp contrast to this result, is the little empirical evidence
to support that absolute levels of natural resources have a negative impact on
growth.
Pathways that link natural resources and economic growth are numerous. Point
resources appear to cast their curse through weakened human capital accumulation,
damaged institutional quality, increased debt, and worsened terms of trade, but, at
the same time there is also evidence that point resources bless growth through
better institutional quality. Also di¤use resources are found to both harm and
benet institutional quality.
This survey of the resource curse literature is not the rst of its kind. Stevens
(2003) provides an excellent review of the literature with special attention to theories
of transmission mechanisms, and Wright and Czelusta (2004) scrutinize the idea of
a resource curse by means of historical and case-based evidence, focusing, however,
purely on mineral resources. The present paper, in contrast, draws only sporadic
links to the theoretical literature and does not have a historical perspective beyond
that of the period in which growth is examined; which typically means the last half of
the twentieth century. Instead, the aim is to collect and organize recent empirical
evidence in a manner so that the resource curse or perhaps the lack hereof, can
be characterized. We limit the scope of the analysis to the question of whether
the resource impact has a positive, a negative, or no correlation with growth; the
magnitude of the impact is not considered.
To supplement the survey, we look at data. Specically, we examine how the
value added by di¤erent natural resource industries relative to GDP is correlated
with economic growth. We nd that size of the combined agricultural and forestry
industry relative to GDP is negatively correlated with growth performance, whereas
neither the relative size of the mining nor the shing industry seems to have any
systematic impact on growth. These results are in conformity with a few studies
included in the survey, but seem to diverge from the general pattern.A general
pattern of how various types of natural resources impacts growth, however, is not
easily established.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents further motivation
for why an appraisal of di¤erent natural resource types and measures of natural
resource abundance is likely to be an important tool in unraveling if, and how,
natural resources are correlated with growth. In section 3, we survey 17 empirical
studies on the resource curse after rst establishing their relationship to earlier
empirical results. We pay special attention to how natural resources are measured
and how they interact with growth. On this basis, we report stylized results of the
resource impact in section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis, and the nal
section provides concluding remarks.
2 Natural Resource Measures and Types
At least two immediate tasks arise in the attempt to empirically examine the re-
source curse: the rst is to decide which measure to use for natural resource abun-
dance, and the second is to clarify the type of the natural resource(s) under suspi-
cion.
2.1 How to Measure Natural Resource Abundance?
The empirical literature typically measures natural resource abundance in two ways:
either by the value of production (or exports) of natural resources relative to GDP
(or exports), or by absolute levels of production, exports, or reserves. In the follow-
ing we refer to the rst measures as proxies of relative natural resource abundance,
and to the latter measures as proxies of the absolute natural resource abundance:
Relative abundance measure:
natural resources measured relative to the size of the economy or exports.
Absolute abundance measure:
natural resources measured as endowments, reserves, or production.
Stijns (2005, 110) notes: there is no theoretical reason to believe that results
obtained by using one type of resource abundance indicator would necessarily extend
the results reached using another type of such indicator.
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The likely importance of this dichotomy can be motivated by a simple illustra-
tion. Durlauf et al. (2005) identify 15 growth miraclesand 15 growth disasters.
The growth miracles are the countries which in 1960-2000 have had the highest an-
nual growth rate, and the growth disasters are the countries with the lowest ditto.
Table 1 presents the growth estimates of Durlauf et al. (2005) along with each
nations per capita natural resource wealth divided into six natural resource types
as estimated by World Bank (2006).1
The last column presents all natural resource wealth in total wealth. Median
and the average values for each group of countries are also calculated and included
in the table. One di¤erence in the natural resource abundance pattern between the
two groups of countries is striking: as a share of total wealth, the growth miracles
have substantially less natural resource wealth than the growth disasters. On av-
erage, growth miracles have eight percent of all their wealth in natural resources,
whereas growth disasters have on average seven times as much: 43 percent. Yet no
di¤erences in the endowments of the individual resources between the two groups
appear distinct. The most valuable natural resource for the growth miracles is
cropland and pastureland; forest resources and protected areas play a smaller role.
There is substantial variation in whether growth miracles have subsoil assets, but,
on average, subsoil assets are their third largest source of natural wealth.
Also the group of growth disasters has substantial wealth in cropland and a
large variation in subsoil assets. The median subsoil wealth of this group is less
than the median subsoil wealth of the growth miracles, and ve countries have no
subsoil wealth compared to only four countries in the growth miracles group. In
addition, the median growth disaster country has less natural resource wealth than
the median growth miracle country.
1Unfortunately, World Bank (2006) estimates are incomplete for two of the biggest growth
winners: Taiwan and Hong Kong, and for two of the biggest growth losers: Congo and Angola.
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Table 1 Annual Growth and Per Capita Natural Resource Wealth in 2000
Growth
1960-2000 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Taiwan 6.3 0 0 - 0 - - - -
Botswana 6.1 246 172 1681 299 55 730 3183 8
Hong Kong 5.7 0 0 - 0 0 0 - -
Korea, R. 5.4 33 0 30 441 1241 275 2020 1
Singapore 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 4.5 469 92 55 855 2370 96 3936 11
Cyprus 4.3 32 7 67 0 1757 929 2794 -
Japan 4.1 28 38 56 364 710 316 1513 0
Ireland 4.1 385 222 51 172 1583 8122 10534 3
China 4.0 511 106 29 27 1404 146 2223 24
Romania 3.9 1222 290 65 175 1602 1154 4508 15
Mauritius 3.9 0 0 3 0 577 62 642 1
Malaysia 3.8 6922 438 188 161 1369 24 9103 19
Portugal 3.5 41 438 107 385 1724 934 3629 2
Indonesia 3.3 1549 346 115 167 1245 50 3472 25
Mean (growth miracles) 763 143 188 203 1117 917 3658 8
Median (growth miracles) 41 92 56 167 1307 210 3183 3
Peru 0.0 934 153 570 98 1480 341 3575 9
Mauritania -0.1 1311 14 29 21 1128 480 2982 37
Senegal -0.3 4 238 147 78 608 196 1272 13
Chad -0.4 0 311 366 80 787 316 1861 42
Mozambique -0.5 0 340 392 9 261 57 1059 25
Madagascar -0.6 0 174 171 36 955 345 1681 33
Zambia -0.6 134 276 716 78 477 98 1779 27
Mali -0.8 0 121 276 44 1420 295 2157 41
Venezuela -0.9 23302 0 464 1793 1086 581 27227 60
Niger -1.0 1 9 58 152 1598 187 1975 53
Nigeria -1.2 2639 270 24 6 1022 78 4040 147a)
Nicaragua -1.3 9 475 146 184 867 410 2092 16
C. Afr. R. -1.6 0 427 1397 641 839 370 3673 61
Angola -2.0 5602 306 1276 31 395 204 7813 -
Congo -4.0 0 0 - 5 278 7 - -
Mean (growth disasters) 2262 208 429 217 880 264 4513 43
Median (growth disasters) 4 238 321 78 867 295 2124 37
Source: Durlauf et al. (2005) and World Bank (2006).
Note: (1): Subsoil assets; (2): Timber resources; (3): Non-timber forest product; (4): Protected
areas; (5): Cropland; (6): Pastureland; (7): All natural wealth; and (8): All natural wealth as
percentage of total wealth (The sum of natural, produced and intangible wealth). Figures
in (1)-(7) are in dollars per capita and in (8) in percent.
a)Natural wealth can exceed total wealth when another wealth component, intangible capital,
is negative. For a detailed explanation, consult World Bank (2006, ch. 2).
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Thus, this simple illustration suggests that the growth disasters are not charac-
terized by high absolute natural resource endowments, but rather by a high share
of natural resource wealth in total wealth, i.e., high relative natural resource abun-
dance.2
Among the 17 studies included in this survey, most use a relative natural re-
source abundance measure. As some studies discuss, this measure may, however,
su¤er from endogeneity problems: high relative natural resource abundance can
be a result of general underdevelopment. The following example is taken from Ng
(2006, 2): Suppose there is an exogenous time-invariant factor called institutional
quality, which has a positive e¤ect on GDP growth but a negative impact on natural
resource exports. Over a long time horizon, countries with poor institutional qual-
ity will exhibit lower GDP levels and higher resource exports than those with better
institutional quality. Therefore, the resource dependency ratio . . . in the former
countries will be higher than that in the latter countries. If we use the resource
dependency ratio as a proxy for resource abundance, then we would tend to nd
a negative correlation between output growth and resource abundance. But this
negative relationship is driven by institutional quality, and not by natural resource
abundance.
A similar concern is shared by Stijns (2005). He (ibid., 108) argues that mea-
suring natural resource abundance by relative abundance is an issue of concern in
that relative abundance, and Stijns quotes Wright (2001), may serve primarily as
proxies for development failure, for any number of reason that may have little to
do with the character of the resources themselves.
2.2 How to Classify Natural Resource Types?
Whereas a part of the empirical literature treats natural resources as one aggregate
resource, others distinguish between di¤erent types of natural resources. This sec-
tion provides a brief guide to di¤erent ways natural resources can be classied in
2Heal and Chichilnisky (1991, 103) make a related observation. They argue that nations which
have a high share of oil in GDP (e.g., Middle-East nations) have a growth pattern that replicates
the pattern of the oil price.
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relation to economic development.
Generally, a commodity is considered a natural resource when the primary ac-
tivities associated with it are extraction and purication. Thus, mining, petroleum
extraction, shing, and forestry are natural resource industries. Often, however,
the denition of natural resources is more casual and refers to all primary prod-
ucts, and includes also agriculture and horticulture industries such as in the recent
World Bank (2006) statement of the wealth of nations, in which, natural resources
are divided into six di¤erent groups: subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber
forest products, protected areas, cropland, and pastureland.
A classical natural resource type classication is based on availability: the dis-
tinction between renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable resources are
regenerated within a time span relevant to man,3 such as timber, sh, wildlife, and
agricultural produce, whereas non-renewable resources are not, such as oil, gas,
coal, and diamonds. This property conditions how a particular natural resource is
optimally exploited and managed,4 and is at the core of a large literature on sus-
tainability.5 A central aspect of renewable resources is that overextraction prevents
regeneration and causes deterioration. This can be fatal to the economy and was
arguably the reason behind the collapse, a complete growth disaster, of the Easter
Island civilization around 1400 A.D. as demonstrated by Brander and Taylor (1998).
Overextraction problems of natural resources, also known as the tragedy of
the commons, can in addition be related to the institutional properties of the
resource. Institutional properties concern whether the resource is excludable or non-
excludable. The degree of excludability is determined by existence and enforcement
of property rights. Classical non-excludable resources are common grazing land
and the stocks of sh and wildlife. Chichilnisky (1994) argues that poorly dened
property rights on natural resources in resource rich poor countries may (falsely)
3Assuming sustainable harvest methods that allow regeneration.
4See, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
5The sustainability literature especially emphasizes that considerations of the well-being of
future generations should play an important role in how natural resources, in particular, non-
renewable resources, are managed today (Hartwick 1977; Solow 1986).
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look like a comparative advantage in resource intensive goods. Trade between such
countries and countries with well dened property rights leads to over-extraction of
the natural resource.
In the context of the resource curse literature, a problem with the institutional
property classication is that while in principle a resource can be assigned property
rights, in practice, the cost of enforcing those property rights can be extremely high
due to massive contest from rent seekers. This additional consideration speaks in
support of a classication system which is based on how easily a resource can be
appropriated.
Appropriability in part depends on the institutional properties and in part on the
availability properties of the resource: A number of renewable resources are spread
over large geographical areas, which makes it di¢ cult to enforce an ownership; i.e.,
tend to make them non-excludable. In turn, however, their value is scattered over
large areas and thus they are poor targets for rent seeking. This type of natural
resources is therefore also called di¤use resources. Point resources, in turn, are
concentrated in narrow geographical areas; e.g., non-renewable resources such as
minerals and oil, but also plantation produce such as timber, sugar, and banana.
In contrast to di¤use resources, point resources have high values concentrated in
small areas and they are consequently easy targets for rent seeking, corruption, and
conicts.6
3 The Empirical Literature
The notion of a resource curseis not new; it dates back in history. The decline
of Spains prosperity after its colonization of the New World and discovery of large
amounts of gold and other precious metals is a classical example. And even before
this era, philosophers were concerned over the impact of great wealth on a soci-
ety(Stevens 2003, 5). Yet it is apparently not until after World War II that the
economics literature begins to argue that there may be a systematic negative rela-
6For a detailed classication of natural resources in relation to conicts, consult Lujala (2003)
and Boschini et al. (2005).
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tionship between natural resource abundance and economic performance.7 And it
is not until even later that empirical evidence, which suggests a negative connection
between natural resource abundance and economic growth, emerges. Chichilnisky
and Heal (1986, 43) present evidence that, in the period 1973-1982, middle-income
oil exporters on average grew less than middle-income oil importers. In some years,
1960-70, however, the situation was reversed. This nding is explained within a
North-South trade model, originally presented in Chichilnisky (1981). By examin-
ing the situation where the South is characterized by duality in production (i.e.,
large variation in factor input ratios across sectors) and abundant labor (i.e., a
highly elastic labor supply), Chichilnisky shows that increased export by the South
may lead to worsened terms of trade and less growth the South. If one interprets
the basic goodas a natural resource, the model predicts a resource curse type
of situation. Indeed, the model is extended in this direction in subsequent work.
For instance, Chichilnisky et al. (1984) introduce oil as a separate factor input
which is exported by the South. In order to produce the oil, the South needs a
nancial transfer. The paper illustrates that when the South expands its oil sector,
by borrowing foreign capital, the terms of trade can be worsened for the South
(the opposite may also happen). In succeeding work, which among others includes
Heal and Chichilnisky (1991), the growth performance of oil-exporting countries
relative to that of oil-importing countries is further scrutinized. In addition to
the pattern already explained in Chichilnisky and Heal (1986), the authors observe
that high-income oil exporters went from having the highest growth rate in 1973
to the slowest growth rate in 1982. Chichilnisky and Heal (ibid., 103-4) argue that
a possible explanation is that high-income oil exporters have a high relative share
of natural resource (oil) revenues in GDP, and hence these economies followed the
fate of the oil sector. The oil sector, in turn, followed the fate of oil prices.
Another early contribution to the empirical evidence relating to the resource
7Initially concern was with the impact that exports of primary products could have on the
terms of trade and the lack of linkages generated by primary product exports compared to those
of manufacturing. Following the oil-chocks in the 1970s, also theoretical literature on the Dutch
disease begins to emerge. For a detailed review of these theories, consult Stevens (2003).
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curse is Auty (1993). Auty also nds that in 1960-83, on average, mineral and oil
exporters had lower growth rates than other middle-incomecountries. Focusing
in particular on selected mineral economies, Auty argues, among other things, that
an overcondence in the ability of the mineral sectors to spur future economic
development prevented development of a competitive economic diversication.
The current generation of resource curse literature is largely sparked by the in-
uential papers of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997)8 in which the authors observe
what they call a conceptual puzzle; namely, that natural resource abundance
seems to have adverse e¤ects on growth. While the earlier literature has already
hinted at a negative relation between natural resource abundance and economic
growth, Sachs and Warner appears to be the rst who, in order to compare the role
of natural resource abundance in economic growth across a large number of coun-
tries, perform a cross sectional analysis.9 Since then, more studies on the resource
curse have followed this approach. We limit the scope of our survey to empiri-
cal work produced after Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), and to empirical results
which stem from cross sectional regressions.10 Hence, common to all studies in this
survey is that they have annual growth in GDP per capita, or per economically
active population, as dependent variable,11 and some measure of natural resource
abundance among the independent variables. Special emphasis is put on examining
how natural resource abundance is correlated with economic growth; what types of
natural resources are considered; how natural resources are measured; and on iden-
tifying the pathways through which natural resources and growth are potentially
correlated.
Each study is in the following grouped according to the particular pathway which
8Sachs and Warner (1997) is essentially an updated version of Sachs and Warner (1995).
9In the context of Barro (1991).
10In practice, this means we omit results from panel estimations in our survey. Among the 17
studies which we review, the few studies that consider panel estimations, however, also report
cross sectional results.
11Although it has been argued by Neumayer (2004) that this is to analyze the wrong term.
Instead he suggests that growth in genuine income, i.e., GDP minus the depreciation of produced
and natural income, is the right measure. Neumayer nds, than genuine income growth and
natural resource abundance appears to be negatively correlated too. In fact, the resource curse
seems somewhat more severe for genuine income growth than for GDP growth.
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relates natural resource abundance to growth: Dutch disease; institutions, conicts,
and social infrastructure; other pathways; and no pathways. Some papers have
a theoretical model to motivate their empirical approach, whereas others purely
focus on the empirics. In addition to the general survey below, table A1 in the
appendix provides a list of the selected 17 studies contained in our survey, along
with information about the growth period considered and the sample sizes used by
each study.
3.1 Dutch disease
Theories of Dutch disease generally focus on explaining a negative relationship
between natural resource abundance and productivity levels, appreciation of the
real exchange rate, and declining growth rates (e.g., Corden and Neary 1982; van
Wijnbergen 1985; Krugman 1987; Torvik 2001; Frederiksen 2007).
3.1.1 Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997)
In their seminal paper, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) consider a theoretical Dutch
disease model in which learning by doing is purely generated in the manufacturing
(traded) sector. An increase in resource intensity leads to increased demand for
non-traded goods and accordingly to a movement of labor from the traded sector
into the non-traded sector. As the traded sector shrinks, subsequent growth rates
decline.
In their empirical analysis, Sachs and Warner examine the relationship between
natural resource abundance and growth. Natural resources are dened in the broad
sense as primary products and measured by a measure of relative natural resource
abundance: the ratio of primary product exports to GNP (SXP) in 1970. Including
a number of variables, such as initial income, institutional quality, openness, in-
equality, terms of trade volatility, and investments in their growth regression, SXP
remains signicant and negative. As a robustness test of the measure of natural
resource abundance, Sachs and Warner also consider: the share of mineral produc-
tion in GDP in 1971, the fraction of primary exports in total exports in 1971, and
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the log of land area per person in 1971; all of which also seem to be negatively
associated with subsequent growth.
As an attempt to unravel how natural resources exercise their impact on growth,
Sachs and Warner examine if natural resources, besides the direct impact, have an
indirect impact that works through the control variables. It seems, however, that
the evidence of any indirect e¤ects is vague, and, in magnitude, less important than
the direct e¤ects. Accordingly, their analysis appears to demonstrate that natural
resource abundance belongs to the list of variables which have a direct negative
impact on growth.
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) o¤er little insight into how this relationship can
be explained. An interpretation near at hand is therefore that natural resources
are bad for growth per se. Sachs and Warner stress, however, that this would
be a misinterpretation and warn against precipitate discrimination against natural
resource industries.
3.1.2 Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega (1999)
Gylfason et al. (1999) also present a theoretical Dutch disease model. Their hypoth-
esis is that the size of the primary sector inuences growth negatively by preventing
a secondarytraded sector, in which all learning by doing is generated, to expand.
To test this theory empirically, as their measure for natural resource abundance,
they use the share of primary production in the labor force in 1970. Controlling
for initial income, investments, primary and secondary education, external debt,
exchange rate volatility, and using an African dummy, they nd that the size of
the labor force in the primary sector is negatively (albeit only signicantly when
external debt is left out of the regression) correlated with growth. They also nd
that once a measure for natural resource abundance is included in the regression,
the importance and signicance of the education variables decreases. Gylfason et
al. give two possible explanations: If indeed a large primary sector prevents a sec-
ondary learning by doing generating sector, there is only little need for human
capital, and education has no impact on growth. Moreover, if education is initially
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poor, no secondarysector will emerge, and only the primary sector remains.
As a second test of the role of natural resource abundance in growth, Gylfason
et al. use the share of primary exports in total export in 1970. The matching regres-
sions indicate that this measure of natural resource abundance too is signicantly
negatively correlated with economic growth. Like the primary labor share measure,
once introduced into the regression, the education variables lose their signicance.
Gylfason et al. do not include a proxy for intuitional quality in their regression.
One could speculate, therefore, that a reason why they nd that a large primary
sector is negatively related to growth, is that a large primary sector is a sign of
underdevelopment of other sectors, which have been relatively more damaged by
poor institutions than the primary sector. Moreover, a common remark applies to
both of the models of Dutch disease presented above. Both assume that growth
purely takes its rise in a traded sector. Later (theoretical) work, e.g., Torvik (2001),
argues that there may be reason to think that also the non-traded sector generates
learning by doing. In this case, the hypothesis is that long-run growth is una¤ected
by altered resource abundance. As demonstrated in Frederiksen (2007), however,
this result is vulnerable to issues of endogenous labor supply.
3.2 Institutions, Conicts, and Social Infrastructure
A large share of the general resource curse literature is related to issues of political
economy. Natural resources are, for instance, linked to political instability (Collier
and Hoe­ er 2004; Ross 2001, 2004) and ine¤ective governance (Tornell and Lane
1999; Robinson and Torvik 2004).
3.2.1 Leite and Weidmann (1999)
Leite andWeidmann (1999) examine if mother nature corrupts.First, they present
a formal neoclassical growth model in which rms must bribe the government in
order to be able produce. This model demonstrates that the optimal level of cor-
ruption increases with capital intensity in production, but at a decreasing rate, and
that a higher level of corruption leads to slower growth towards the steady state.
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Interpreting increased natural resource abundance as a positive technology shock,
the net e¤ect from increased natural resource intensity depends on the trade-o¤
between the positive productivity chock and higher levels of corruption. Moreover,
countries which have higher initial capital levels are marginally less harmed by an
increase in corruption.
In testing these predictions, Leite and Weidmann account for endogeneity of
corruption by estimating a two equation system. First, they estimate the e¤ect
of natural resource abundance on corruption, and, second, the e¤ect of corruption
and a direct e¤ect from natural resources on growth. Arguing that di¤erent natural
resources industries may have di¤erent e¤ects on corruption and growth, for instance
because they di¤er in capital intensity, natural resources are divided into fuel and
ores- and agriculture and food exports as a share of GDP in 1970 after it has been
tested that the coe¢ cients of the two types of resources within each group are not
signicantly di¤erent in the corruption regression.Fuel and ores have a signicant
negative impact on corruption (increases corruption), whereas agriculture and food
have signicant positive e¤ect. In the growth regression,low levels of corruption
are signicantly positively correlated with growth.
In addition to via corruption, natural resources are also directly included in
the growth regression. When measured by SXP in 1970 they remain negatively
associated with growth as in Sachs and Warner (1995). Decomposing SXP into
separate types of natural resources in the growth regression reveals, that the only
signicant resource is food, which is negatively correlated with growth. Why only
food impacts growth remains an open question left for future research.
3.2.2 Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)
While Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) pay special attention to the case of
Nigeria, they also examine the resource curse hypothesis for a larger sample of
countries. Inspired in part by the work of Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu
et al. (2001), they reconsider the idea, which is empirically rejected in Sachs and
Warner (1995), that somehow natural resource abundance has an adverse e¤ect on
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institutions, and in this way (also) indirectly hinders growth.
As their measure of natural resource abundance they use both SXP in 1970
and 1980, as well as four other measures: the share of the exports in fuel, ores
and metal, agricultural raw materials, and food in GDP and in total exports; the
share of the exports of all natural resources in total exports; and a dummy for oil
producing countries. To address the problem of potential endogeneity, they use
initial values of the natural resource measure as independent variables in 1970 and
1980 respectively.
Treating natural resources as undi¤erentiated (SXP), and controlling for insti-
tutions using instruments such the fraction of the population which speaks English
and European languages, they nd no evidence that natural resource abundance is
directly negatively correlated with economic growth. The sign of the coe¢ cients
of the two natural resource variables change over the two periods, and the vari-
ables, besides, are insignicant. Instead, a signicant negative relationship between
SXP and the rule of law suggests an indirect negative e¤ect from natural resources
onto institutional quality, which does not show up in the growth regressions once
institutions are controlled for.
Among the di¤erentiated natural resource types, agricultural and food gener-
ally have no inuence on either growth or institutions. Minerals and fuel, on the
other hand, are negatively correlated with both growth and institutions. Indeed,
even after introducing regional dummies, mineral and fuel remain signicantly neg-
atively correlated with institutional quality. The oil dummy is positively correlated
with growth, and negatively correlated with institutions, but the robustness of this
nding not tested by regional dummies.
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) perform a range of further tests. In
particular, they nd that the growth impact from mineral abundance is non-linear:
oil corrupts and excess oil corrupts more than excessively,and their results are
robust to choices of di¤erent control variables and measures of intuitional quality.
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3.2.3 Olsson (2003)
Olsson (2003) pays special attention to one particular point resource: diamonds.
Olsson (ibid., 2) argues that diamonds play a special role as targets for conicts
due to their extremely high price, their e¢ cient convertibility to money or arms,
their small practical size, their indestructibility, and the di¢ culty with which their
origin can be established.
He presents a predator-prey model, in which there is a battle over a resource.
On one side, the ruler seeks to defend the resource so its rents can be used on
public utilities,and on the other hand a rebelseeks to control the resource to
the rebelsown benet. When natural resource abundance is not high enough,
the rulersdefense expenses crowd out public utilitiesand growth declines as
the resource gets more abundant. At a certain level, however, higher resource
abundance increases income of the rulerenough that the rulercan spend more
on public utilities,which in turn leads to an increase in growth. This trade-o¤
predicts a U-shaped relationship between growth and natural resource abundance.
In his empirical test, Olsson uses three di¤erent measures of diamond abundance:
the value of diamond production as a share of GDP in 1999,12 averaged annual
production (1990-99) per sq km, and the value of production (in 2000) per sq km.
Olsson argues that the advantage of the latter is that they are not related to GDP,
and the diamond measure is thus more likely to be exogenous.13 His empirical
results indicate a convex relationship between diamond abundance and growth; i.e.,
countries with only little diamonds are cursed, and countries (Botswana) rich in
diamonds are blessed. This relationship holds for all di¤erent diamond abundance
specications.
One apparent problem with Olssons test is that the results seem to be vulnerable
with respect to the sample size. Once Botswana is excluded, the U-shape no longer
12The value of the production of diamonds is based on prices in 2000 and production quantity
in 1999.
13Olsson (2003) argues that these two measures are truly exogenous.One may argue, however,
that production could be endogenous in that richer countries are likely to have put more e¤ort
into locating diamond reserves.
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holds. Instead, a linear negative relationship between diamonds prevails. In this
case, his results are back in the Sachs and Warner (1995) framework, arguing a
direct negative relationship between diamond abundance and economic growth.
3.2.4 Murshed (2004)
Also Murshed (2004) have point resources under suspicion. He considers rent seek-
ing a likely explanation that this type of natural resources damages growth, and
presents a neoclassical growth model, in which rent seeking activity, contest,dam-
ages capital productivity. Rent seeking activity is likely to be higher, the higher
the value of the resources, i.e., higher for point resources than for di¤use resources.
His hypothesis is that democracies decrease the success rate in rent seeking.
In a two equation estimation, he rst estimates the e¤ect of point and di¤use
resources on democracy, and then the e¤ect of democracy on growth, so that democ-
racy is endogenously determined by the natural resources. As his measure of natural
resources he uses a dummy coded 1 for point resources, if a countrys major export
is a point resource, and likewise a dummy coded 1 for di¤use resources if a coun-
trys major export is di¤use resources. Murshed nds that both types of resources
have a negative impact on the level of democracy; however, only point resources
signicantly. Democracy, in turn, has a positive signicant e¤ect on growth. Thus,
the ndings of Murshed seem to conrm the results of Leite and Weidmann (1999)
and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), although he does not include natural
resources directly in the growth regression.
3.2.5 Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005)
Also Isham et al. (2005) join this group. Their idea is that point resource abundance
weakens institutions, which impairs their ability to respond e¤ectively to shocks.
As this ability is positively linked to higher growth, poor institutions may lead to
slow growth rates.
Isham et al. distinguish between natural resources on the basis of point, di¤use,
as well as co¤ee and cocoa resources. Resource abundance is measured by exports,
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and in the growth regression, they use an index which refers to the degree of reliance
of a particular resource in the exports earnings. In addition, they consider SXP in
1970. Using a two equation system, in which the rst equation estimates the insti-
tutional quality based on natural resource abundance, and the second equation uses
these intuitional variables to estimate growth, Isham et al. nd that particularly
point source resources damage institutional quality, co¤ee and cocoa to a lesser ex-
tent, and di¤use resources have no signicant e¤ect. Institutional quality, in turn,
is positively correlated to economic growth.
The impact of primary products export is less clear. SXP seems to have a
positive e¤ect on institutions, but a negative coe¢ cient in the growth regressions,
albeit not signicant. Isham et al. (2005, 161) describe this result as: a bit more
speculatively, the hypothesis cannot be rejected that the only impact of export
structure on growth is through institutions.Isham et al. do not include the other
natural resource variables directly in the growth regression, and whether natural
resources have an e¤ect on growth beyond that of through institutions, which Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argue is not the case, is not examined.
3.2.6 Perälä (2003)
Perälä (2003) tests if slow growth in resource rich economies can be explained by
lack of social cohesion,14 which, in turn, is adversely inuenced by natural resources.
In particular, she examines whether it makes a di¤erence if a country is endowed
with di¤use or point resources.
A country is classied as natural resource rich if per capita cropland is above 0.3
ha. Resource rich nations are further divided into point source economies if more
than 40 percent of the total exports can be related to fuel and minerals.15 Resource
rich countries not categorized as point sourceeconomies are dened as di¤use
sourceeconomies and the remaining countries as resource poor countries.
14Social cohesion is measured by an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index taken from Easterly
and Levine (1997).
15One may argue that it is not entirely obvious why a point source economy must have per
capita cropland above 0.3 ha.
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In the growth regressions, both types of natural resources have a negative impact
on growth, but point resources reduce growth about twice the amount of di¤use
resources. Both types of resources lose their signicance once regional dummy
variables and a lack of social cohesions in point resource economy variable are
introduced. The lack of social cohesion in point resource economics variable is an
interaction term between point resources and lack of social cohesions. Whereas the
lack of social cohesion is insignicant, the interaction term is both signicant and
negative.
When instead a lack of social cohesion in di¤use resource economies variable is
used in the growth regression, both di¤use and point resources continue to have
signicant negative relationships with growth, and the lack of social cohesion in
di¤use economics variable is positively correlated to growth. No explanation for
this puzzling relationship is o¤ered, and once regional dummies are introduced, all
natural resource measures, including the interaction term, lose their signicance.
Moreover, the lack of social cohesion in di¤use economies variable is not robust
to various specications of the controls. Accordingly, Perälä (2003) concludes that
there is no evidence of any particular relationship between growth and di¤use re-
sources.
This seems to suggest that resource abundance per se does not impede growth,
but resource abundance of point resources in a fractionalized society does. As a
robustness check, the social fractionalization of point resources variable is included
in a number of well-known regressions, among them Sachs and Warner (1997).16 It
turns out to be signicant and increases the explanatory power of all regressions.
In the Sachs and Warner specication, however, also SXP remains signicant; high
primary export shares are still negatively related to growth.
16The others are: Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), King and Levine (1993), and DeLong
and Summers (1991).
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3.2.7 Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006)
Mehlum et al. (2006) present a theoretical model in which they distinguish between
grabber-friendlyand producer-friendlyinstitutions that conditions a grabber-
equilibriumor a producer-equilibrium respectively. In this model, natural re-
sources are a curse in the grabber-equilibrium; while in a producer-equilibrium
they are a blessing.
Mehlum et al. use SXP in 1970 to measure natural resource abundance. To
test their hypothesis, they include in addition an interaction term between natural
resources and institutional quality in the growth regression. Resource abundance
is signicantly negative, institutions are insignicant, and the interaction term is
signicant and positive. Hence, natural resources are damaging for growth only
when institutions are weak. Changing the natural resource abundance measure to
the share of mineral production in GDP in 1971, they nd an even more negative
impact on growth from the resource, and an even stronger positive e¤ect on growth
from institutional quality. In order to test the robustness of their results, they
also control for education, ethnic fractionalization, and test if leaving out Africa
has an e¤ect. In all cases, resource abundance appears to harm growth, but good
institutions can reverse the e¤ect.
3.2.8 Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine (2005)
Boschini et al. (2005) perform a similar empirical test. In addition to the SXP
measure, they introduce three other measures, which they argue are increasingly
prone to appropriability, and hence, damage growth increasingly more: the ratio of
ores and minerals exports to GDP, the share of mineral production in GDP, and
the share of gold, silver and diamonds in GDP. Their empirical test conrms the
results of Päräla (2003) and Mehlum et al. (2006): natural resources, in particular
minerals, are negatively correlated to growth, but the interaction term between the
resources and institutional quality is positive. Moreover, their results conrm that
gold, silver, and diamonds have the most negative impact on growth, followed by
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ores and minerals exports and mineral production, and that SXP has the least
negative impact on growth.
3.2.9 Ng (2006)
Ng (2006) argues that absolute natural resource abundance is likely to play a dif-
ferent role in explaining growth than relative natural resource abundance since the
latter is likely to be endogenous responses of production and trade.Therefore,
he distinguishes sharply between the two measures. The rst, he argues, refers to
exogenous endowments. For this variable he uses three measures: the stock value
of natural capital in 1994, the export value of natural resources in 1970 and the
value-added component of GDP in natural resource sectors in 1970. As a measure
of relative natural resource abundance, he uses the share of exports of natural re-
source goods in GDP in 1970. All measures are divided into mineral and agricultural
resources.
Controlling for investments and intuitional quality, he nds that neither absolute
abundance of minerals nor of agricultural resources have any signicant impact on
growth (nor on non-mining GDP growth). Relative mineral abundance, in turn,
has a signicant negative relationship to growth (and to non-mining GDP growth),
whereas relative agricultural resource abundance has no signicant impact.17 Ng
proceeds to propose a neoclassical many-country two sector growth model with a
mining and a non-mining sector and only TFP growth in the non-mining sector. By
calibrating this model, he nds that its predictions conrm his empirical results.
Finally, he examines the empirical relationship between mineral resources and
institutional quality. He nds that institutional quality is positively correlated
with absolute mineral abundance, but negatively correlated with relative mineral
abundance. Moreover, he nds that institutional quality is positively correlated
with non-mining TFP; hence, countries with better institutions seem to have both
17Ng (2006) also examines output level e¤ects, and nd that mineral abundance has a signicant
positive impact on output levels, mineral dependence has no impact on output level, and neither
agricultural abundance, nor agricultural dependence, exhibit any signicant impact on output
levels.
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higher TFP levels and higher absolute mineral abundance.
Thus, Ng (2006) o¤ers a new perspective on the resource curse: High absolute
natural resource abundance does not harm growth per se; in fact, high absolute
mineral abundance appears to have a positive impact on institutional quality. High
relative natural resource abundance, on the other hand, possible stems from low
growth.
Summing this section on institutional pathways up, we nd that there are two
types of empirical results among the studies which consider a relative natural re-
source abundance measure: (1) Natural resources, especially, point resources dam-
age institutional quality, which in turn damages growth (Leite and Weidmann 1999;
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Murshed 2004; and Isham et al. 2005); and
(2) natural resources have a negative impact on growth unless institutional quality
is good, in which case, natural resources can be a blessing (Päräla 2003; Mehlum et
al. 2006; Boschini et al. 2005). Ng (2006), on the other hand, who uses a measure
of absolute natural resource abundance nd di¤erent results. He nds that point
resources have a positive impact on institutional quality.
3.3 Other Pathways
3.3.1 Gylfason (2001)
Another concern, addressed by Gylfason (2001), is whether natural resource abun-
dance has an adverse e¤ect on human capital accumulation, and thereby also on
economic growth. The idea is that resource rich nations may think, that natural
resources is, and will remain, their main source of income, and therefore inadver-
tentlyfail to develop their human capital.
To test this idea, he uses the share of natural capital in national wealth in 1994 as
measure of natural resource abundance. A two equation system estimates rst the
natural resource and school enrolment rate e¤ects on growth controlling for initial
income and investments; and second, the natural resource e¤ect on enrolment rate
controlling also for initial income. Gylfason nds a signicant negative correlation
both between natural resources and growth, as well as between natural resources
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and enrolment rates, whereas enrolment rates and economic growth is positively
correlated.
Considering the empirical results surveyed above, one explanatory variable in
Gylfasons regression seems missing: some proxy for institutional quality. One may
speculate that also poor institutions lead to low levels of enrolment rates. Moreover,
if indeed, natural resources have an adverse e¤ect on the quality of institutions; this
would o¤er another explanation as to why natural resources seem to be negatively
correlated with enrolment rates.
3.3.2 Manzano and Rigobon (2001)
The study of Manzano and Rigobon (2001) serves to purposes: First, it tests if
the resource curse in Sachs and Warner (1995) is robust to panel estimation, and,
second, it provides a new explanation for a negative relationship between natural
resources and economic growth. As their measure of natural resource abundance,
they use SXP in 1970 as well as agricultural and non-agricultural export shares.
Non-agricultural export is further divided into minerals and fuel export shares.
A resource curse shows up in their cross sectional estimations, but, when primary
exports are decomposed, only non-agricultural resources are signicant in explaining
growth. Fuels are only slightly signicant, whereas minerals have twice the impact
on growth than that of fuels and are strongly signicant. In contrast, Manzano and
Rigobon nd that a resource curse outcome is not robust to panel estimation, and
suggest that a possible explanation is omitted variables.
After demonstrating that introducing institutional quality has no e¤ect on the
signicant negative correlation between natural resources and growth, Manzano
and Rigobon proceed to test their hypothesis: that the omitted variable may be
initial debt to GNP ratio. They argue that resource rich countries were tempted to
use natural resources as collateral when resource prices were high in the 70s, and,
subsequently, where hit by debt overhangwhen prices fell in the 80s. Empiri-
cal analysis conrms their hypothesis: after controlling for debt constraints,the
natural resource variable is insignicant, and its coe¢ cient is reduced substantially.
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While being very careful in examining the e¤ect of di¤erent types of natural
resources on growth, a similar analysis is not provided for the e¤ect of di¤erent
types of natural resources on debt. An explanation could be that their hypothesis
seems most relevant for non-agricultural resource rich countries.
3.3.3 Atkinson and Hamilton (2003)
A di¤erent, but also nancial, perspective is taken by Atkinson and Hamilton
(2003). Their concern is that natural resource rich countries subjugate to poor
saving policies, i.e., low genuine saving rates, which, in turn, has adverse e¤ects
on growth. As their measure of natural resource abundance, they use the average
share of total resource rents in GDP over the period 1980-95. Resource rents are
calculated as the sum of rents from oil, gas, coal, basuxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel,
phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver, and timber.
Estimating growth, using regional dummies, and controlling for initial income,
investments, and human capital, they nd that natural resource abundance is neg-
atively correlated with growth. In order to explore if the presence of high resource
rents has an adverse inuence on government expenditure, they examine the inter-
action between government investment, government consumption, and the share of
public sector wages in total government expenditure. It appears that the resource
curse is present when governments spend resource rents to nance government con-
sumption, and can be avoided when governments spend resource rents on invest-
ments. In the latter regression, natural resources have a signicant negative impact
on growth, but the interaction term between natural resources and government in-
vestments is positive and also signicant. Hence, countries with higher government
investments benet from higher growth. Further analysis reveals that countries
su¤ering from a resource curse are countries with a negative genuine saving.
A proxy for intuitional quality is not included in the controls. It seems plausible,
however, that poor institutions would amplify any tendency a government has to
liquidate,rather than create national wealth.If natural resource abundance and
poor institutional quality are correlated, the question is whether natural resources
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remain signicant after controlling for institutional quality.
3.3.4 Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004)
Instead of focusing on one particular pathway, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) ex-
amine a range of pathways: corruption, investments, openness, terms of trade, and
schooling. To motivate these choices, they estimate the e¤ect of natural resources
on growth rst without including these variables and then when including them. In
the rst case, natural resources, measured as share of mineral production in GDP in
1971, has a signicant and negative impact on growth. After controlling for corrup-
tion, investments, openness, terms of trade, and schooling, natural resources lose
their signicance in explaining growth. Papyrakis and Gerlagh suggest therefore,
that natural resources have no impact on growth per se, but instead they exercise
their harm on growth indirectly.
The empirical analysis conrms that indeed natural resources are correlated
with those variables. Natural resource abundance decreases openness, schooling,
and investments, and increases corruption and terms of trade; although only signif-
icantly with respect to openness and terms of trade. Papyrakis and Gerlagh argue
that this is due to the small sample size (39 countries) and that running each path-
way separately, whereby a larger sample can be used, implies signicance for all
pathways, except corruption. In this way, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) seem to
conrm the ndings of Gylfason (2001) on education and of Atkinson and Hamilton
(2003) on saving. Natural resources may be a blessing, if negative indirect e¤ects
are excluded.Their results, however, disagree with Leite and Weidmann (1999) on
the signicance of a corruption transmission channel.
3.3.5 Stijns (2005)
A somewhat di¤erent approach is taken by Stijns (2005). Stijns decomposes natural
resources into individual resources such as oil, gas, coal, minerals and land, and
measures natural resource abundance by reserves per 1000 capita in 1999 and land
area per capita in 1971. First, he examines the link between his reserve measures
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and SXP, and nds that land has a signicant positive e¤ect on SXP. Moreover,
it seems that coal has a negative e¤ect on SXP, which he suggests is due to high
transportations costs or that coal abundance is associated with secondary, instead
of primary, exports.
Turning to the growth regressions, and using reserves as measure of natural
resource abundance in the regression otherwise identical to that of Sachs andWarner
(1995), Stijns nds no signicant negative correlation between growth and natural
resource reserves but land. While gas is negatively associated with growth, this
e¤ect is not signicant, and coal has a positive, but also insignicant, e¤ect. The
e¤ect and the sign of minerals and oil vary with the estimation specication, and
neither is signicant.
In the further analysis, Stijns reintroduces the SXP measure in the regression.
SXP remains signicant and negative even after controlling for natural resource
reserves. Also land remains negative and signicant whereas the other natural
resource reserve measures are insignicant. Stijns provides a preliminary explana-
tion to these results. He argues that perhaps land is associated with agricultural
production which, in turn, may be oppositely related to growth.
The lack of signicance of the resource reserves is the subject of further inves-
tigation, and Stijns suggests that these resources may inuence economic growth
though positive and negative channels which cancel out. He identies ve channels:
political infrastructure, market orientation, savings and investment, human capital,
and Dutch disease. Simple analysis of correlation (i.e., no controls) suggests that oil
and gas have a positive e¤ect on education, investment, and economic policy, but
a negative e¤ect on Dutch disease. Coal and minerals seem in particular to have
a positive e¤ect on economic policy and investment, whereas land is negatively
correlated with all channels of inuence.
Hence, Stijns (2005) seems to conrm the interpretation that natural resources
are not a curse per se. Despite controlling for reserves and land, however, pri-
mary products export shares maintain their direct adverse e¤ect on growth. Stijns
concludes: what matters most is what countries do with their natural resources.
67
Chapter 2
3.4 No Pathways
3.4.1 Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004)
As the last study in our survey, we include Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). They perform
a test of determinants of long-term growth using Bayesian model averaging. They
do not explain channels of impact, but purely focus on identifying robustness of
explanatory variables in cross-country economic growth regressions.As a measure
of natural resource abundance they use two measures: the fraction of GDP in
mining in current prices in 1994 as well as an oil-producing country dummy. The
former belongs to the list of robust variables contributing positively to growth,18
whereas the latter is not signicant.
4 Stylized Results
This section proceeds to synthesize the empirical ndings of the 17 studies surveyed
above and present them in a manner which we refer to as stylized results. Naturally,
these stylized results are a rough presentation, but they serve a useful purpose as
an overview and as a mean to answer our questions.
Table A2 in the appendix provides a full list of the di¤erent natural resource
types considered by each study. In this table, we label each natural resource type
as non-di¤erentiated, di¤use, or point according to their appropriability. Following
Boschini et al. (2005, g. 1), di¤use resources are agricultural products; sh;
meat; and fertile land. Point resources are diamonds; precious metals; oil and other
minerals; co¤ee; cocoa; sugar; and timber. If both types of resources are considered
jointly, the resource is labeled as non-di¤erentiated.
In addition, table A4 in the appendix presents a list of the resource impact
reported by the 17 studies. We distinguish between two types of resource impacts:
direct and indirect. For studies, in which the main result is a direct e¤ect, such as
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), the indirect impact does not apply. Most studies,
18The authors, however, argue that this may be due to an outlier: Botswana. Botswana has
beneted tremendously from its diamond industry.
68
Chapter 2
however, examine pathways which relate natural resources abundance to growth
performance. These studies can broadly be divided into two groups: studies that
use a two equation system and studies that use an interaction term. For the rst
group, the direct e¤ect is the e¤ect from the resource in excess of their e¤ect on
the transmission channel. Some studies do not report this e¤ect, e.g., Isham et al.
(2005), whereas others do, e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). The sign
of the indirect impact is the e¤ect that natural resources have on growth via the
transmission channel.
For the other group, the group of studies which use an interaction term, the
direct e¤ect is the e¤ect natural resources have on growth, once an interaction term
is introduced in the regression. The indirect e¤ect, in this case, indicates the sign
of the interaction term. The interpretation of a positive interaction term is that
natural resource is a blessing for growth once the interaction e¤ect exceeds any
direct negative e¤ect.
4.1 Stylized Result 1: Natural Resource Type Matters
Table 2 presents natural resource impact by natural resource type: non-di¤erentiated,
di¤use, and point, based on table A2 and A4 in the appendix.
Table 2 Natural Resource Type Classication and Sign of the Resource Impact
Direct Impact Indirect Impacta
Natural Resource Type Obs Neg. nsb Pos. Obs Neg. ns Pos.
Non-di¤erentiated (N) 10 7 3 0 3 2 0 1
Di¤use (D) 10 2 8 0 5 1 3 1
Point (P) 22 6 14 2 13 9 1 3
Total 42 15 25 2 21 12 4 5
aExcluding studies which use an interaction term.
bns: non-signicant; include also U-shape and situations where no clear e¤ect is
reported (indicated by ?in table A4).
Examining the patterns in table 2, it seems that natural resources mostly have
been found to have no, or a negative, direct impact on growth and a negative
impact via their transmission channel. As the full e¤ect on growth of a given
natural resource is the sum of the indirect e¤ect and any remaining direct e¤ect,
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table 2 suggests that all three groups of natural resource types typically have been
shown to a negative e¤ect on growth. Point resources more than di¤use resources,
but the studies which investigate non-di¤erentiated natural resources seem to have
the highest incidence of a natural resource curse. An ad hoc ranking according to
the incidence of a natural resource curse implies that:
non-di¤erentiated resources > point resources > di¤use resources.
This ranking seems peculiar: As non-di¤erentiated resources generally are the
sum of both point and di¤use resources, one would expect that non-di¤erentiated
resources would be no worse than point resources. A possible explanation of why
this reasoning does not correspond to the pattern in table 2, upon which the ranking
is based, is suggested by our next stylized result.
4.2 Stylized Result 2: Natural ResourceMeasurementMat-
ters
In providing this result, we draw on table A3 and table A4 in the appendix. Table
A3 assign labels to each study according to whether it uses a relative or an absolute
natural resource abundance measure.
Table 3 Natural Resource Measure Classication and Sign of the Resource Impact
Direct Impact Indirect Impacta
Natural Resource Measure Obs Neg. nsb Pos. Obs Neg. ns Pos.
Relative abundance (R) 32 14 16 2 16 11 3 2
Absolute abundance (A) 10 1 9 0 5 1 1 3
Total 42 15 25 2 21 12 4 5
aExcluding studies which use an interaction term.
bns: non-signicant, include also U-shape and situations where no clear e¤ect is
reported (indicated by ?in table A4).
Examining the patterns in table 3, it seems that using a relative measure gives
much worse results in term of a more frequent natural resource curse than using an
absolute measure:
relative abundance > absolute abundance.
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Moreover, it seems that there is no systematic pattern in how natural resources
measured by their absolute abundance impacts growth: the evidence of a positive
e¤ect and of a negative e¤ect appears roughly equal. Separating by natural resource
type (cf. table A4 in the appendix), it appears that absolute land abundance has
a negative indirect impact on growth, whereas absolute point resource abundance
has no or a positive indirect impact on growth. This result is, however, based only
on two studies: Stijns (2005) and Ng (2006).
Moreover, caution must be taken in drawing rm conclusions from the ranking
given under stylized result 1 and stylized result 2. Precisely the natural resource
type non-di¤erentiated and the relative natural resource abundance measure are
used by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). Many of the empirical analyses are, to a
greater or lesser extent, based on the dataset of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). It
is therefore possible, that an issue that has to do with selection of dataset is also
contributing the results.19
4.3 Stylized Result 3: Natural Resources Impact Growth
for a Variety of Reasons
To examine the pathways through which natural resource abundance and growth
is related, we distinguish between studies which have explored the natural resource
curse by use of a transmission channel and by use of an interaction term.
According to table 4 below, which is based on table A3 and table A4 in the
appendix, it seems that di¤use resources have a missing, or a positive, relationship
with institutional quality. Only Stijns (2005) nds that a di¤use resource, land
per capita, is bad for economic performance by indirect transmission channels.
Point resources, in turn, seem to have many pathways though which they can harm
growth: debt overhang, less openness, worse terms of trade, more corruption, less
democracy, and poorer institutions. The results of Ng (2006), however, stand out
in that they suggest that point resources have a positive impact on institutional
19For instance, Lederman and Maloney (2002), among other things, nd that Sachs andWarners
(1995) results are not robust with respect to changes in time horizon.
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quality when measured by their absolute abundance.
All studies which use an interaction term nd a non-negative coe¢ cient on the
interaction term, which suggests that when the level of institutional quality is high
enough, natural resources are a blessing for economic growth.
Table 4 Transmission Channels, Interaction Term, and Indirect Resource Impact by
Natural Resource Type and Measure
Indirect Resource Impact
Neg. nsa Pos.
Transmission channel
Debt (Manzano and Rigobon) P/R
Education (Gylfason) N/R
Five channels (Stijns) D/A P/A
Openness and ToT (Papyrakis and Gerlagh) P/R
Institutions:
Corruption (Leite and Weidmann) P/R D/R
Democracy (Murshed) P/R D/R
Institutions (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian) N/R; P/R D/R
Institutions (Isham et al.) P/R; P/R D/R N/R
Institutions (Ng) P/R P/A; P/A; P/A
Interaction term
Gov. expenditure (Atkinson and Hamilton) P/R
Institutions (Boschini et al.) P/R; P/R; P/R; P/R
Institutions (Mehlum et al.) P/R; P/R
Lack of social cohesion (Perälä) D/n.a. P/n.a.
Note: N: non-di¤erentiated resources; P: point resources; and D: di¤use resources;
A: absolute natural resource abundance; R: relative natural resource abundance.
ans: non-signicant, include also situations where no clear e¤ect is reported
(indicated by ?in table A4).
5 Additional Data
The aim of this section is to provide some additional data to the survey. In par-
ticular, we consider the relationship between growth performance and the share
of value added by natural resource industries relative to GDP. Among the studies
included in the survey, also Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) consider this measure of
natural resource abundance. They, however, consider only the mining industry;
here, in addition, we include also agricultural industries in the analysis.
72
Chapter 2
We use a simple cross sectional growth regression that describes economic growth
in country i between time t = 0 and t = T: Growth is a function of initial GDP,
Y i0 ; and a vector of structural characteristics X
i :
ln(Y iT=Y
i
0 )
T
= 0 + 1 ln(Y
i
0 ) + 2X
i + "i: (1)
A negative sign of 1 can be interpreted as a conformation of the conditional con-
vergence hypothesis: across countries, ceteris paribus, high income countries grow
more slowly than low income countries. We are especially interested in examining
if natural resources are among the X is. Based on our general survey results, we
expect a negative coe¢ cient on natural resources which can be dened as point
resources, whereas we expect the coe¢ cient on di¤use natural resources to be in-
signicant.
In addition, we perform an analysis in which we include an interaction term
between natural resources and institutional quality among the X is. According to
our survey, we expect the coe¢ cient on this interaction term to be positive for point
resources and insignicant for di¤use resources.
5.1 Sample and Data Sources
For our measure of natural resource abundance, we use data sources from the United
Nations National Account Statistics (SNA 2006). Our data cover the period 1991-
2003. National account estimates are prepared once a year for all countries and
break real GDP down by industries. This feature allows us to distinguish two main
natural resource industries: agriculture, hunting, forestry, and shing; and min-
ing and quarrying.20 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and shingcan be further
subdivided into agriculture, hunting, and forestry and shing as separate indus-
tries.21
20Mining and quarrying includes extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas as well as service
related activities.
21Actually, data can be even further divided into agriculture, hunting, and related service activ-
ities and forestry, logging, and related service activities. Future research could try to disentangle
agriculture and forestry.
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For the empirical analysis we use a measure of relative resource abundance.
Specically, we use the share of value added by natural resource industries relative
to GDP in 1996.22 Not every national account includes all four natural resource
industries. We therefore create four samples. Each sample is constructed on the
basis of one of four natural resource variables: Min; AgrForFish; AgrFor; and Fish.
Tables A7 to A10 present the full lists of countries within each sample.
As our dependent variable we use average growth over the period 1991-2003
(calculated as (lnY i2003   lnY i1991)  100=12); and as our measure of income, we
use real GDP per capita (chain), both of which are taken from Penn World Table
6.2.23 For our other explanatory variables we use investment share of real GDP
in 1991 ((I=Y )1991) which is also taken from Penn World Table 6.2, and a proxy
for institutional quality, the rule of law in 1996, which is taken from Kaufmann
et al. (2006).24 The rule of law measure ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, where a higher
score means better rule of law. The rule of law indicates the extent to which
agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence (ibid., 4). Table A5 in the appendix contains a detailed
specication of all variables and Table A6 in the appendix lists their mean and
standard deviation.
5.2 Results
Table 5 shows the cross sectional growth regressions of each sample corresponding
to (1) using simple ordinary least squares (OLS). We perform an analysis with and
without the interaction term.
As expected, the coe¢ cient on initial income is negative, and, in addition, sig-
nicant. The coe¢ cient implies a rate of conditional convergence between roughly a
half and one percent per year. Institutions are signicant and positively correlated
22We choose 1996 because from this year on, more and more countries di¤erentiate agriculture,
forestry and shing into separate industries. Ideally, we would have liked to use year 1991.
23http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.
24http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/pdf/2005kkdata.xls.
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with growth, whereas the interaction term is not signicant in any sample (as can
be seen in OLS1b, OLS2b, OLS3b, OLS4b). Common to all regressions is that they
have low levels of explanatory power, and lower than most of the studies reviewed
in the literature above.
The rst regression, OLS1a, examines the relationship betweenMin and growth,
controlling for initial income, initial investment share, and the rule of law. The
coe¢ cient on Min is negative, but not signicant. This result seems to contradict
most evidence presented in the survey above, which nds a negative relationship
between point resources and growth performance. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004),
however, nd that the size of the mining industry relative to GDP is positively
correlated with growth.
Table 5 Growth Regressions
Dependent variable: Average GDP per capita growth 1991-2003
Sample Min AgrForFish AgrFor Fish
OLS1a OLS1b OLS2a OLS2b OLS3a OLS3b OLS4a OLS4b
Constant 6.30 6.46 11.88 12.55 10.93 11.34 7.01 7.26
(2.86) (2.94) (3.88) (3.90) (3.90) (4.00) (2.55) (2.62)
lnY1991 -0.59
 -0.61 -1.15 -1.22 -1.09 -1.14 -0.73 -0.75
(-2.23) (-2.29) (-3.49) (-3.53) (-3.53) (-3.64) (-2.28) (-2.34)
(I/Y)1991 0.03 0.03 0.03
 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
(1.41) (1.44) (1.84) (1.77) (2.23) (2.26) (2.66) (2.69)
Rule of Law 0.69 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.62 0.75 0.66 0.72
(2.27) (1.86) (2.33) (2.33) (2.35) (2.55) (2.14) (2.27)
Resources1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.16
(-0.86) (-1.38) (-2.92) (-2.88) (-2.51) (-2.70) (-0.20) (-0.79)
Interaction2 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.18
(1.29) (-0.69) (-1.00) (-0.87)
R2 adjusted 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13
N 106 106 112 112 82 82 68 68
Notes: The t-statistic for the coe¢ cients is in the parentheses.
10% level of signicance, 5% level of signicance, 1% level of signicance.
1The resource variable considered is: Min; AgrForFish; AgrFor; and Fish respectively.
2The interaction term is the interaction between the resource and the rule of law variable.
The OLS2a regression analyses the relationship between the relative size of all
agricultural industries to GDP and growth. The coe¢ cient on AgrForFish is both
negative and signicant. A 10 percent increase in the share of all agricultural
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industries in GDP decreases average growth performance by 0.7 percentage points.
A similar pattern is repeated in OLS3a in which the shing industry is excluded
from the resource variable.
A hypothesis, which could explain why a the relative size of the agricultural
industry is negatively correlated with growth, is that a relatively large agricultural
industry may be a sign of general underdevelopment of other, more productive,
sectors; an indication that the economy has not yet entered an industrial or
new-economystage. Indeed, Quella (2006) nd that labor-generated knowledge
spillovers and TFP growth in agricultural sectors in the US economy are small
compared to other sectors of the US economy. Within the group of OECD countries,
however, OECD (2003) nds that agricultural TFP growth has outperformed TFP
growth in other sectors in 1970-1990.
The picture changes when considering the correlation between the size of the
shing industry relative to GDP and growth, which is done in OLS4a. The coe¢ -
cient on the shing industry is not signicant. One could speculate that a reason
why the shing industry seems to have a di¤erent impact on growth than the agri-
cultural industry is that countries with a large shing industry also have easy access
to the sea. They are therefore less likely to be landlocked. Malik and Temple (2006)
argue that geography and, in particular, landlockness, increases output volatility,
and others, e.g., Ramey and Ramey (1995), have argued that high output volatility
is negative correlated with growth performance.
Summing up, for reasons yet to be solved,25 our regression analyses seem to
produce results counter to the general stylized resultsof studies which also use
a relative natural resource abundance measure presented above. One may argue,
that this divergence emphasizes that there is still much to be understood in how
natural resources interact with growth performance. We stress, however, that our
empirical analysis only o¤ers preliminary results.
25The analysis can, for instance, be extended by use of regional dummies.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude that the story of the resource curse appears to be a complex story.
The type of natural resources matters, how they are measured matters, and there
is a range of pathways through which natural resources impact growth.
Specically, among the 17 studies chosen for our survey, more studies show
evidence that point resources are negatively correlated with growth than evidence
that di¤use resources are negatively correlated with growth. Almost all studies
that examine non-di¤erentiated resources, i.e., all primary products, nd a negative
relationship between growth and natural resource abundance.
An important factor in these results, however, seems to be how natural resource
abundance is measured. Measured in relative terms, such as relative to the overall
size of the economy, natural resources seem consistently negatively correlated with
growth performance. This type of measure is used by the majority of studies in our
survey. In sharp contrast to this result, is the seemingly lack of empirical evidence
to support that absolute levels of natural resources damage growth.
Transmission channels are numerous, but no general pattern seems to emerge.
Point resources appear to cast their curse through weakened human capital accumu-
lation, damaged institutional quality, increased debt, and worse terms of trade, but,
at the same time there is also evidence that point resources bless growth through
better institutional quality. Also di¤use resources are found to both harm and ben-
et institutional quality. Indeed, examining this issue of endogenous institutional
quality further is possible subject for future research: What are the trade-o¤s which
determine whether natural resources benet or harm institutions?
Our empirical cross sectional analysis suggests that the size of the combined
agricultural and forestry industry relative to GDP is negatively correlated with
growth, whereas neither the size of the mining industry nor of the shing industry
relative to GDP seems to have any systematic relationship with growth. We ar-
gue, that these ndings, albeit preliminary, conrm that a general pattern in how
various types of natural resources impact growth is not easily established. Hence,
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we conclude that there is still much to be understood in whether natural resources
take one route or the other to impact growth.26 In addition, the present paper takes
the rather simple approach of purely considering the sign of the resource impact.
Future work might compare the magnitude of the natural resource impact across
di¤erent studies.
It seems also that an important issue remains unsolved: Can we be sure that
is it the natural resources that matters? If indeed high relative natural resource
abundance is a proxy for underdevelopment, the resource curse should be interpreted
as a symptom of underdevelopment rather than an as indication of a negative impact
from natural resources onto growth. One may argue we still lack reliable estimates
and that the question of causality remains open. A potential solutions to the
problem would be to nd an instrument variable for natural resources. In this
respect, absolute abundance measures seem superior. For instance, site quality may
be a valid instrument of lands yielding capacity, and thus agricultural abundance.
Another subject for further elaboration is that of linking the resource curse
to issues of global development and environmental issues. Chichilnisky (1994) ar-
gues that poorly dened property rights on natural resources in resource rich poor
countries lead to over-extraction (via trade) of the natural resource and hence a
deterioration of the global environment.
26This is the topic of the two subsequent chapters of this thesis (Frederiksen 2006, 2007).
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A Appendix
Table A1 Chronological Presentation of Studies and Some Statistics
Study ID Sample Size Growth Period
Sachs and Warner 1997b 1 87-71 1970-90
Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega 1999 2 125-65 1960-92
Leite and Weidmann 1999 3 72 1970-90
Gylfason 2001 4 85 1965-98
Manzano and Rigobon 2001 5 74-54 1970-90
Atkinson and Hamilton 2003 6 91 1980-95
Olsson 2003 7 124-123b 1990-99
Perälä 2003 8 82-79 1960-99
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003 9 70-69 1970-98
Murshed 2004 10 50 1970-2000
Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004 11 103-39 1975-96
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller 2004 12 88 1960-96
Isham et al. 2005 13 66-22 1974-97
Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine 2005 14 80 1975-98
Stijns 2005 15 87-71 1970-89
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik. 2006 16 87-59 1965-90
Ng 2006 17 70 1970-2000
aWe list Sachs and Warner (1997) as this study considers an additional year.
bOut of which 18 countries produce diamonds.
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Table A2 Natural Resource Types and Type Classication
Natural Resource Type Type Classication
Non-di¤erentiated Di¤use Point
ID * (NR) (N) (D) (P)
1 Primary products N
2 a Labor force in primary sector N
b Primary products N
3 a Agriculture and food D
b Fuels and ores P
4 Natural wealth N
5 a Primary products N
b Agricultural products D
c Non-agricultural products P
6 Oil, minerals, et al., and timber P
7 Diamonds P
8 a Di¤use D
b Point P
9 a Primary products A
b Agricultural products D
c Non-agricultural products P
d Oil producer P
10 a Di¤use D
b Point P
11 Minerals P
12 a Mining P
b Oil producer P
13 a Di¤use D
b Point P
c Co¤ee and cocoa P
d Primary products A
14 a Primary products A
b Ores and metals P
c Minerals P
d Gold, silver, diamonds P
15 a Land D
b Oil, coal, minerals, gasa P
c Primary products N
16 a Primary products N
b Minerals P
17 a Agricultural products D
b Minerals P
See Appendix A1 for list of sources
aStijns (2005) considers these natural resources separately, but only land
plays a separate role.
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Table A3 Natural Resource Measures and Measure Classication
Natural Resource Measure Measure Classication
ID* Relative(R) Absolute(A)
1
 NR export
GNP

1970
SXP1970 R
2a
 
NR
All labor

1965
R
2b

NR export
All export

1970
R
3a,b SXP1970 R
4
 
NR wealth
National wealth

1994
R
5a,b,c SXP1970 R
6
 
NR rents
GDP

1980 95 R
7
 Value of NR production
GNP

2000
R
7

NR production
Country size

1990 99
A
7

NR value
Country size

2000
A
8a 1, if exp. include < 40% mineral and oil n.a.a
8b 1, if exp. include > 40% mineral and oil n.a.
9a,b,c

NR export
All export

1970;80
R
9b,c
 NR export
GDP

1970;80
R
9d 1, if NR exp.: > 2
3
all exp., and = 1% of world NR exp. R
10a,b 1, if NR is the major source of exp. R
11
 Value of NR production
GDP

1971
R
12a
 
NR value added
GDP

1994
R
12b 1, if NR exp.: > 2
3
all exp., and = 1% of world NR exp R
13a,b,c

NR net export
Net export

1980 R
13d SXP1970 R
14a SXP1970 R
14b
 NR export
GDP

1975
R
14c
 Value of NR production
GDP

1971
R
14d
 Value of NR production
GDP

1972 80 R
15a

NR
Capita

1971
A
15b

1000 * NR reserves
Capita

1999
A
15c SXP1970 R
16a SXP1970 R
16b
 NR production
GNP

1971
R
17a,b
 
NR stock value
Worker

1994
A
17a,b
 NR export
Worker

1970
A
17a,b
 
NR value added
Worker

1970
A
17a,b
 NR export
GDP

1970
R
See Table A1 for list of sources and Table A2 for NR specications.
aSince, in addition, cropland/capita > 0.3 ha in 1970
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Table A4 Natural Resource Impact and their Transmission Channels/Interaction Term
Natural Resource Type Resource Impacta
ID* (NR) Direct Indirect Channel/Interaction Term
1 Primary product - ... ...
2a Labor force in primary sector - ... ...
2b Primary products - ... ...
3a Agriculture and food ns and - + Corruption/
3b Fuels and ores ns and ns - Corruption/
4 Natural wealth - - Education/
5a Primary products - ... ...
5b Agricultural products ns ... ...
5c Non-agricultural products ns -b Debt/
6 Oil, minerals, et al., and timber - +/- /Government expenditure
7 Diamonds (R, A) U-shape ... ...
8a Di¤use ns ? /Lack of social cohesion
8b Point ns - /Lack of social cohesion
9a Primary products ns - Institutions/
9b Agricultural products ns ns Institutions/
9c Non-agricultural products ns - Institutions/
9d Oil producer + - Institutions/
10a Di¤use ... ns Democracy/
10b Point ... - Democracy/
11 Minerals ns - Openness and terms of trade/
12a Mining + ... ...
12b Oil producer ns ... ...
13a Di¤use ... ns Institutions/
13b Point ... - Institutions/
13c Co¤ee and cocoa ... - Institutions/
13d Primary products ns + Institutions/
14a Primary products ns ns /Institutions
14b Ores and metals - + /Institutions
14c Mineral - + /Institutions
14d Gold, silver, diamonds - + /Institutions
15a Land - - Five channels/
15b Oil, coal, minerals, gas ns +/? Five channels/
15c Primary products - ... ...
16a Primary products - + /Institutions
16b Minerals - + /Institutions
17a Agricultural products (R, A) ns ... ...
17b Minerals (R) - - Institutions/
17b Minerals (A) ns + Institutions/
See Table A1 for list of sources
aNatural resource impact on growth. ns: non-signicant (cf. level used by the source).
bThe e¤ect on non-agr. resources on debt is not tested directly
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Table A5 List of Variables
Variable
Growth Average yearly growth rate (in percent).
[ln(rgdpch03-rgdpch91)*100/13]]. Source: PWT 6.2.
lnY1991 Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (Chain).
[ln(rgdpch91]]. Source: PWT 6.2.
(I/Y)1991 Investment share of real GDP per capita (in percent).
[KI1991] Source: PWT 6.2
Rule of Law Score between -2.5 and 2.5. Taken from year 1996.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2006).
Min Value added by Mining and Quarrying at constant prices in 1996
(in percent). Source: SNA (2006).
AgrForFish Value added by Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing at constant
prices in 1996 (in percent). Source: SNA (2006).
AgrFor Value added by Agriculture, Forestry and Hunting at constant
prices in 1996 (in percent). Source: SNA (2006).
Fish Value added by Fishing at constant prices in 1996 (in percent).
Source: SNA (2006).
Table A6 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables for each Sample
Min AgrForFish AgrFor Fish
Variable Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Growth 1.76 1.61 1.69 1.60 1.63 1.54 1.72 1.48
lnY1991 8.63 1.07 8.64 1.08 8.74 1.11 8.71 1.10
(I/Y)1991 14.6 8.43 15.14 9.16 10.07 10.48 15.81 9.81
Rule of Law 0.26 0.97 0.25 0.98 0.34 1.03 0.33 1.00
Resource 5.27 9.09 13.64 12.28 10.07 10.48 0.98 1.66
Interaction 1.12 8.77 -4.79 14.44 -3.81 10.84 -0.37 1.53
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Table A7 List of Countries in Min-sample
Albania Ecuador Mauritius Senegal
Argentina Egypt Mexico Slovak Republic
Australia El Salvador Mongolia Slovenia
Austria Estonia Morocco South Africa
Bahamas Finland Mozambique Spain
Bahrain France Namibia Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Germany Nepal Suriname
Belgium Ghana Netherlands Swaziland
Belize Greece New Zealand Sweden
Benin Guatemala Nicaragua Switzerland
Bhutan Honduras Niger Syria
Bolivia Hungary Nigeria Thailand
Botswana Iceland Norway Tonga
Cambodia India Oman Trinidad Tobago
Cameroon Indonesia Pakistan Tunisia
Canada Israel Panama Turkey
Cape Verde Italy Papua New Guinea Uganda
Chile Jamaica Paraguay United Kingdom
Colombia Japan Peru United States
Costa Rica Jordan Philippines Uruguay
Cote dIvoire Kenya Poland Venezuela
Croatia Korea, Republic of Portugal Vietnam
Cuba Kuwait Puerto Rico Yemen
Cyprus Laos Qatar Zambia
Czech Republic Lesotho Romania Zimbabwe
Denmark Luxembourg Rwanda
Dominican Republic Malaysia Saudi Arabia
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Table A8 List of Countries in AgrForFish-sample
Albania Dominican Republic Malawi Rwanda
Argentina Ecuador Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Australia Egypt Mauritius Senegal
Austria El Salvador Mexico Singapore
Bahamas Estonia Mongolia Slovak Republic
Bahrain Finland Morocco Slovenia
Bangladesh France Mozambique South Africa
Belgium Germany Namibia Spain
Belize Ghana Nepal Sri Lanka
Benin Greece Netherlands Suriname
Bhutan Guatemala New Zealand Swaziland
Bolivia Honduras Nicaragua Sweden
Botswana Hungary Niger Switzerland
Brunei Iceland Nigeria Syria
Cambodia India Norway Thailand
Cameroon Indonesia Oman Tonga Tobago
Canada Iran Pakistan Trinidad
Cape Verde Israel Panama Tunisia
Chad Italy Papua New Guinea Turkey
Chile Jamaica Paraguay United Kingdom
Colombia Japan Peru United States
Costa Rica Jordan Philippines Uruguay
Cote dIvoire Kenya Poland Uzbekistan
Croatia Korea, Republic of Portugal Venezuela
Cuba Kuwait Puerto Rico Vietnam
Cyprus Laos Qatar Yemen
Czech Republic Lesotho Romania Zambia
Denmark Luxembourg Russia Zimbabwe
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Table A9 List of Countries in AgrFor-sample
Argentina Czech Republic Kuwait Russia
Australia Denmark Lesotho Rwanda
Austria Ecuador Luxembourg Senegal
Bahamas El Salvador Malaysia Slovak Republic
Bahrain Estonia Mexico Slovenia
Bangladesh Finland Mongolia Spain
Belgium France Mozambique Suriname
Bhutan Germany Namibia Swaziland
Bolivia Ghana Netherlands Sweden
Botswana Greece New Zealand Switzerland
Brunei Honduras Nicaragua Thailand
Cambodia Hungary Nigeria United Kingdom
Cameroon Iceland Norway United States
Canada India Oman Uruguay
Cape Verde Indonesia Panama Uzbekistan
Chad Iran Peru Venezuela
Chile Italy Philippines Vietnam
Colombia Jamaica Poland Yemen
Cote dIvoire Japan Portugal Zambia
Croatia Kenya Romania Zimbabwe
Cyprus Korea, Republic of
Table A10 List of Countries in Fish-sample
Argentina Cyprus Jamaica Philippines
Austria Czech Republic Japan Poland
Bahamas Denmark Kenya Portugal
Bahrain Ecuador Korea, Republic of Romania
Bangladesh El Salvador Kuwait Rwanda
Belgium Estonia Lesotho Senegal
Botswana Finland Malaysia Slovenia
Brunei France Mexico Spain
Cambodia Germany Mozambique Suriname
Cameroon Ghana Netherlands Sweden
Canada Greece New Zealand Thailand
Cape Verde Honduras Nicaragua United Kingdom
Chad Hungary Nigeria Uruguay
Chile India Norway Venezuela
Colombia Indonesia Oman Vietnam
Cote dIvoire Iran Panama Yemen
Croatia Italy Peru Zambia
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Abstract
This paper examines how revenues from a natural resource interact with
growth and welfare in an overlapping generations model with altruism. The
revenues are allocated between public productive services and direct transfers
to members of society by spending policies. We analyze how these policies
inuence the dynamics, and how the dynamics are inuenced by the abun-
dance of the revenue. Abundant revenues may harm growth, but growth and
welfare can be oppositely a¤ected. We also provide the socially optimal pol-
icy. Overall, the analysis suggests that variation in the strength of altruism
and in spending policies may be part of the reason why natural resources
seem to a¤ect economic performance across nations di¤erently.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to propose an endogenous growth model in which the
relationship between growth performance and natural resource abundance can be
studied. Especially, we explore the hypothesis that the political economy and the
strength of altruism matters for how natural resource abundance a¤ects growth.
The idea of a resource curse1 is not new; it dates back in history. The decline
of Spains prosperity after its colonization of the New World and discovery of large
amounts of gold and other precious metals is a classical example. Also within
recent decades, has the idea of a resource curse received support by a large body
of empirical (see Auty 1993, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001, among
others) as well as theoretical literature.2 Classical theories include the Dutch disease
theory (Corden and Neary 1982; Torvik 2001; van Wijnbergen 1984), rent seeking
problems (Tornell and Lane 1999; Torvik 2002), and political economy explanations
(Ross 2004, 2006; Robinson and Torvik 2005). Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) suggest
that natural resource rich countries are overshooting their consumption levels and
consequently converge to their steady states from above, which results in slow rates
of economic growth.
Empirical evidence, however, which questions an unconditional negative rela-
tionship between natural resources and growth, seems also to be emerging (Sala-i-
Martin et al. 2004; Stijns 2005; Frederiksen 2007; Ng 2006). Besides, a classical
counterexample to the resource curse is oil-rich Norway. Larsen (2005) concludes
that resources are a blessing for Norways economy.3
Yet only a limited number of theoretical studies have tried to explain a di-
verging experience of the resource impact on economic performance. Exception
includes Mehlum et al. (2006). They argue that growth performance varies with
1We use the term resource curseto describe the situation in which resource abundant nations
grow slower than nations endowed with fewer resources. In the literature, the term is sometimes
used in a more general way to describe poor economic performance. For our analysis, however, it
is important to distinguish between growth and welfare e¤ects.
2For a recent survey of the theoretical literature, consult Stevens (2003).
3He notes, however, a slow-down in growth after the mid-90s.
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how resource revenues are distributed between grabbingand production, which,
in turn, depends on the type of institution. The paper empirically supports that the
resource curse is weaker, or completely missing, in countries with producer friendly
institutional quality. In general, however, while there has been intense focus on
analyzing natural resources in positive settings, an important aspect, how best to
manage the resource revenues despite potential harmful growth e¤ects, has been
largely ignored.4
Revenues from natural resources are typically managed by governments, and
political economic factors are likely to inuence how revenues are spent. Spending
policies, in turn, possibly matters for how revenues impact economic performance.
The political economy literature often argues that abundant natural resources lead
to poor spending policies. The idea is that easy revenues corrupt, bring about
conicts (Ross 2004, 2006), and encourage economically ine¢ cient - but politically
important - projects (Robinson and Torvik 2005). To mitigate such problems,
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) suggest, at least for the case of Nigeria,
to decentralize revenues by distributing them directly to the people by which the
government is forced to nance public services by taxes. Taxes may be costly to
collect, yet overall society gains in that collecting taxes is claimed to incorporate a
disciplining mechanism which protects against wasteful projects.5
We argue that nations may be in di¤erent stages of economic development, or
what we refer to as di¤erent economic growth regimes, and that across such stages,
economic factors as private savings di¤er in the way they are generated. Insofar
that savings matter for growth, decentralized revenues may therefore have di¤erent
impacts on economic development.
4One exception is Matsen and Torvik (2005). They analyze an optimal intertemporal consump-
tion path in a Dutch disease model, and show that the growth maximizing policy di¤ers from the
welfare maximizing policy. In their framework, this means some Dutch disease is optimal. Within
the literature of exhaustible natural resources, the literature of how optimally to manage resource
revenues in order to achieve intergenerational equity is well established, see, e.g., Hartwick (1977)
and Solow (1974, 1986).
5A similar proposal is made by Sandbu (2006). He argues that tax revenues di¤er from resource
revenues in that the rst is considered as out-of-pocket losses and the latter as forgone gains
by members of society. In general, he argues, members of society are more likely to hold the
government accountable for out-of-pocket losses than for forgone rents.
94
Chapter 3
We model the possibility of di¤erent growth regimes, and the possibility of
di¤erent spending policies in a unied framework. We use a two-period overlapping
generations growth model in which individuals are altruistic in that parents care
about the welfare of their children. Parents have the possibility to leave bequests,
which they will do, when their altruism is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the economy
is dynastic and behaves like an innitely-lived representative agent model, whereas
the economy behaves like an overlapping generations model, when altruism is not
intense enough and bequests are absent (Barro 1974; Weil 1987). Resource revenues
enter the model in every period as a xed fraction of man-made output. They are
allocated according to a spending policy as direct transfers to members of society
and as expenditures on a public productive service as in Barro (1990).
Our results suggest a potential caveat to decentralizing resource revenues. While
trying to avoid a resource curse created through political economy mechanisms by
distributing revenues directly to members of society, a resource curse may be cre-
ated due to economic factors instead. In addition, we examine various endogenous
spending policies and nd that under such policies, increased resource abundance
may lead to a shift in growth regime to a regime with a lower growth rate; as such
a shift implies higher welfare.
Our model is related to that of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), but more gen-
eral. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) study a two-generation overlapping generations
model (without altruism), in which resource revenues are given entirely to the re-
tired old generation. Higher revenues means less savings, and therefore the economy
is resource cursed.6 Our study emphasizes that the resource curse is fragile with
respect to variation in the allocation of revenue across generations, and that poten-
tial adverse e¤ects on savings can be remedied by spending policies that stimulate
intergenerational transfers.
Our model is also related to the literature that studies e¤ectiveness of economic
6The authors consider in an appendix a situation, in which all individuals (i.e., young and old)
equally divide the resource revenue and nd that resource revenues are less harmful to savings
than when revenues are only given to the old.
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policy in an altruistic setting. Caballe (1998) analyzes how taxation of labor and
capital inuences not only growth performance, but also the growth regime. In his
model, the level of altruism that distinguishes the growth regimes is determined by
the tax policy. Croix and Michel (2002, ch. 5) analyze the neutrality of economic
policy, when the bequest motive is operative.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present the model in section 2. In section 3,
we explain the market equilibrium and characterize the conditions for the altruism
factor which distinguishes the growth regimes. In section 4, we examine di¤erent
policy objectives, derive corresponding spending policies, and analyze the impact
of natural resource revenues on growth and welfare under these policies. In section
5, we study the optimal policy, and the nal section provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and described by a one sided altruistic overlapping gener-
ationsframework. Parents care about the welfare of their o¤spring and have the
possibility to make intergenerational transfers to their immediate descendants in
the form of bequests. Individuals live for two periods: as young and as old. Only
the young generation works, the old generation is retired. There are L individuals
in each generation, which remains constant over time.
2.1 Natural Resource Revenues
In every period t; revenues from the sale of a natural resource enter the economy.
The value of the revenue is exogenously given as a xed fraction, ; of the real value
of man-made output, Yt; where 0 <  < 1: We may think of ; which we refer to as
relative natural resource abundance, as a characteristic that is country specic.7
7Natural resource revenues vary considerably across countries. For instance, Ice-
land, Nigeria, Norway and Venezuela have a share of primary exports in GDP above
0.2, whereas Nepal, Sweden and the US have a share of primary exports below 0.1.
(http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.)
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Let Et denote the real value of the revenue; then,
Et = Yt: (1)
Accordingly, our theoretical model applies also to inows of foreign aid and other
gifts and transfers from abroad.As the resource revenue man-made output ratio
is constant over time, we focus purely on spending policies in relation to intergen-
erational transfers and economic growth.8 Similar ways of modeling of the revenue
(or foreign aid) are found in Chatterjee et al. (2003), Lensink and White (2001),
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), and Torvik (2001).9
2.2 Spending Policies
Based on a spending policy, a government spends all resource revenues in every
period on one or two purposes.
First, it may allocate a share,  ; where 0   < 1; directly to members of society
in a lump-sum fashion.10 Of this share, the young share parameter, ; is given to
the young generation and (   ) to the old; i.e., 0     .
Second, the government invests the remaining resource revenue in a public ser-
vice ow, Gt; that works as input into production. We think of the public service
as a broad range of services that could be infrastructure, administration, legal, and
environmental services. There are no externalities associated with the use of public
services.
In every period, the government runs a balanced budget. It cannot issue debts
nor run surpluses by accumulating assets. Hence,
Gt = (1  )Et = (1  )Yt: (2)
8For a reference on optimal resource extraction, consult Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
9Torvik (2001) discusses alternative ways of modeling the revenue in footnote 4, p. 290. The
important assumption is that the revenue grows over time so that, as a share of income, it does
not converge towards zero.
10A real example of direct transfers of resource rents is found in Alaska. One purpose of the so-
called Alaska Permanent Fund is to distribute the returns of the fund, which come from minerals
and oil, to all inhabitants of the state in the form of a check (Hannesson 2001).
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Therefore, the resource constraint, which is the public budget, satises
Et + (   )Et + (1  )Et = Et = Yt: (3)
2.3 Firms
A representative rm produces man-made output, Yt; and uses three factors in
production: labor, L, the average public service ow per worker, gt  Gt=L, and
capital,Kt:Output per worker, yt; is produced according to the following production
technology:
yt = Ag

t k
1 
t ; (4)
where 0 <  < 1 is the share of labor and of public services in production, A is a
positive constant productivity term, and kt is capital per worker. Labor productiv-
ity increases as the public service ow per worker, gt; increases.11
The representative rm maximizes prots taking gt; as well as the price of out-
put, which is the numeraire, and of inputs, as given. Capital fully depreciates in
each period, and each factor is paid its private marginal product.
@Yt
@Kt
= (1  )A

gtL
Kt

= 1 + rt; (5)
@Yt
@Lt
= A

gtL
Kt

kt = wt: (6)
where rt is the rental rate of capital, and wt is the wage rate.
2.4 Altruistic Individuals
Newborn individuals are identical within as well as across generations. A parent
is altruistic with respect to the welfare of her o¤spring in the Barro (1974) sense
and weights her o¤springs utility in her utility function, Vt: Let Ut denote utility
derived from life-cycle consumption; thus, total utility of an individual at time t
can be presented as
Vt = Ut + Vt+1; (7)
11The public service ow per worker is non-rival, but subject to congestion from L:
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where 0 <  < 1 is the intergenerational discount factor, which we refer to as the
altruism factor. When generations are altruistic, parents care about the welfare of
their children, who in turn care about the welfare of their children, and so forth. In
this way, welfare of all future generations is linked.
Utility from own consumption is the sum of utility from consumption as young,
c1t; and the discounted utility of consumption as old, c2t+1. Specically,
Ut = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1); (8)
where 0 <  < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor. By recursively eliminating
Vt+i; i = 0; :::;1; in (7) we have.12
Vt =
1P
i=0
i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (9)
saying that utility of a young individual born at time t equals own life-cycle utility
plus the discounted sum of life-cycle utilities of her descendants.
In any period t; the young individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor for
which she receives the market wage rate, wt. When the young share parameter,
; is positive, she also receives a direct transfer as a share of the natural resource
revenue, and, nally, she may inherit bequests, bt; from her parents. She consumes
c1t and saves st for her retirement; hence,
c1t + st = bt + wt + et; (10)
where et  Et=L denotes the lump-sum resource revenue income of a young at
time t: When old, she receives the proceeds of her saving, (1 + rt+1)st; where rt+1
is the rate of interest. In addition, if  < ; she receives income from the natural
resource, which she consumes and possibly bequeaths to her o¤spring. Accordingly,
her period two budget constraint can be written as
c2t+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + (   )et+1; (11)
12Eq. (7) can be rewritten by induction as Vt =
PT
i=0 
i[u(c1t+i)+ u(c2t+1+i)] + 
T+1Vt+1+T :
Taking the limit for T ! 1 and assuming that total utility satisfy the limit condition
lim
T!1
T+1Vt+1+T = 0; we get Vt =
PT
i=0 
i(Ut+i): Using Ut = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1); we have
(9).
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where (   )et+1 is the resource revenue given lump-sum to an old person at time
t+ 1. Bequests cannot be negative, i.e., bt+1  0: This restriction prevents parents
from leaving debts to their children.
The dynamics of bequests are found by eliminating st in (10) and (11):
bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)(bt + wt + et   c1t) + (   )et+1   c2t+1: (12)
An individual of generation t maximizes life time utility given in (9) subject to
the two budget constraints, (10) and (11), and the non-negativity constraint on
bequests, by optimally choosing consumption, savings, and bequests, taking bt; wt;
rt+1; et; and et+1 as given.
The Lagrangian of period t is equal to life-cycle utility, Ut; with the change
pt+1bt+1 ptbt in the shadow value of bequests; pt; over a period (Croix and Michel
2002, 244)
Lt = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1) + pt+1bt+1   ptbt: (13)
Note that bt+1  0 implies (1 + rt+1)(bt + wt + et) + (   )et+1  (1 + rt+1)c1t +
c2t+1: Incorporating this restriction in the maximization problem, the optimality
conditions, which are both necessary and su¢ cient, are given by
1
c1t
=
(1 + rt+1)
c2t+1
; (14)
and
bt+1


c1t+1
  
c2t+1

= 0 (with bt+1  0 and 
c1t+1
 
c2t+1
): (15)
The transversality condition is
lim
t!1
tptbt = 0: (16)
Equation (14) describes the trade-o¤ between a persons consumption as young and
as old. In optimum, the individual is indi¤erent between consuming as young and
saving for old consumption. In equation (15), when 
c1t+1
= 
c2t+1
then bt+1 > 0
and when 
c1t+1
< 
c2t+1
then bt+1 = 0. When bequests are positive, a parents
marginal utility of own consumption equals her marginal utility of the o¤springs
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consumption. If a parents marginal utility from her o¤springs consumption is less
than the marginal utility of her own consumption, then bequests are zero, and the
solution is given by a corner solution.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
For simplicity, we normalize the number of working people, L; to unity, so we can
write Et = et; Yt = yt; Kt = kt; and Gt = gt: We obtain the following expression by
rewriting (4) using (2):
yt = Akt

(1  )yt
kt

, yt = [A(1  )] 11 kt  f( ; )kt (17)
where @f(;)
@
< 0: The larger the share of the natural resource revenues spent on
direct transfers, the smaller the public service ow. This implies a smaller public
service ow capital ratio, gt
kt
. Due to the AK structure of the model, it also leads to
a drop in the output capital ratio. Therefore, all things equal, @f(;)
@
> 0; higher
revenues increase public services.
Using (4), factor market clearing implies
rt = (1  )A(gt
kt
)   1; (18)
wt = A(
gt
kt
)kt; (19)
and using (17) in (18) and (19), we get
rt = (1  )f( ; ; )  1  r( ; ); (20)
wt = f( ; ; )kt  w( ; )kt; (21)
where w( ; ) denotes the wage rate capital ratio. Both the rate of return and the
wage rate are positively associated with the public service ow capital ratio, gt
kt
;
and, thus, @r(;)
@
< 0 and @w(;)
@
< 0.
The capital market equilibrium requires savings of the young to equal capital
installed in the productive sector:
st = kt+1: (22)
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Lastly, the goods market equilibrium is given by the aggregate resource constraint.
Using the budget constraints (10), and (11), and the equilibrium conditions (2),
(20), (21), and (22), the aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as
(1 + )yt = c1t + c2t + kt+1 + gt: (23)
Total income in period t is the sum of man-made output plus the natural resource
revenue.
3.1 Dynamics
In the following, we distinguish two growth regimes of the economy based on the
presence of intergenerational transfers. When parents marginal utility of own con-
sumption is larger than the marginal utility they derive from the o¤springs con-
sumption, the non-negativity constraint on bequests is binding, and there are no
bequests.
3.1.1 Zero Bequests
Assume that (15) holds with inequality so bequests are absent. Letting bt = bt+1 = 0
in (10) and (11), we can, by also using (14), derive the an expression for the savings
st :
st =

1 + 
[w( ; )kt + et]  (   )et+1
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
: (24)
Savings are increasing in wages and resource revenues received as young and decreas-
ing in resource revenues received as old. This is intuitive; consumption smoothing
requires higher savings the smaller income is as old compared to income as young.
Using (22), we get from (24)
kt+1 =

1 + 
[w( ; )kt + et]  (   )et+1
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
;
which is the law of motion of capital. Dividing both sides by kt; we nd
Ot+1 =

1 + 
[w( ; ) + 
et
kt
]  (   )
et
kt
(Ot+1 + 1)
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
  1;
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where Ot+1 = (kt+1=kt) 1 is the growth rate of capital (and also capital per worker
due to a constant labor force) when bequests are absent. Note that et = yt =
f( ; ; )kt: Rearrange, and Ot+1 can be expressed as
Ot+1 =
[1 + r( ; )][w( ; ) + f( ; )]
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )] + (   )f( ; )   1  
O(;  ; ): (25)
We dene a balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; and
et grow at constant relative rates in all periods t > 0. From (17) it follows that
capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are given as a
xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that also revenues grow at
the same rate as output. Moreover, as public services are given as a xed fraction
of total resource revenues (in (2)), public services grow at the same rate as output.
From the goods market equilibrium, (23), it follows that aggregate consumption (c1t
plus c2t) grows at the same rate of output. By (14), (20), and rt = r( ; ); it then
follows that period one and period two consumption grow at the rate of output.
Hence, the bequest constrained economy has no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt;
yt; gt; and et grow at the same rate along a balanced growth path at all periods t.
We denote values taken by the variables on the balanced growth path without
bequests with the superscript O:Using (20), (21), and taking kO0 > 0 as given,
equilibrium is given by
cO1t = f( ; )(+ )
1  + (   )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) k
O
t  cO1t(;  ; ); (26)
cO2t = f( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt  cO2t(;  ; ); (27)
kOt+1 =
(1  )f( ; )(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) k
O
t  kOt+1(;  ; ): (28)
On this growth path, parents behave as if they are selsh as they do not leave
intergenerational transfers. Essentially, the economy behaves like an overlapping
generations model.
Growth is positive when income received in period one is su¢ ciently large to
ensure that savings exceed the capital depreciation. Accordingly, (1 )f( ; )(+
) > (1 + )(1  ) + (   ) implies that O(;  ; ) > 0:
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3.1.2 Positive Bequests
When bequests are positive, by (15) 
c1t+1
= 
c2t+1
and the economy is dynastic. In
this regime, the growth rate of period one consumption, Dt+1; is found by dividing
the rst order solutions given in (14) and (15):
Dt+1 = [1 + r( ; )]  1  D(;  ; ): (29)
Again, we dene a balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt;
bt; and et grow at a constant relative rates in all periods t > 0. From (17) it follows
that capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are given
as a xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that natural resource
revenues grows at the same rate as output. Moreover, as public services are given
as a xed fraction of resource revenues (in (2)), also public services grow at the rate
of output.
By the goods market equilibrium, (23), and rt = r( ; ); it must be that if
capital and output grow as the same rate, then this rate equals that of growth
of consumption. From (14), we know that consumption as old and as young is a
constant ratio, so old consumption grows at the same rate as young consumption.
From either of the budget constraints (10) or (11), it follows that also bequests grow
at the same rate as consumption. Thus, also the bequest constrained economy has
no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; bt; and et grow at the same rate along
a balanced growth path at all periods t.
From the rst order conditions to (13), it can be shown that pt equals 1c1t ;
when bequests are positive.13 Hence, pt decreases at the rate D( ; ):We can thus
conclude, when bt > 0; ptbt is a constant, and the transversality condition in (16)
simplies to  < 1. When (15) holds with equality, parents leave bequests and the
economy behaves like a dynasty of innitely-lived generations.
We denote values taken by the variables on the balanced growth path with
13By (13), @Lt@c1t = 0 implies that
1
c1t
= pt+1[1 + r( ; )]; and @Lt@bt = 0 implies that pt =
pt+1[1 + r( ; )], so it follows that 1c1t = pt:
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positive bequests with the superscript D:Equilibrium is given by
bDt = f( ; )

   + [+ (1 + )](1  )
 + 
  

kDt  bDt (;  ; );(30)
cD1t = f( ; )

1 +    (1  )
 + 

kDt  cD1t(;  ; ); (31)
cD2t = f( ; )

1 +    (1  )
 + 

kDt  cD2t(;  ; ); (32)
kDt+1 = f( ; )(1  )kDt  kDt+1(;  ; ); (33)
with kD0 > 0.
Along this growth path, the growth rate is positive when  > 1
1+r(;)
: This con-
dition says, for a young individual to have positive savings and bequests, marginal
utility of consuming one unit extra as young is less than marginal utility derived
from letting the o¤spring consume 1 + r( ; ) units.
Clearly, the growth paths described by (25) and (29) in general di¤er, as does
the way they respond to changes in revenues and in spending policies.
3.2 The Resource Curse
The resource curse typically indicates a negative relationship between natural re-
source abundance and economic performance. In this paper, the resource curse
specically describes the situation where resource abundant nations grow slower
than nations endowed with fewer resources. We can think of two possibilities of
why an economy may be resource cursed: when spending policies are such that
increased abundance (i) leads to savings decline, and (ii) leads to a regime shift to
a regime with a lower growth rate. In the following, we explain and examine both
possibilities.
3.2.1 Savings Decline
Indeed, we nd that savings may be negatively inuenced by increased resource
revenues. In particular,
Lemma 1. Within growth regimes, there exist exogenous policies (  ; ) that
imply a resource curse. When bequests are absent (whether this is due to the policy
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or a low altruism factor) increased natural resource abundance can lead to a lower
growth rate.
Proof. When bequests are absent, along O(; ):
@O(; )
@
=
n
@f(;)
@
(1  )(+ ) + f( ; )[(1  )   (1 )(+)( )
(1+)(1 )+( ) ]
o
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) :
A policy where  = 0 and (1   2) > (1 )

(1 + ) implies @
O(;)
@
< 0: In a
dynastic growth regime,
@D(; )
@
= (1  )@f( ; )
@
> 0 8 0   < 1
proves the non-existence of a resource curse, when bequests are positive. 
An operative bequest motive eliminates the resource curse threat as the growth
rate in this regime is increasing in the rate of return to capital, which, in turn, is
increasing in resource abundance; i.e., @r(;)
@
> 0. Savings are una¤ected by the
allocation of direct transfers as any change in revenues given to a young individual
is o¤set by an identical opposite change in bequests.14 Hence, the rate of growth in
this environment, D(;  ; ); is independent of :
When bequests are absent, accumulation of capital depends on the distribution
of resource revenues across generations. For example, a policy that distributes all
direct transfers solely to the old generation may lead to a resource curse outcome,
in which, higher resource abundance results in fewer savings. The resource curse
prevails when, due to increased resource abundance, a young individual derives
higher marginal utility of consuming as young than as old; i.e., what generates the
resource curse is a disproportional large direct transfer to the old generation in
the situation where bequests are absent. Therefore,
Proposition 1. Given an exogenous policy (  ; ), then when direct transfers
14To see this notice that along a balanced growth path, eq. (12) can be rewritten as
bDt () =
(1+r())(w()kDt +eDt  cD1t)+( )(1+D())eDt    (1+D())cD1t
(1+D()) (1+r()) ; where
@bDt ()
@ =  eDt : Now, write
st =

1+ (b
D
t + w()kDt + eDt )   ( )(1+
D())eDt  (1+D())bDt
(1+)(1+r())  sDt (): Calculating @s
D
t ()
@ using
@bDt ()
@ =  eDt gives @s
D
t ()
@ = 0:
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from the government are absent, or when they, if present, are allocated only to the
young generation, there is no resource curse.
Proof. By lemma 1, we only analyze an economy without bequests.
If  =  = 0; then
@O(; )
@
=

1 + 
@f( ; )
@
> 0 8  = 0;
and, if  =  ; then
@O(; )
@
=

1 + 

@f( ; )
@
(+ ) + f( ; )

> 0 8 0 <  < 1: 
A larger inow of revenues, ceteris paribus, enhances the public service ow
capital ratio and, thus, the wage rate and the rate of return. When direct transfers
are positive, young income increases further relative to old income and savings grow.
We make an interesting observation about the resource curse:
Proposition 2. Increased resource abundance may improve welfare of the two
current generations, despite causing a resource curse.
Proof. See appendix.
Next, we turn to examine how it can be determined that a particular economy
belongs to either of the two growth regimes and how the economy may shift between
growth regimes. In particular, we focus on relating these issues to spending policies
and to the size of the revenue to man-made output ratio, .
3.2.2 Growth Regime Shifts
Though the altruism factor, ; is exogenously given, whether bequests are positive
or zero, is determined endogenously by the rst order condition given in (15). From
(15), we know that when parents marginal utility of own consumption is greater
than their marginal utility from the o¤springs consumption, the economy is without
bequests. A decline in the consumption of the o¤spring relative to consumption of
the parent triggers intergenerational transfers, if the decline is large enough.
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We dene the threshold value of the altruism factor, ; such that under a given
spending policy, ( ; ); when  =  then O(;  ; ) = D(;  ; ). In the special
case, where  = ; bDt (;  ; ) = 0 and parents leave zero bequests. Inverting (29),
substituting in (25), using (20), and (21) yields
 =
(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )  
(;  ; ): (34)
Using this denition of ; we obtain the standard result (Caballe 1998; Cardia and
Michel 2004; Weil 1987) that, when the altruism factor is less than the threshold
value,  < (;  ; ); the economy is without bequest, and the growth path is
described by (25). On the other hand, when the altruism factor is higher than the
threshold value,  > (;  ; ), bequests are positive, and growth evolves according
to (29). We can now compare growth rates in the two regimes:
Proposition 3. Given  6= ; then, if  > , the economy grows faster than
if  < .
Proof. We note, by eq. (34), that eq. (25) can be rewritten as O(;  ; )
= (;  ; )(1  a)f( ; )  1: Since the economy follows this growth path as long
as  < (;  ; ); but changes to D(;  ; ) = (1   a)f( ; )   1 with positive
bequests when  > (;  ; ); it must be that O(;  ; ; ) < D(;  ; ): 
We observe in particular that (;  ; ) is a function of the spending policy as
well as the size of the natural resource abundance. The larger direct transfers given
to the young, ; the more altruistic the parents must be to leave bequests, and the
larger direct transfers given to the old, (   ); less altruistic parents also leave
bequests. In general, changes in  amplify di¤erences in direct transfers across
generations, and we give the following direct transfer distribution rules: When
 = [(1 + )(1 

) + 1]; there is no e¤ect on (;  ; ) from changes in ; i.e.,
@(; ;)
@
= 0; and when  < (>)[(1 + )(1 

) + 1]; @
(; ;)
@
> (<)0: Therefore,
changes in  may push economies from one growth regime to another. In the
following, we examine what happens to the growth rate when increases in  cause
the economy to shift regime:
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Figure 1: Impact on growth from changes in growth regime, prompted by an
increase in natural resource abundance.
Proposition 4. There exist exogenous spending policies ( ; ) for which a
change in growth regime invoked by increased natural resource abundance implies a
resource curse. When the economy shifts from an overlapping generations regime
to a dynastic regime due to increased natural resource abundance then growth can
be lower in the new regime than in the old.
Proof. See appendix.
The situation where a resource curse can occur as a result of a change in growth
regime induced by enhanced natural resource abundance is illustrated in g. 1. In
the gure, subscript 1 refers to the situation before - and subscript 2 refers
to the situation after - an increase in natural resource abundance (i.e., in ). The
horizontal lines illustrates the growth rate in the overlapping generations regime,
O; which is independent of the altruism factor (cf. (25)), and the growth rate in
the innitely lived agents regime, D; which increases in  (cf. (29)).
Consider a situation in which before the change in natural resource abundance
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 < 1 and hence the economy evolves along 
O
1 : Now suppose that the natural re-
source abundance increases; that the spending policy is such that both the threshold
altruism factor and the growth rate in the overlapping generations regime declines
(to 2 and 
O
2 respectively); and moreover that 

2   so that the economy shifts to
the dynastic regime, where the growth rate is given by D2 . Then, as illustrated by
the thicker part of D2 ; if  < ^; the growth rate declines. Interestingly, however,
we also notice that growth declines less that it would have done otherwise without
the regime shift, in which case the growth rate would be O2 : Indeed, if   ^
a potential resource curse situation (as described in lemma 1) is prevented by the
regime shift as in this case D2 > 
O
1 .
Summing up, this section illustrates that spending policies matter and that they
matter di¤erently depending on the presence of bequests. When spending policies
are exogenous, the resource curse prevails as a consequence of savings decline. Fi-
nally, we note that the resource curse and welfare gains may be opposite sides of
the same coin.
4 Political Equilibrium
It seems reasonable, however, to think of spending policies as typically endogenously
determined by a specic economic or political agenda. Therefore, in this section
we ask a slightly di¤erent question; namely, if there are economies in which the re-
source curse exist under endogenous policies. We examine specic policy objectives:
growth maximizing policies, young and old policies.
4.1 Growth Maximizing Policies
Lemma 2. Let bO and bO be the growth maximizing policy when the public budget is
given by the resource revenues (in (3)) and the economy is constrained to be without
bequests. Then bO =  and
bO = ( 0 if 1    2  0
1    2

if 1    2

> 0
:
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When direct transfers are positive and
given to the young, they inuence the growth rate through two channels between
which there is a trade-o¤. The higher  ; the larger direct transfers (to the young
generation) which, ceteris paribus, leads to larger savings for retirement. The higher
 ; however, the less public service input into private production. Lower public
service input into production leads to lower marginal factor productivity, and lower
wage rates means fewer savings for retirement.15
When  = bO =  and  = bO  bO(; ); savings are maximized under the
given public budget and generate the highest feasible growth rate in a no bequest
environment. We notice, when the value of bO(; ) is given by a corner solution,
the rate of economic growth will increase further if the government is able to collect
lump-sum taxes to expand the public service. In such a situation the size of the
public service ow is sub-optimal.
Notice also @bO(;)
@
> 0 when 1   2

> 0: This means that the more abundant
the resource, a larger share of the revenues is given as direct transfers in order to
maximize growth. The reason is that the larger ; the higher the value of one unit
of direct transfer. Higher costs, in terms of lower factor payments, can therefore be
tolerated; i.e., the benets exceed the costs up until the new policy rule.
Lemma 3. Let bD be the growth maximizing policy when the public budget is
given by the resource revenues (in (3)) and the economy is constrained to be with
positive bequests. Then bD = 0:
Proof. Because @
D(: ;)
@
=  @r(;)
@
< 0 we have that bD = 0: 
In the innitely-lived generationsenvironment, the growth maximizing policy
is independent of the magnitude of the natural resource abundance; letting resource
15Moreover, less public service input into production means less man-made output. Since re-
source revenues are a xed fraction of total output, this e¤ect feeds back into lowering the total
amount of resource revenues to be distributed in the rst place. This externality, however, is not
internalized in the competitive equilibrium.
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revenues work as input into production leads to higher growth rates, since the rate
of return is highest, when direct transfers  are zero.
Combining lemma 2 and 3, it can be shown that when   2
1  , the growth max-
imizing policy is identical for the two growth regimes, namely zero direct transfers.
Proposition 5. Under growth maximizing policies, a resource curse does not
exist; increased natural resource abundance enhances growth.
Proof. See Appendix.
The growth maximizing spending policy depends on the strength of altruism.
For high values of the altruism factor, in order to enhance growth, all resource
revenues are invested in public services, and for low values of altruism, the growth
maximizing policy is to allocate a share of the natural resource revenues as direct
transfers to the young.
Growth maximizing policies may, however, su¤er from another potential prob-
lem: dynamic ine¢ ciency. When bequests are absent, the only way for the young to
provide for themselves when old, is to save, which they may do even if the interest
rate is very low. In this case, transferring resources from the young generation to
the old generation is Pareto e¢ cient.
Dynamic ine¢ ciency in endogenous growth models occurs when the competitive
real rate of interest falls short of the growth rate (King and Ferguson 1993). This
condition corresponds to () > 1:16 Under growth maximizing policies, if, e.g.,bO = bO = 1      2

; then (bO;bO; ) = (+)
1+
; therefore, in this case, growth
maximizing policies trigger dynamic ine¢ ciency when  > 1
+ 1 and bequests are
absent.
4.2 Young and Old Policies
In this section, either the young or the old decide a policy, which is implemented
by the government. The policy remains unaltered in perpetuity,17 and the policy
16O(;  ; ) > r( ; ), (; )(1  a)f( ; )  1 > (1  a)f( ; )  1() (; ) > 1:
17A similar assumption is made in Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
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decision is made at the beginning of some arbitrary initial period. After determining
the policy, the young earn a wage and decide their savings knowing whether they
receive a direct transfer from the government or bequests or both. The old receive
a return on their savings, possibly receive a direct transfer from the government,
and possibly leave bequests.
At time t; the utility of a young person is given as in (9):
V t =
1P
i=0
i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (35)
=
1
1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t) +

 + 
1  

ln[1 + ]

: (36)
The young derive utility of own consumption both as young and as old as well of
consumption of their heirs. The old, on the other hand, only derive utility of own
consumption as old and of consumption of their heirs:
V t = ln(c2t) +
1P
i=0
1+i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (37)
= ln(c2t) +

1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t) +

 + 
1  

ln[1 + ]

: (38)
Nevertheless,
Proposition 6. The resource curse can exist when individuals have a very
smallaltruism factor and spending policies are decided by an old generation.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the economy is borderline non-altruistic,a policy decided by the old can
trigger a resource curse. This may not be surprising in that the old generation care
overridingly about its own consumption. Yet since the old receive a higher return
to savings the higher the rate of return, the old do not claim all resource revenues.
A part, if not all, of the revenue is still allocated to public services. Therefore, a
non-altruisticeconomy ruled by the old is not automatically cursed.
Unfortunately, nding closed form solutions to the welfare maximizing policy of
either generation cannot seem to be done in this model. By imposing an additional
assumption to the problem, however, we are able to obtain such results.
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Assumption 1.  =  : (Only the young receive direct transfers from the gov-
ernment.)
As the assumption exogenously determines the intergenerational allocation of
potential direct transfers from the government, we refer to policies under assumption
1 as quasi-endogenousspending policies. In the following, young policies and old
policies, i.e., the policies that the young or the old implement in order to maximize
their welfare, are accordingly quasi-endogenousspending policies.
Assumption 1 is not binding when bequests are positive, since any change in
the distribution of direct transfers of natural resource revenues across generations
is o¤set by an opposite change in bequests. Assumption 1 does, however, a¤ect the
threshold altruism factor positively, which pushes economies towards being in the
overlapping generationsregime.
Under assumption 1, let  and  denote the policy that maximizes V t and V t
given the size of the public budget given by the resource revenues. When  and  are
zero, utility will increase further if the government collects lump-sum payments to
increase the size of the public service. In this case, expanded public services increase
the wage rate and the return to capital, which leads to an overall increase in utility.
We analyze this possibility in the next section, but for now, the maximum size of
the public service is bounded from above by inows of natural resource revenues,
as under growth maximizing policies.
Let O be the spending policy that maximizes young welfare subject to the
public budget restriction when the economy is constrained to be without bequests,
and let D be the spending policy that maximizes young welfare, also subject to
the public budget restriction, when the economy is constrained to be with positive
bequests. Moreover, dene O  1+
(1 )+1+
1 

and D  (1  )O: Then, under
assumption 1,
Lemma 4. Young policy when the economy is constrained to be in either growth
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regime:
O =
(
0 if O  
O 
(1+O)
if O > 
and D =
(
0 if D  1  (1  )
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
if D > 1  (1  ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
Likewise, subject to the public budget restriction, let O be the spending policy
that maximizes welfare of the old generation when the economy is constrained to
be without bequests, and let D be the spending policy that maximizes old welfare
when the economy is constrained to be with positive bequests. Moreover, dene
O  1+
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

and D  (1 )(
1+

)
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

: Then, under assumption
1,
Lemma 5. Old policy when the economy is constrained to be in either growth
regime:
O =
(
0 if O  
O 
(1+O)
if O > 
and  I =
(
0 if D  1  (1  )
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
if D > 1  (1  ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
We notice that the young and old spending policies,  and  ; are both functions
of the intertemporal and intergenerational discount factors as well as of resource
abundance;   (; ) and   (; ):
In both growth regimes, the marginal loss of increasing direct transfers is a
decline in public service input into production, which channels into lower factor
payments. The trade-o¤ faced by the individual depends on the weights given in
her welfare function, which, in turn, depends on whether she is young or old, and
the growth dynamics. For example, when bequests are absent, all things equal, the
young are more likely to implement a spending policy that involves direct transfers;
O > O; @
O()
@O
> 0 and @
O()
@O
> 0: The young generations value the utility of own
consumption in their utility function undiscounted, whereas the old discount the
o¤springs utility of young consumption using the intergenerational discount factor.
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The marginal utility the young obtain from direct transfers is therefore higher and
o¤sets higher marginal utility costs which the direct transfers impose.
Moreover, under assumption 1,
Proposition 7. Within either growth regime, a resource curse does not exist
under either young or old policies; increased natural resource abundance enhances
growth.
Proof. See Appendix.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that under assumption 1, increased
natural resource abundance increases welfare of the young and the old under both
a young and an old policy, when the growth regime remains unaltered. Under both
policies, @c
O
1t(;)
@
> 0;
@cD1t(;)
@
> 0;
@cO2t(;)
@
> 0;
@cD2t(;)
@
> 0; and by proposition 7,
@O(;)
@
> 0 and @
D(;)
@
> 0, so by (36) and (38) we have that within either regime
@V t
@
> 0 and @V t
@
> 0 8  =  and 0   < 1.
Lemma 4 and 5 imply that young and old policies are likely to vary, which means
that also growth rates may vary across political regimes. An economy under either
a young or an old policy may grow faster in either regime. We notice also that
young and old policies di¤er from growth maximizing policies (derived in lemma
2 and 3), when direct transfers are present. On the other hand, policies decided
by the young, the old, as well as growth maximizing policies are coincident, when
direct transfers are zero.
4.2.1 Growth Regime Shifts and the Resource Curse
The quasi-endogenous spending policies of an economy ruled by the young or
the old laid out in lemma 4 and 5 are policies which are constrained by presence
or absence of bequests. This section illustrates that the young or the old may be
able to, through their policies, determine whether bequests are present or not, and
unlike growth maximizing policies, young or old policies can imply a resource curse.
It su¢ ces to analyze either of the above quasi-endogenouspolicies, since the
mechanism is the same. We choose to analyze an economy ruled by the young and
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apply a numerical example given by  = 0:3; 18  = 0:33 and  = 0:55; 19 so that
O = 1:60 and D = 1:12 by lemma 4.
For the parameter values chosen for this example, a young policy, which is
constrained by positive bequests, involves positive transfers when resource abun-
dance is high (when the condition in lemma 4, D > 1   (1   ); is fullled)
and, accordingly, (D(; ); ) grows as parents must be increasingly altruistic to
leave positive bequests. The possibility of positive bequests remains, however, since
(D(; ); ) <  for all values of 0 <  < 1 in the example. Yet at a certain
level of resource abundance, the economy could also be in the overlapping genera-
tionsgrowth regime. At these levels of resource abundance, direct transfers under
a no bequest constrained young policy would involve transfers so high that par-
ents would not leave bequests. Interestingly, therefore, the economy, for values of 
high enough, could be on a growth path with zero or with positive bequests. The
young, therefore, must compare welfare levels to determine the regime in which to
set young policy which is not constrained by presence or absence of bequests.
Fig. 2 maps utility levels of a representative young individual under either
growth regime along with the corresponding growth rates at di¤erent values of
. Both utility levels and growth rates of either regime increase in : We only
map utility and growth rate in the overlapping generationsregime for relevant
values of , that is, when the economy could be in this regime under young pol-
icy (i.e., when  >  where is the value taken by  when  = ; i.e.,  =
f[(1+)(1 )=] g(1+O)+
O
).20
Utility levels are illustrated by the thick lines and thus the line, which crosses
from below, illustrates utility levels for the overlapping generations regime, whereas
the other - kinked - line, illustrates utility levels for the dynastic regime. The kink
occurs then direct transfers become positive. At this point, a smaller share of the
18This value is taken from Croix and Michel (2002, 255).
19Assuming each period is 30 years, this corresponds to an annual discount rate of 2 percent.
20To see this, let  = (+
O)
(1+)(1 ) under young policy. As  = 0:3 = 
() requires O > 0;
substituting O =
O 
(1+O) ; and solving for 
 yields  = f[(1+)(1 )=] g(1+
O)+
O
:
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resource revenue is allocated to productive public services and the direct transfers
from the government to the young are o¤set by a decline in parents bequests.
Therefore, the growth rate increases at a slower rate when  gets higher. The fact
that both consumption as young and old, as well as the growth rate, enters the
welfare function of the young given in (36), explains the kink.
x
Growth rates; Utility
Og
Dg
D
tV
O
tV
1
1*x
Figure 2: Growth rates and utility levels for a young person under di¤erent
policies considered by a young policy maker at di¤erent levels of natural
resource abundance.
Assuming that the productivity term A is large enough that growth is positive,
growth rates are illustrated by the thin lines in g. 2. The line, which starts at
 = ; illustrates the growth rate for under the no bequest regime, and the line,
which it crosses, illustrates the growth rate of the dynastic regime. Generally, the
growth rates vary across growth regimes, and, we notice, that the dynastic growth
rate has the kink that corresponds to the level of revenues at which positive direct
transfers set in. Comparing utility levels, as  becomes higher, there is a utility
gain for the young person from shifting from the dynastic regime to overlapping
generations regime. By shifting growth regime, as natural resources become more
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abundant, the young receives a larger direct transfer from the government, which,
despite at the expense of bequests, leads to higher consumption levels as young,
and, despite the drop in the growth rate, in higher welfare levels.
Indeed, the depicted economy experiences a decline in the growth rate, when,
in response to higher resource revenues, the young policy maker decides a policy
which shifts the economy from the dynastic regime to the overlapping generations
regime with a lower growth rate.
5 The Optimal Policy
This section introduces a social planner, whos objective is to maximize welfare,
Wt; of current and all future generations. The role for a social planner is threefold
as the model has three sources of inequality between the social planner equilibrium
and the market equilibrium. First, the positive e¤ect on GDP from man-made
production, in the form of increased resource revenue, is external to the producers
leading to under-saving and under-accumulation of capital. Second, in the market
equilibrium, investments in the public service are restricted by the available budget,
namely the resource revenues, and there may be economies for which an optimal
size of public service ow is not feasible. Lastly, we noted that when bequests are
absent, the competitive equilibrium may be dynamically ine¢ cient.
Welfare at time t = 0, W0; is given as a weighted sum of current and future
utilities of the members of society by a social welfare function that can be presented
as
W0 =  ln(c20) +
1P
t=0
t+1[ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1)]; (39)
where  is the is the planners intergenerational discount factor.21
The social planner runs a balanced budget, and the resource constraint is the
same as in the market economy, given by
(1 + )yt = c1t + c2t + kt+1 + gt; (40)
21For simplicity, the private intergenerational discount factor equals that of the social planner.
In principle, they could di¤er.
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with initial capital k0 > 0: The variable gt denotes the level of public service chosen
by the social planner. Using this constraint, and substituting c1t; (39) can be
rewritten as
W0 =  ln(c20) +
1P
t=0
t+1 ln f[(1 + )yt   c2t   kt+1   gt] +  ln(c2t+1)g : (41)
The necessary transversality condition is given by
lim
t!1
tqtkt = 0; (42)
where qt is the shadow price of the capital stock. Equation (42) ensures that the
discounted value of wealth tends to zero and that (39) converges (Croix and Michel
2002, 252).
The solution to the social planners problem is found by di¤erentiating (41) with
respect to c2t; kt+1; and gt. We obtain the following conditions satised for all
periods, t :

c1t
=

c2t
; (43)
and
1
c1t
=
[(1 + )@yt
@kt
]
c1t+1
: (44)
Equation (43) says that the ratio between the utility of consumption of the young
and the old generation must equal the ratio between the intertemporal and intergen-
erational discount factor. Unlike the solution to the altruistic generationsproblem,
this equation must hold, since otherwise welfare would increase by shifting con-
sumption across generations. Equation (44) says that the ratio between utility of
young consumption in two consecutive periods must equal the intergenerational
discount rate multiplied with the gross return on capital, since this is the return to
savings. As capital fully depreciates, the social return to capital, rspt ; is
(1 + )
@yt
@kt
= (1 + )(1  )yt
kt
= 1 + rspt ; (45)
so (44) can be rewritten as
1
c1t
=
(1 + rspt )
c1t+1
: (46)
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The social planner chooses an optimal public service ow that satises
(1 + )
@yt
@gt
= 1: (47)
In optimum, the marginal benet of increasing the public service, the rise in man-
made output plus resource revenues, is exactly equal to the cost of doing so. By
use of (4), (47) can be expressed as
gt = (1 + )yt: (48)
As gt is a constant fraction of yt; in optimum, the public spending output ratio is
constant. Applying this expression of gt; we can rewrite (4) as
yt = Akt

(1 + )yt
kt

, yt = [A(1 + )] 11 kt  f sp()kt: (49)
Using (49), we can express rspt from (45)
rspt = (1 + )(1  )f sp()  1  rsp(): (50)
By (46), the growth rate in the consumption of the young generation, t+1; is
t+1 = [1 + r
sp()]  1  (): (51)
We dene an optimal balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt;
gt; and et grow at a constant relative rates, (); at all periods t > 0. From (49) it
follows that capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are
given as a xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that the inow
of natural resource revenues grows at the same rate as output. Moreover, as public
services are given as a xed fraction of total resource revenues (in (57)), also public
services grow at the rate of output.
By the resource constraint (in (40)) and (50) it must be that if capital and
output grow at the same rate, then this rate equals that of consumption. From
(43), we know that the ratio of young and old consumption is constant; thus, old
consumption grows at the same rate as young consumption.
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It can be shown that qt equals 1c1t 1 (Croix and Michel 2002, 103) and therefore
decreases at the rate (), and the transversality condition in (16) simplies to
 < 1. To ensure non-negative growth, we assume that   1
1+rsp()
: The economy
has no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; and et are an optimal solution to
the social planners problem and grow at the same rate along a balanced growth
path at all periods, where (51) characterizes the balanced growth path. Along such
a path, equilibrium is given by
c1t =
(1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  c1t(); (52)
c2t =
(1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  c2t(); (53)
kt+1 = (1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  kt+1(); (54)
with k0 > 0 given.
5.1 Decentralization
We proceed to show how the social planner may decentralize the optimal solution
just derived. Decentralization requires three policy instruments since one external-
ity has to be internalized, public services have to be nanced, and the competitive
equilibrium may be dynamically ine¢ cient.
To internalize the spillover e¤ect from man-made production onto resource rev-
enues, the social planner subsidizes the rms with the resource inow. The repre-
sentative rm solves
max
Kt;L

(1 + )AK1 t (gtL)
   rtKt   wtL
	
; (55)
taking gt; rt; and wt as given. Hence, from the standpoint of the rm,
rt = (1 + )(1  )f sp()  1 = rsp(); (56)
and the private marginal return to capital coincides with the social marginal return.
As resource revenues are allocated to the rms, the social planner collects lump-
sum taxes to invest in the public service. It is convenient to let the tax be a share
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of GDP, so e(1 + )yt = gt; (57)
where the lump-sum tax rate, e ; is a constant. It follows from the balanced budget
that 0 < e < 1. The social planner collects a share, e; of the tax payments from
the young generation and the rest, (1   e); from the old generation. An altruistic
individual is now faced with the following budget constraint:
c1t + st = bt + wt   egt; (58)
when young, and
c2t+1 + bt+1 = [1 + r
sp(; )]st   (1  e)gt+1; (59)
when old, where the real wage rate, wt; can be derived from (55), and bt  0:
Lemma 6. Let e and e be a policy that decentralizes the resource allocation
chosen by the social planner. Then e =  and e = 1  1 

(1+)
+
.
Proof. The size of the public service is optimal when (48) equals (57). Hence,e = :
The transfer which ensures the competitive consumption path equals the optimal
consumption path when bequests are absent satises for old consumption, by (59)
and (53), that
[1 + rsp()]kt   (1  e)gt = (1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt:
Substituting rsp(); kt; and gt; and solving for e; we nd e = 1  1  (1+)+ :
When bequests are positive, they are given by
bt = (1 + )f
sp()[(1  )(1 + )
 + 
  (1  e)]kt
which is positive for e > 1  1 

(1+)
+
and just zero when e = 1  1 

(1+)
+
: As
@bt
@e = (1 + )f sp()kt = gt;
and as
c2t = [1 + r
sp()]kt   (1  e)gt   bt
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so
@c2t
@e = 0;
consumption is invariant to changes in e as long as e  1  1 

(1+)
+
. 
The share, e; thus provides a lower bound on how little the young may be
taxed and still leave the parent at least indi¤erent between leaving bequests or not.
When 1 > e > 0; both the old and the young contribute to the public service.
When e = 0 only the old pay, and when e < 0; only the old pay and the young
generation receives a transfer. The share, e; cannot be higher than one, since then
the young would have negative consumption.
As we expect, an optimal balanced growth path is dynamically e¢ cient. Whene = 1  1 

(1+)
+
; parents are indi¤erent about leaving bequests and  = : Since
 < 1; the rate of return is higher than the rate of growth. Finally,
Proposition 8. Under optimal policies, welfare and growth increase when in-
ows of natural resource revenues increase.
Proof. By (39),
Wt =  ln c2t +
1
1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1) +
(1 + )
1   ln(1 + ())

:
As @()
@
> 0 we can conclude that the resource curse does not exist, and, further
by @c1t()
@
> 0 and @c2t()
@
> 0; that @Wt
@
> 0: 
6 Concluding Remarks
Using an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations, we ex-
plain why nations may respond di¤erently to natural resource abundance: Nations
may be in di¤erent growth regimes that vary in how savings are a¤ected by natural
resource revenues.
As rst pointed out by Weil (1987), there is a threshold level of altruism which
separates the two growth regimes. In our model, this threshold level of altruism,
which is determined endogenously, is inuenced by the allocation and the abundance
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of the resources. When parentsaltruism is higher than the threshold altruism level,
the bequest motive is operative, and resource abundance increases growth as well
as welfare of either generation. Bequests interrupt the connection between direct
transfers from the government and savings by allowing for o¤setting intergenera-
tional transfers from the old to the young. Therefore, savings are una¤ected by how
resource revenues are allocated across generations. In contrast, a resource curse may
exist when the bequests motive is not strong enough that parents leave bequests.
In this case, policies that allocate revenues to the old generation may harm savings
of the young and, subsequently, growth. Yet the e¤ect on the current generations
welfare is ambiguous; resource abundance may increase consumption levels which
then (perhaps more than) compensates for reduced growth.
We also examine spending policies that are endogenously determined by a spe-
cic economic or political agenda. We nd that a resource curse is avoided by
growth maximizing policies. Under such policies, when bequests are absent, any
direct transfers are given exclusively to the young generation. Higher resource abun-
dance merely increases direct transfers, and, hence, savings and growth. When be-
quests are positive, all revenues are allocated to public services, since, in a dynastic
regime, growth expands with more public services. Public services, in turn, expand
with the revenue under this spending policy.
Instead, a resource curse may be triggered by gerontocracy when altruism is
very small.The old generation may prefer to allocate to itself direct transfers to
an extent that higher resource abundance reduces savings of the young generation.
We also examine spending policies decided by a young and an old generation
respectively. Unfortunately, however, we can only nd closed form solutions to the
welfare maximizing spending policy of either generation when the old generation
is excluded from receiving direct transfers. In this case, however, a decline in
growth rates caused by increased resource abundance implies an increase in welfare.
Thus, the general use of the term poor economic performance in relation to
slower economic growth rates may be misleading. Nevertheless, by solving the
social planners problem, we show that under optimal polices there can never be a
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resource curse as dened here.
Further theoretical work may seek to endogenize the policy decision which is
modeled exogenously in this model. Such models will add to the literature on polit-
ical economy explanations for the resource curse. Another extension is to examine
other allocations of the resource revenue. In particular, a model in which the re-
source revenue is used only as direct transfers as suggested by Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) may lead to more explicit solutions. In addition, research into
what factors, for instance, life-expectancy or fertility, that inuence the strength
of the bequest motive may be helpful in identifying how nations are a¢ liated with
growth regimes, or development stages.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove proposition 2 by presenting parameter combinations for which @
O()
@
< 0
and, for both the young and the old generation, @Vt
@
> 0.
Utility of a representative young individual at time t in the overlapping gener-
ationsregime, V
O
t ; is given as
V
O
t =
1
1  

ln(cO1t) +  ln(c
O
2t) +

 + 
1  

ln(1 + O(; ))

;
(this equation is the same as (36) in the main text), where
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  
8<:
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

@cO2t
@
cO2t
+

 + 
1  
 @O(;)
@
1 + O(; )
9=; : (60)
Utility of a representative old individual at time t in the overlapping generations
regime, V Ot ; is given as
V Ot = ln(c
O
2t) +

1  

ln(cO1t) +  ln(c
O
2t) +

 + 
1  

ln(1 + O(; ))

;
(this equation is the same as (38) in the main text), where
@V Ot
@
=
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

1  
8<:
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

@cO2t
@
cO2t
+

 + 
1  
 @O(;)
@
1 + O(; )
9=; : (61)
When  = 0; then
@cO1t
@
cO1t
=

(1  ) +

1  +   

(1 + )(1  ) +  ; (62)
and
@cO2t
@
c02t
=

(1  ) +

1  +  ; (63)
and
@O(;)
@
1 + O(; ) =

(1  )  

(1 + )(1  ) +  : (64)
Substituting (62), (63), and (64) in (60) and (61) gives
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  
8<:
h
1 + + +
1 
i
(1  ) +
(1 + )
1  +   

h
1+
1 
i
(1 + )(1  ) + 
9=; ;
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and
@V Ot
@
=

(1  ) +

1  +  + 
@V
O
t
@
:
We proceed by use of a numerical example in which  = 0:2;  = 0:5; and  = 0:1:
By the proof of lemma 1, @
O()
@
< 0 , (1   2) > (1 )

(1 + ): Hence,
(1  2) > (1 )

(1 + ) implies for the numerical example that
 > 0:4:
Moreover, @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies
6:5
3
+
6
0:8 + 
 

1
0:9

6
1:2 + 
> 0;
and @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies
1
4
+

0:8 + 
+ 0:1

6:5
3
+
6
0:8 + 
 

1
0:9

6
1:2 + 

> 0:
Since 1
4
+ 
0:8+
> 0 then @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies @V
O
t
@
> 0: Hence, we can focus on welfare
of the young generation. We complete the proof by providing an example where
 > 0:4 and 6:5
3
+ 6
0:8+
   1
0:9

6
1:2+
> 0. For example,  = 0:5 > 0:4 satises
the rst condition, and  = 0:5 ) 6:5
3
+ 3
1:2
    1
0:9

3
1:7
= 2:7058 > 0 satises the
second condition. Hence,  = 0:5 satises @
O()
@
< 0; @V
O
t
@
> 0 and @V
O
t
@
> 0: 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Combining (25) and (34) gives O(; ) = (; )(1  a)f( ; )  1: Then,
@O(; )
@
=
@(; )
@
[(1  a)f( ; )] + (; )(1  a)@f( ; )
@
:
where @
(;)
@
= 
(1+)(1 )+( )
h
   (+)( )
(1+)(1 )+( )
i
R 0 and @f(;)
@
> 0:
By (29), we derive
@D(; )
@
= (1  a)@f( ; )
@
:
where @f(;)
@
> 0:
There are three situations: @
(;)
@
= 0; @
(;)
@
> 0; and @
(;)
@
< 0:
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First, when@
(;)
@
= 0; the growth regime remains unaltered by higher resource
revenues (and @
O(;)
@
> 0 and @
D(;)
@
> 0):
Second, when @
(;)
@
> 0; if an economy changes regime, it changes from a
dynastic to an overlapping generations regime. When  = (; ); by denition,
O(; ) = D(; ) and thus when  < (; ); the initial growth rate D(; ) is less
than O(; ): Hence, when the economy shifts from D(; ) to O(; ); and since
@O(;)
@
> 0 in this situation, the economy grows faster on the new growth path than
on the old growth path.
Third, when @
(;)
@
< 0; if the economy changes regime, it changes from an
overlapping generations regime to a dynastic regime. Again, when  = (; ); by
denition, O(; ) = D(; ):
Consider rst the situation where @
(;)
@
< 0; but @
O(;)
@
 0: Using the sub-
script 1 as a reference to the situation before and subscript 2 as a reference
to the situation after an increase in natural resource abundance, then O2 (; ) 
O1 (; ): Since, for the regime shift to occur,  > 2(; ); and since when  = 2(; )
by denition O2 (; ) = D2 (; )(= f( ; 2)(1   )); we have that a regime shift
implies D2 (; ) > O1 (; ); i.e., the economy grows faster on the new growth path
(D2 (; )) than on the old growth path (O1 (; )).
Now, consider the situation where @
(;)
@
< 0 and @
O(;)
@
< 0: Again, using the
subscript 1as a reference to the situation before and subscript 2as a reference
to the situation after an increase in natural resource abundance, then O2 (; ) <
O1 (; ): For the regime shift to occur,  > 2(; ); and since when  = 2(; )
by denition O2 (; ) = D2 (; )(= f( ; )(1   )) we have that growth is higher
along the new growth path than along the old growth path, i.e., D2 (; )  O1 (; );
only if   ^; where ^ is dened as the value of the altruism factor for which
O1 (; ) = D2 (; ): If  < ^ the economy grows slower along the new grow path
than along the old growth path. 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the problem
max
;
O(;  ; ) subject to   0;    ; and  < 1:
The growth rate, O(;  ; ); is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions
are all linear. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient.
The Lagrangian is
L = (1  )f()(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )   1 + 1   2(   )  3(   1):
The ve Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
(1  )f()
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

1 +
+ 
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

+ 1   2 = 0 (65)
(1  )(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

@f()
@
  f()
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

+ 2   3 = 0 (66)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (67)
2  0;    ; 2(   ) = 0 (68)
3  0;  < 1; 3(   1) = 0 (69)
If  = 0 and  = 0 then 3 = 0: Combination of (65) and (66) yields
1 =
 
h
f() + @f()
@

i
1 + 
:
Since 1  0; 2  1   must be satised for this to be a solution. In this case,
2 =
f()
1 + 
+
f()
(1 + )2(1  ) + 1 > 0;
which is then a solution.
If  = 0 and  > 0; then 2 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (65)
1 =   (1  )f()
(1 + )(1  ) + 

1 +

(1 + )(1  ) + 

;
which contradicts 1  0:
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If  > 0 and  > 0; then 1 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (65) for this to be a solution,
2 > 0; and by (68), this requires  =  : Using (65) in (66), we have
@f()
@
(+ ) + f() = 0;
which is satised when  = 1    2

:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (1   2 ; 1   
2

; 0; f()
1+
+ f()(+)
(1+)2(1 ) ; 0) if
2

< 1 ; and
(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (0; 0;
 [f()+ @f()@ ]
1+
; f()
1+
+ f(;)
(1+)2(1 )  
[f()+ @f()@ ]
1+
; 0) if
2

 1  . 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
First, consider the economy without bequests. Let bO denote the growth rate under
a growth maximizing spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
bO = b(1  ) bfO   1  bO(bO;bO; ); (70)
where b  (bO;bO; ) = (+bO)
(1+)(1 ) and
bfO  f(bO; ). Direct transfers may be
zero or positive: When bO = bO = 0; then
@bO()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@ bfO
@
#
> 0;
When, bO = bO = 1    2

; then
dbO()
d
= (1  )
"
@b
@bO db
O
d
bfO + b@ bfO
@bO db
O
d
#
:
Since @
b
@bO dbOd > 0 and @ bfO@bO dbOd > 0; we have that dbO()d > 0:
Second, let bD denote the growth rate when the economy is dynastic, thus
bD = (1  ) bfD   1  bD(bD; );
where bfD  f(bD; ): Since bD = 0,
@bD()
@
= (1  )@
bfD
@
> 0:
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Third, we consider the situation where the economy is in di¤erent growth regimes
before and after the change in natural resource endowments. In this case,
b(bO=0) <  < b(bO=1  2

) ,

(1 + )(1  ) <  <
 [+ ]
(1 + )(1  ) ;
so that spending policies decide whether bequests are absent or present. Since
@b(bO=0)
@
= 0 and
@b(bO=1  2=)
@
> 0 the economy will be in the dynastic growth
regime when direct transfers are absent at all levels of natural resource abundance.
Using the subscript 1 as a reference to the situation before and subscript
2as a reference to the situation after an increase in natural resource abundance,
consider rst the situation where initially the growth maximizing policy is to letbO = 0 and thus initially the economy evolves along bD1 : When policies are growth
maximizing, the new growth regime will be the overlapping generations regime only
if bO2 > bD2 ) bO2 > bD1 since @bD()@ > 0: Hence, growth is higher on the new growth
path than on the old. Else, if bO2 < bD2 ; there will be no regime shift, and cf. above,
growth increases along the initial growth path (since @bD()
@
> 0).
Now, consider the situation where initially the growth maximizing policy is
to let bO = 1      2

; and thus initially the economy evolves along bO1 : When
policies are growth maximizing, the new growth regime will be dynastic only ifbD2 > bO2 ) bD2 > bO1 since @bO()@ > 0: Hence, growth is higher on the new growth
path than on the old. If bD2 < bO2 ; there will be no regime shift, and cf. above,
growth increases along the initial growth path.
Thus, there is no resource curse under growth maximizing policies. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
We consider the problem
max
;
V Ot subject to   0;    ; and  < 1:
First, we choose  = 0; then V Ot = ln(c
O
2t) = ln

f( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt
	
:
Utility, V Ot ; is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all linear.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The Lagrangian
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is
L = lnf( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt 	+ 1   2(   )  3(   1):
The ve Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
 
1  + (   ) + 1   2 = 0 (71)

1  + (   )  

1  
1
1   + 2   3 = 0 (72)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (73)
2  0;    ; 2(   ) = 0 (74)
3  0;  < 1; 3(   1) = 0 (75)
If  = 0 and  = 0; then 3 = 0: Combination of (71) and (72) then yields
1 =

1  :
In this case,
2 =
 
1   + 1:
Since 2  0; when   ; this is then a solution.
If  = 0 and  > 0; then 2 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (71),
1 =

1  +  ;
which is satised for  > 0: From (72),

1  +  =

1  
1
1   ;
which is satised for  = (1  )(1  

): As  > 0, for this to be a solution  < :
If  > 0 and  > 0; then 1 = 3 = 0: Since,
2 =
 
1  + (   ) ;
for this to be a solution, 2 > 0: This requires  > ; which contradicts    :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (0; 0;

1  ;
 
1  ; 0) if   ; and (0; (1  )(1   ); 1 + ; 0; 0) if
 < : When  = 0 and  = (1  )(1  

); @
O
@
= f()
1++ (

1  +

+
  
1++ ):
Hence, when 
1  +

+
< 
1++  ;
@O
@
< 0.
Now, by continuity, this also holds for su¢ ciently smallpositive s. 
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
We consider the problem
max

V t(c1t; c2t; ) subject to   0 and  < 1
given  =  ; and where V t(c1t; c2t; ) is given by (36) in the main text with insertion
of (26), (27) and (25) when the economy is constrained to be without bequests, and
with insertion of (31), (32), and (29), when the economy is constrained to be with
bequests. V t is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all linear.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The Lagrangian
is
L = V t + 1   2(   1):
The three Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@V t
@
+ 1   2 = 0 (76)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (77)
2  0;  < 1; 2(   1) = 0 (78)
where
@V t
@
=
1
1  

1
c1t
@c1t
@
+

c2t
@c2t
@
+

 + 
1  

1
1 + ( ; )
@( ; )
@

: (79)
Under assumption 1,  =  ; on a balanced growth path without bequests,
1
cO1t
@cO1t
@
=

+ 
  
(1  )(1  ) ; (80)
and
1
cO2t
@cO2t
@
=   
(1  )(1  ) ; (81)
and
1
1 + O( ; )
@O( ; )
@
=

+ 
  
(1  )(1  ) : (82)
Substituting (80), (81), and (82) into (79), we get
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  

1 + 
1  


+ 
 

+
1 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
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By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, if  = 0; then 2 = 0; thus by (76),
1 =  @V
O
t
@
:
Since 1  0,

+ 1+
1 


1  

1+
1 



for this to be satised. Hence,   O
where O  1+
(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0) for  = 0 to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0; thus by (76),
1 =  @V
O
t
@
= 0:
Hence,

+ 1+
1 


(1 )(1 ) =

1+
1 


+
; which implies  = 
O 
(1+O)
; which is then
a solution when O > :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(O; 1; 2) = (0; @V
O
t
@
; 0) if   O and ( O 
(1+OLG)
; 0; 0) if O > :
On a balanced growth path with positive bequests,
1
cD1t
@cD1t
@
=

1 +    (1  )  

(1  )(1  ) ; (83)
and
1
cD2t
@cD2t
@
=

1 +    (1  )  

(1  )(1  ) ; (84)
and
1
1 + D( ; )
@D( ; )
@
=   
(1  )(1  ) : (85)
Substituting (83), (84), and (85) into (79), we nd
@V
D
t
@
=
1
1  


1 +    (1  )

(1 + ) 

+
1 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, if  = 0 then 2 = 0: By (76), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
:
Since 1  0,

+ 1+
1 


(1 ) 
h

1 (1 )
i
(1 + ) for this to be a solution. Hence,
1  (1  )  D where D  (1+)(1 )
(1 )+1+
1 

= (1  )O(> 0) is a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (76), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
= 0:
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Hence,
h

1+ (1 )
i
(1+) =

+ 1+
1 


(1 )(1 ) which implies  =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
:
Since  > 0; for this to be a solution, D > [1  (1  )]:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(D; 1; 2) = (0; @V
D
t
@
; 0) if 1  (1  )  D and ( D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; 0; 0) if
D > [1  (1  )]: 
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
We consider the problem
max

V t(c1t; c2t; ) subject to   0 and  < 1
given  =  ; and whereV t(c1t; c2t; ) is given by (38) in the main text with insertion
of (26), (27) and (25) when the economy is constrained to be without bequests,
and with insertion of (31), (32), and (29), when the economy is constrained to be
with bequests. V t; is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all
linear. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The
Lagrangian is
L = V t + 1   2(   1):
The three Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@V t
@
+ 1   2 = 0 (86)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (87)
2  0;  < 1; 2(   1) = 0 (88)
where
@V t
@
=

1 +

1  

1
c2t
@c2t
@
+

1  
"
1
c1t
@c1t
@
+

 + 
1  
 @(;)
@
1 + ( ; )
#
: (89)
Substituting (80), (81), and (82) from the proof of Lemma 4 into (89), we nd
@V Ot
@
=

1  

1 + 

+
 + 
1  
  
(1  )(1  ) +
1 + 
1  

+ 

:
By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have that if  = 0; then 2 = 0: By (86), then
1 =  @V
O
t
@
:
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Since 1  0,

1 +
(+ 1+1  )
1 


1   1 

1+
1 



for this to be satised. Hence,
  O; where O  1+
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0); for this to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (86) rst condition then
1 =  @V
O
t
@
= 0:
Thus,

1 +
(+ 1+1  )
1 


(1 )(1 ) =

1 

1+
1 


+
; which implies  =
O 
(1+O)
: Since
 > 0; for this to be a solution, O > :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(O; 1; 2) = (0; @V
O
t
@
; 0) if   O and ( O 
(1+O)
; 0; 0) if O > :
When bequests are positive, by use of (83), (84), and (85) from the proof of
Lemma 4, (89) is
@V Dt
@
=
1
1  

(1 + )

1 +    (1  )  

1 + + 

 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
By the Kuhn Tucker conditions, if  = 0; then 2 = 0; and then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
:
Since 1  0,
h
(+ 1 + 

+
1 
i

1   (1 + ) 1 (1 ) for this to be satised.
Hence, 1 (1 )  D where D  1+
+1+(+1  )
1 

=
1 

(1+)
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0)
for this to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (86), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
= 0:
Thus,
h
(+ 1 + 

+
1 
i

(1 )(1 ) =
(1+)
1+ (1 ) ; which implies  =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
:
Since  > 0; for this to be a solution, D > [1  (1  )]:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(D; 1; 2) = (0; @V
D
t
@
; 0) if 1  (1  )  D and ( D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; 0; 0) if
D > [1  (1  )]: 
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Bequests may be absent or present. Let O denote the growth rate under a young
spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
O = 

(1  )fO   1  O(O; );
where 
  (O; ) = (+O)
(1+)(1 ) and f
O  f(O; ); and let O denote the growth
rate under an old spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
O = (1  )fO   1  O(O; );
where   (O; ) = (+O)
(1+)(1 ) and f
O  f(O; ): Under both policies, direct
transfers from the government may be zero or positive. We treat young and old
policy in turn. Young policy (as given in lemma 4): When O = 0; then
@O()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@f
O
@
#
> 0;
when, O = 
O 
(1+O)
; then
dO()
d
= (1  )
"
@

@O
dO
d
f
O
+ 
@f
O
@O
dO
d
#
:
Since @

@O
dO
d
> 0 and @f
O
@O
dO
d
> 0; we have that d
O()
d
> 0: Old policy (as given in
lemma 5): When O = 0; then
@O()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@fO
@
#
> 0;
when, O =
O 
(1+O)
; then
dO()
d
= (1  )
"
@
@O
dO
d
f
O
+ 
@f
O
@O
dO
d
#
:
Since
@
@O
dO
d
> 0 and
@fO
@O
dO
d
> 0; we have that
dO()
d
> 0:
Let D denote the growth rate under a young spending policy when the economy
is dynastic, thus
D = (1  )fD   1  D(D; );
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where f
D  f(D; ): Likewise, let D denote the growth rate under an old spending
policy when the economy is dynastic, then
D = (1  )fD   1  D(D; );
where fD  f(D; ): Again, under both policies, direct transfers from the govern-
ment may be zero or positive. We treat young and old policy in turn. Young policy
(as given in lemma 4): When D = 0, then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@
> 0;
and when D = 
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@D
dD
d
> 0:
Old policy (as given in lemma 5): When D = 0 then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@
> 0;
and when D =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@D
dD
d
> 0:
Thus, there is no resource curse under young or old policies when the growth regime
remains unaltered. 
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Abstract
This paper studies a model of Dutch disease with learning by doing and
household production. Only women work in the households. We compare
economies with mobile labor and economies with gender specic sectors. In
the latter economy, in addition to working in the household, women work
in either the traded or the non-traded sector, and men allocate all their
labor to the sector not occupied by women. The e¤ect of enhanced natural
resource abundance on factor allocation, the real exchange rate, wage rates,
production, and growth are worked out for each case. Our analysis suggests
that labor mobility and di¤erences in how gender is grouped across sectors
play a role in how natural resource abundance impacts economic performance.
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1 Introduction
Despite substantial e¤orts to reveal empirically the nature of how natural resource
abundance interacts with economic development, it appears that no denite an-
swers can be given to whether such abundance is a blessing or a curse.1 Earlier
literature on the Dutch disease2 depicts a negative relationship between resource
abundance and productivity levels (see in particular van Wijnbergen 1984; Krug-
man 1987; Sachs and Warner 1995; and Gylfason et al. 1997 in the learning by
doing context) and economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995; and Gylfason et al.
1997). In contrast, Torvik (2001) proposes a Dutch disease model in which variation
in sectoral learning by doing e¤ects and spillover rates explains variation in how
natural resources impact sectoral productivity. In this model, natural resources
have no impact upon the long-term growth rate.
Generally, in these models labor moves exibly between the traded and the
non-traded sector, and the labor supply is exogenously given and constant. Behind
these approximations lies an assumption about perfect labor mobility and about
inelastic labor supply. While these assumptions may apply to some economies,
they clearly seem unrealistic for others. They ignore the possibility that societal
structures in the labor market matter for how an economy responds to changes in
natural resource abundance, which is precisely what the Dutch disease models seek
to analyze. Nevertheless, aspects of labor mobility and labor supply are almost3
completely neglected in the existing Dutch disease literature.
We pay special attention to two circumstances which motivate how this issue can
be addressed. The rst circumstance concerns gender-grouping of the labor market.
1The resource curse hypothesis receives support by a large body of empirical literature (Auty
1993, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001 among others). Nevertheless, the notion of an
unconditional curse is also questioned empirically (Larsen 2005; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004; Stijns
2005; Ng 2006). See Frederiksen (2007) for a survey of the recent empirical literature.
2The precise meaning of Dutch disease has evolved over time (consult Stevens (2003) for a
review). Our paper belongs to the strand of literature that relates Dutch disease to learning by
doing e¤ects on productivity and growth.
3We know of two exceptions; both neoclassical models. Hoel (1981) analyzes a short run Dutch
disease model, where labor is immobile. Hsieh et al. (1998) examine endogenous labor-leisure
choices within a Dutch disease model.
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Gender-based occupational segregation, which has been shown to be a worldwide
phenomenon, describes the situation in which labor markets are divided on the
basis of gender (Anker 1998). Occupational segregation can be explained by social
and cultural barriers that leads to labor market immobility, and, consequently, to
a reduction in the economys ability to adjust to change. Since it is precisely the
economys ability to adjust to change - in the form of a increased resource abundance
- which leads to the Dutch disease, occupational segregation presumably matters
for predicting Dutch disease symptoms.
The second circumstance concerns household production. Household production
supports the lives of most families; yet a person engaged in production for household
use is not usually regarded as belonging to the labor force. Endogenous labor supply
decisions, however, also inuence how the economy adjusts to changes in resource
abundance.
Therefore, we add a household sector to an economy, which is otherwise de-
scribed by a Dutch disease model with learning by doing e¤ects. We consider labor
in the household a heterogeneous factor in production in that male labor is not
productive. With respect to production in the two other sectors, the traded and
the non-traded sector, we consider rst labor as a homogenous factor of production,
but barriers, such as stigma and customs, force men and women to work in sepa-
rate sectors. Second, we consider an economy in which labor is completely mobile
between the traded and the non-traded sector. In this scenario, the main departure
from Torvik (2001) is the endogeneity of the female labor supply.
Our analysis demonstrates that labor market structures play a critical role in
whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse; i.e., in the context of this
paper, for production and growth. Slower economic growth rates in natural resource
abundant economies are explained by a movement of female labor into the household
sector which does not contribute to overall economic growth. As we also show,
whether women decrease their labor supply in response to increased natural resource
abundance, in turn, depends on the gender-grouping of the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. Next, we provide background information
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to support our analysis of the labor market. Section 3 presents the model, and
equilibrium outcomes are explained in section 4. Section 5 presents a resource
impact analysis. In particular, we analyze the link between labor market structure
and the Dutch disease. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 Background
Mens and womens labor market patterns diverge. Among other things, this diver-
gence is manifested as gender-di¤erences in occupations: Occupational segregation
by sex4 is extensive in every region, at all economic development levels, under all
political systems, and in diverse religious, social and cultural environments. It is one
of the most important and enduring aspects of labour markets around the world
(Anker 1997, 315).
Explanations and theories of occupational segregation are numerous.5 Anker
(1998) distinguishes three categories: neoclassical, segmentation, and non-economic
theories. Neoclassical theories typically explain occupational segregation by gender-
di¤erences in preferences, or in human capital. If women are less educated than
men, for instance because women spend more time in the household, they will work
in occupations that requires lower levels of education. Segmentation theories, on the
other hand, argue that so-called barriers, which could be institutional, exist between
segments of the economy. The idea is that each sector may function according to
neoclassical theory, but barriers prevent interaction between sectors. Typically,
one of the sectors is the well paid, primary,or male dominated sector, whereas
the other sector is the less attractive, secondary, or female dominated, sector.
Finally, non-economic explanations involve social norms and cultural restrictions.
A classical example is purdah, which forbids women in some Islamic cultures to
interact with male strangers in public (Anker 1998). Goldin (1995) argues that
low-income societies stigmatize the husbands of women who perform paid work.
4Often, the literature distinguishes between sex and gender. The term sex refers to
biology, and the term gender to di¤erences that are learned on the basis of cultural or social
norms. The current paper, however, uses the terms sexand genderinterchangeably.
5See, e.g., Leontaridi (1998) for a review of the literature.
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The extent of gender-segregation in occupations varies from region to region.
Sanday (1981, 80) notes that: Sexual separation is so extreme in some societies
that almost all work activities are dened as either male or female, with the result
that the sexes form sexual ghettos.At the same time, Sanday nds considerable
diversity in the cultural patterning of work. Also Boserup (1970) documents wide
variations across Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the representation of women
in agriculture, trade, and administration. Tasks considered male in one society are
often allocated to women in others.
There are several ways to measure gender-based occupational segregation. Anker
(1998) presents two,6 among others, measures: the index of dissimilarity (ID) and
the representation ratio for women. The IDmeasure is the most commonly used, but
also criticized, index for measuring gender segregation of labor markets. It measures
the sum over all occupations of the absolute di¤erences between the proportion of
all females and all males in each occupation divided by two, and hence it ranges
from zero to one. The higher the ID, the higher the gender-based occupational
segregation. Table 1 presents the ID in ve regions of the world.
Table 1 Regional index of dissimilarity (ID)
Regiona
OECD Middle East and Asia/Pacic Other Transition
North Africa Developing Economies
ID 0.600 0.672 0.492 0.629 0.593
Source: Anker (1998).
a In all, 41 countries are included in the data.
We observe a variation in the degree of gender segregation across regions. Gen-
der segregation is highest in the Middle East and North Africa region, and lowest in
the Asia/Pacic region. We also note that the OECD region has considerable segre-
gation. The pattern of gender segregation in table 1 is in conformity with womens
representation ratios across six occupational groups, all non-agricultural, which are
6We refer to Anker (1998, ch. 5) for a thorough and technical explanation of the di¤erent
measures.
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illustrated in table 2. The representation ratio is the percentage female in an oc-
cupational group divided by the average percentage female for the non-agricultural
labor force7 as a whole. A value greater than one implies that women are overrep-
resentented, and a value less than one implies that women are underrepresentated,
relative to their overall share of the non-agricultural labor force.
Table 2 Representation Ratios for Women for Six Occupational Groups
Regiona Occupational Group
Professional and Admin. and Clerical Sales Services Production
technical managerial
OECD 1.17 0.51 1.61 1.24 1.51 0.37
Middle East and
North Africa 2.43 0.46 1.85 0.28 1.25 0.33
Asia/Pacic 1.35 0.34 0.95 1.02 1.42 0.74
Latin America and
Caribbean 1.21 0.58 1.37 1.25 1.53 0.43
Africa 1.15 0.39 1.31 1.47 1.13 0.51
Source: Anker (1998).
a In all, 56 countries are included in the data.
Table 2 reveals variation across regions in the representation of women. In ad-
dition, which is not shown in the table, there is also great variation within regions
(Anker 1998). In general, however, there are two occupational groups in which
women are underrepresented: administrative and managerial occupations and pro-
duction. The administrative and managerial occupational group is a small group
and employs roughly four percent of the labor force. In contrast, production is a
large occupational group and employs about 33-48 percent of the labor force. As
production sectors are typically the traded sectors, this indicates that women are
generally underrepresented in trade. As shown in table 2, womens underrepresen-
tation in production is smallest in the Asia/Pacic region. Women have therefore
most likely contributed to the development of this region, which has been ascribed
largely to exports (UNIDO 1994).
7In Ankers (1998) representation ratio estimates, agricultural occupations are excluded from
the data. The reason is methodological problems of measuring correctly and consistently agricul-
tural employment, as a large share of agricultural employment is incorporated in household work;
especially, in developing countries.
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Within the two male dominated occupational groups: administrative and man-
agerial occupations and production, men typically hold jobs as government admin-
istrators and various types of construction workers.
Not surprisingly, women are overrepresented in the traditional female occupa-
tions such as services, clerical, and sales, with the exception of the Middle East
and North Africa region, in which women are strongly underrepresented in sales.
Womens underrepresentation in sales in this region may be explained by the above
mentioned tradition of purdah. Women are generally also overrepresented in the
professional and technical group. This can be ascribed to their larger representa-
tion in jobs such as teachers and nurses.
Another aspect of the di¤erences in mens and womens labor market patterns
relates to the household sector in that households, worldwide, are operated mainly
by female labor. In developing countries, despite variations from rural to urban
households, as some household work, or subsistence activities, which can be per-
formed in rural areas cannot be carried out in urban surroundings, women use a
large share of their labor endowments in the household (Boserup 1970). Newman
(2002) nds that in Ecuador, men spend on average 62 minutes per day in the
household, whereas women spend as much as 327 minutes. In Pakistan, Fafchamps
and Quisumbing (2003) nd that women do 80-90 percent of all household chores.
Also women in developed countries use a substantial part of their labor resources in
the household. Freeman and Schettkat (2005) nd, among seven developed coun-
tries,8 that women, on a daily work day, spend on average 203 minutes, whereas
men spend only 93 minutes, in the home.
In the context of a Dutch disease model, gender-di¤erences in labor market
patterns form an additional, a societal, dimension. As pointed out in, e.g., Torvik
(2001) and Isham et al. (2005), there is great variation across nations in what sectors
produce exported, traded goods, and what sectors produce domestic, non-traded,
goods. For instance, some countries may export manufactured goods, whereas other
8Freeman and Schettkat (2005) study Canada, Netherlands, Norway, UK, US, Italy, and Aus-
tria.
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countries export agricultural goods. Based on the labor market patterns presented
above, it is therefore likely, that, besides this type of variation, there is also variation
across countries in whether traded and non-traded sectors are maleor female
occupations.9
Thus, in order to study how di¤erent combinations of gender and sectors, or what
we could refer to as societal structures, e¤ect the economys adjustment pattern to
a change in natural resource abundance, this paper provides both an analysis of a
gender segmented labor market, and of a labor market in which traded and non-
traded sectors are divided equally among men and women. In each case, however,
only women work in the household.
3 The Model
We use a non-overlapping generations model with perfect competition. The econ-
omy consists of three sectors. Sector 1 is a non-traded sector, sector 2 is a traded
sector, and sector 3 is a household sector. We refer to the traded and the non-traded
sectors as the formal sectors since output is sold and purchased in the market place.
Output from the household sector is completely consumed within the household,
in which it is produced. All sectors employ labor supplied by household members,
and, specically, the household sector uses only female labor.
Households are formed by two individuals, a woman and a man. Both live for
one period, and both have an endowment of L > 0 units of labor. The number
of households remains constant, households are identical, and we normalize the
number of households to equal one.
3.1 Traded and Non-traded Production
Also producers within each of the traded and the non-traded sectors are identical.
For the representative producer, production occurs with labor, lt; and a xed factor
9Of course, this hypothesis would be strengthened considerably by a detailed study of separate
countries. For now, this is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future investigation. Some
preliminary results in this direction can be found in Ross (2006).
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as input. Production in the specic factors model has constant returns to scale,10
and we consider one rm within each sector. Growth is fuelled by learning by doing
and evolves over time as a by-product of production. Let xst denote output in the
s = (1; 2) sector at time t; thus,
x1t = H1tl1t
; (1)
x2t = H2tl2t
; (2)
where Hs0 > 0; Hst is a positive productivity term, which can vary between the two
sectors, and 0 <  < 0 and 0 <  < 0 are the labor shares in production.
Earlier literature on the Dutch disease has traditionally attributed productivity
growth to the traded sector only; e.g., van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987).
Sachs and Warner (1995) introduce perfect spillover of learning by doing to the non-
traded sector. We follow Torviks (2001) approach and assume that learning by
doing is generated in all formal sectors, and that intersectoral spillovers are positive
in all directions. Let gst denote growth rates of productivity in the s sector; then,
_H1t
H1t
= g1t = l1t + l2t; (3)
_H2t
H2t
= g2t = l1t + l2t; (4)
where 0    1 is the spillover rate between sectors.11 To simplify matters,
the spillover rate from the non-traded sector to the traded sector equals that from
the traded sector to the non-traded sector.12 As workers from each formal sector
interact in other places than at the workplace, even in a situation when labor is
intersectorally immobile, technology di¤usion can still occur.
Using the traded good13 as numeraire, p1t is the price of the non-traded good
in terms of the traded good, i.e., the real exchange rate. The representative com-
petitive producer within each sector employs factors in order to maximize prots,
10Specic factor models often assume that one sector uses capital specic to that sector, and
another uses land, both xed in supply, and that labor is mobile. See, e.g., Matsuyama (1992).
11Thus, within sectors, this model su¤ers from the often criticized permanent growth e¤ect of
scale.
12Torvik (2001) contains a rigorous analysis of di¤erent spillover rates.
13The price of the traded good is given as a given (world market) price, whereas prices on the
non-traded good and the household good are determined within the model.
151
Chapter 4
st; and takes as given output and input prices. Under perfect competition, prot
maximization leads to
@1t
@l1t
= p1t
x1t
l1t
  w1t = 0; (5)
@2t
@l2t
= 
x2t
l2t
  w2t = 0; (6)
where wst is the wage rate in sector s = (1; 2). The rms prots are maximized
when the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate.
3.2 Natural Resources
The economy is endowed with natural resources. In every period t; the economy
receives a return from the natural resource as an inow, a revenue, Rt; which is
given directly to the households. The revenue is a xed fraction,   0; of the real
income of man-made output in the formal sectors in terms of traded goods, yt :
Rt = yt; (7)
where yt = p1tx1t + x2t: We refer to  as to the natural resource abundance. The
revenue, Rt; varies with changes in output in either formal sector, but the rev-
enue output ratio remains constant. Using this specication, we model the natural
resource revenues as if they arrive as manna from heaven. An alternative interpre-
tation is to think of Rt as inows of foreign aid.14
3.3 Households and Household Production
Production in the household sector di¤ers from formal production in that it purely
takes female labor as input. Furthermore, productivity is constant15 and does not
interact with productivity in the formal sectors. Let x3t denote output, so that
x3t = l3t
; (8)
14Similar ways of modeling of either a natural resource or foreign aid inow are found in Chat-
terjee et al. (2003), Lesink and White (2001), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), and Torvik (2001).
15Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) nd a constant reallocation of household chores among
women, which implies that household chores are easy to learn. Put di¤erently, it seems there is
no learning by doing e¤ect which increases productivity in the household.
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where 0 <   1.
We assume that each family member has an equal weight in the family welfare
function and identical preferences. In this case, we use a conventional unitary house-
hold model with household production. Preferences are dened over consumption
of the non-traded good, c1t; consumption of the traded good, c2t; and consumption
of the household good, zt: For convenience, let the utility function, u; be given as
u(c1t; c2t; zt) =  ln(c1t) + (1  ) ln(c2t) +  ln(zt); (9)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0 are parameters. There are no savings or bequests
in the economy, so household consumption equals household income at any period.
Disposable household income is the sum of male and female earnings and the value
of a natural resource revenue, Rt. Accordingly, the household maximizes utility
given in (9) subject to
p1tc1t + c2t = p1tx1t + x2t +Rt; (10)
p3tzt = p3tx3t; (11)
lft + l3t = L; with l
f
t  0 and l3t  0; (12)
lmt = L; (13)
by e¢ ciently choosing c1t; c2t; and zt; taking as given prices and the resource revenue,
Rt: The shadow price of the household good relative to the price on the traded good
is denoted p3t; and labor shares, l
f
t and l
m
t ; are the female and male labor supply
to the formal sectors respectively. Eq. (10) says that the household uses disposable
income for consumption of the traded and the non-traded good, and (11) says
that the household consumes all the household good which is produced within the
household. Eq. (12) is the female labor endowment constraint and (13) its male
counterpart.
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The rst order conditions from the utility maximization problem are given as

1  
c2t
c1t
= p1t; (14)

1  
c2t
zt
= p3t; (15)


c1t
zt
=
p3t
p1t
; (16)
wft
(L  lft ) 1
= p3t; (17)
where wft denotes the wage rate of female labor. Denoting prots in the sector in
which women work as ft ; by (5) and (6),
@ft
@lft
= wft :
The rst three conditions, (14)-(16), are the standard conditions ensuring that
the marginal rate of transformation between any two goods equals the marginal
rate of substitution between the same two goods. Due to Cobb-Douglas preferences,
budget shares are constant. The last condition, (17), says that the marginal value
product of the labor in household production good equals the opportunity cost, the
wage rate, in optimum.
4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, rms earn zero marginal prots. Hence, from (5) and (6)
w1t = p

1tH1tl

1t
 1; (18)
w2t = H2tl

2t
 1; (19)
where a star denotes equilibrium levels.
The labor market clears for both male and female workers, which means
lmt = L; (20)
lft = L  l3t; (21)
as only women divide their labor between the household sector and a formal sector.
The non-traded good market clears: i.e., consumption equals supply:
c1t = x

1t;
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and consumption of the household good equals production of the household good;
zt = x

3t:
Using the shadow price of the household good, the resource constraint is
p1tc

1t + c

2t + p

3tz

t = (1 + )y

t + p

3tx

3t; (22)
as the traded good is the numeraire.
In order to evaluate income level e¤ects, we also give
GDP t = y

t +R

t = p

1tx

1t + x

2t +R

t = (1 + )(p

1tx

1t + x

2t); (23)
where yt is man-made output, and the last equality follows from (7).
4.1 Characterizing Three Economies
We study three template economies, or scenarios, which we refer to as Men in
Trade (MiT), Women in Trade (WiT), and Mobile Labor (ML) respectively. In
the two former economies, the labor market is completely segmented by sex. Men
inelastically supply all labor to one sector,16 whereas women face a trade-o¤between
allocating labor to the household sector and a formal sector. In a Mobile Labor
economy, male and female workers move freely between formal sectors.
In the following, we solve the model for each economy. As only the supply side of
the model di¤ers among the three labor market specications, we begin by deriving
the demand side.
From (22), the rst order conditions from the households utility maximization
problem, (14)-(16), and the denition of yt; the demand for the non-traded good
can presented as
p1t =
(1 + )
1  (1 + )
x2t
x1t
=
(1 + )
1  (1 + )
H2tl2t

H1tl1t
; (24)
where the last equality follows from (1) and (2). Likewise, the demand for the
household good can be found as
p3t =
(1 + )
1  (1 + )
x2t
x3t
=
(1 + )
1  (1 + )
H2tl2t

l3t
; (25)
16Thus, the sector in which men work is treated as an all-factors-specicsector.
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where the last equality follows from (2) and (8). We combine (24) and (25), since
this expression becomes useful later, to obtain
p1t =


x3t
x1t
p3t =


l3t

H1tl1t
p3t: (26)
We notice a constant term in (24), (25), and (26). This term reects that budget
shares are constant. Moreover, in (24) and (25) the constant involves the term
1 + ; which adjusts for that fact that a positive resource revenue inow puts a
wedge between consumption and production of the traded good. If the resource
inow is absent, the constant term in (24) and (25) is simply the relative budget
shares given by the preferences.
Having laid out the demand side of the model, we now turn to the supply side
for each scenario in order to characterize the equilibrium labor allocation.
4.1.1 Labor Allocation in the Men in Trade Economy
In a MiT economy, by (12) and (13), lft  l1t; thus, l1t + l3t = L: Moreover,
lmt  l2t = L by denition. We use the labor allocation e¢ ciency condition in (17)
to derive the supply of the household good. By (18), since women work in the
non-traded sector, (17) becomes:
pMiT3t = p
MiT
1t


H1t(l1t)
a 1(L  l1t)1 : (27)
Equating (26) and (27), the female labor supply in equilibrium is derived as
lMiT1 (; ; ; )
 =
 
1




+ 1
!
L; (28)
and, by the labor endowment constraint,
lMiT3 (; ; ; )
 =
 








+ 1
!
L: (29)
We observe that both the female labor allocation and the female labor supply are
constant and independent of the resource abundance. Moreover, the higher the
labor share in production within a sector, and the higher the budget share of its
output, the greater the share of the labor endowment which is being allocated to
that particular sector; i.e.,@l
MiT
3 ()
@
< 0;
@lMiT3 ()
@
< 0;
@lMiT3 ()
@
> 0; and @l
MiT
3 ()
@
> 0:
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4.1.2 Labor Allocation in the Women in Trade Economy
In a WiT economy, women e¢ ciently allocate their labor between the household
and the traded sector. Therefore, by (12) and (13), lft  l2t and l2t + l3t = L: Men,
by denition, inelastically supply labor to the non-traded sector; lmt  l1t = L:
Again we use the labor allocation e¢ ciency condition in (17) to derive an ex-
pression for the supply of the household good. We apply (19) and nd
pWiT3t =


H2t(l2t)
 1(L  l2t)1 : (30)
By equating (25) and (30), the female labor supply to the traded sector in equilib-
rium is
lWiT2 (; ; ; ; )
 =
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
L; (31)
and, using the labor endowment constraint, the female labor share used in the
household sector is
lWiT3 (; ; ; ; )
 =
" (1+)
1 (1+)


(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
L: (32)
To avoid corner solutions, we impose the following restriction on the natural resource
abundance:
 <
1  

:
When  = 1 

; the inow of resource revenues increase the demand for the non-
traded good and the household good to an extent that all labor moves out of the
traded sector until it shuts down. When  > 1 

; there is no equilibrium as labor
demand in the household sector exceeds the womans labor endowment, L:
The womans labor allocation depends on , but it is constant for given levels of
natural resource abundance. Like the MiT economy, women allocate more labor to
the household the higher labor share in the home sector and the higher the budget
share of its output, and reversely for the formal sector in which women work; i.e.
@lWiT3 ()
@
< 0;
@lWiT3 ()
@
> 0;
@lWiT3 ()
@
> 0; and @l
WiT
3 ()
@
> 0:
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4.1.3 Labor Allocation in the Mobile Labor Economy
In a ML economy, the size of the labor force is the sum of female and male labor
endowments minus female labor used in the household sector; i.e., 2L  l3t: Of this
quantity, a share, t; is allocated to the non-traded sector, and the remaining share,
(1  t); to the traded sector. Hence, l1t  t(2L  l3t) and l2t  (1  t)(2L  l3t):
As in the standard Dutch disease model with mobile labor, the wage rates are
identical across sectors in equilibrium. Equating (18) with (19), and applying (24),
we nd that
() =
1
1 (1+)
(1+)


+ 1
: (33)
Assuming  < 1 

, it follows that 0 < () < 1:
In equilibrium, the marginal value product of labor used in household production
equals the wage rate. Female labor used in household production, l3t; can then be
derived by combination of (17), (18), (26), and (33):
lML3 (; ; ; ; )
 =
"




()




() + 1
#
2L: (34)
To avoid corner solutions, we need furthermore to assume that
() <




:
If () = 



; the woman uses all her labor endowments, L; in the household, and
if () > 



there is no equilibrium, since lML3 ()
 cannot exceed L:
By (34), we obtain
lML1 (; ; ; ; )
 = ()
"
1




() + 1
#
2L; (35)
and
lML2 (; ; ; ; )
 = [1  ()]
"
1




() + 1
#
2L: (36)
Both female and male labor allocation depends on the natural resource abundance.
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4.2 Static Equilibrium
Having characterized the equilibrium labor allocation, equilibrium values of all other
variables can now be obtained. Insertion of equilibrium labor allocation in (24) gives
p1t; in (25) gives p

3t; and in (23) gives GDP

t in the respective economy. Likewise,
wage rates can be derived from (18) and (19). We refer the reader to the Appendix
A for this exercise.
As shown in the Appendix A, in all economies; Men in Trade, Women in Trade,
and Mobile Labor, wage rates, GDP, and the shadow price of the household good
grow that the same rate as productivity growth in the traded sector. The price of
the non-traded good - the real exchange rate - grows at the ratio of productivity
growth in the traded sector to the non-traded sector. In the following, we describe
the dynamics for each economy.
4.3 Dynamics
There is zero learning by doing in the household, and we focus on the two di¤erential
equations given in (3) and (4). From these equations it is clear that, in general,
output in one sector grows faster than output in the other. By (28), (31), and (34)
we can rewrite (3) and (4) as
gMiT1 =
 
1




+ 1
+ 
!
L; (37)
gMiT2 =
 





+ 1
+ 1
!
L; (38)
and,
gWiT1 ()
 =
"
1 +

(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
L; (39)
gWiT2 ()
 =
"
 +
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
L; (40)
159
Chapter 4
and,
gML1 ()
 =
1




() + 1
f() + [1  ()]g 2L; (41)
gML2 ()
 =
1




() + 1
f() + [1  ()]g 2L; (42)
for the three economies respectively. Productivity growth in either sector in either
economy is constant. Moreover, when the learning by doing spillover across sectors
is less than the direct e¤ect; i.e., when  < 1; in the MiT economy
gMiT1   gMiT2 = (   1)








+ 1
L < 0; (43)
whereas, in the WiT economy,
gWiT1 ()
   gWiT2 () = (1  )
(1+)
1 (1+)


(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
L > 0: (44)
Independently of how gender and sectors are combined, output in the sector that
employs male labor grows faster than output in the sector that employs female
labor. Hence, the asymptotic growth rate is given by the male sector. The reason is
that as the woman uses a share of her labor endowments in household production,
the direct e¤ect of learning by doing generated by female labor is less than the
direct e¤ect of learning by doing generated by male labor. Thus, when spillover
e¤ects are only a fraction of the direct e¤ects, productivity growth in the female
sector is less than productivity growth in the male sector.
When spillover is perfect, in which case  = 1; from either of (3) and (4), we
nd that two sectors grow at the same rate. Specically,
gMiT  =
 
1




+ 1
+ 1
!
L; (45)
gWiT () =
"
1 +
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
L: (46)
In contrast, in a ML economy,
gML1 ()
   gML2 () = (1  )
2()   1




() + 1
2L > 0 if () >
1
2
: (47)
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Output in the sector which employs the largest share of the labor force grows faster
than the other sector, and the asymptotic growth rate is given by this sector. When
 = 1
2
; the two sectors grow at the same rate. The two sectors also grow at the
same rate when spillovers are perfect, in which case, the growth rate is given as
gML() =
1




() + 1
2L: (48)
Having solved the model and described the dynamics of the three economies, the
next section analyzes the role of the natural resource abundance upon the perfor-
mance in each economy.
5 Resource Impact
The Dutch disease is named after a sequence of reactions shown by the Dutch
economy after discovery of large natural gas reserves in the Netherlands. Classical
Dutch disease symptoms include appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e., an
increase in p1t, and a decline in the share of the labor force employed in the traded
sector whereby the economys competitiveness with respect to imports is hurt. It is
typically assumed that productivity is generated purely in the traded sector; thus,
the long-run growth rate is also harmed. An exception to these results is found in
Torvik (2001) where the real exchange rate depreciates in response to larger natural
resource revenue ows, but the long-run growth rate is una¤ected.
In the following, we analyze and discuss for each economy how it adjusts to a
permanent change in . We examine how the economy in general and female labor
allocation in particular are a¤ected.
5.1 Dutch Disease Symptoms in the MiT Economy
We begin the analysis by given the following results:
Proposition 1. Let   0: In a MiT economy, an increase in resource abun-
dance, i.e., in :
(i) has no impact on female labor supply;
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(ii) leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate;
(iii) increases the womans wage rate relative to the mans wage rate;
(iv) increases the man-made output and the GDP level; and,
(v) has no impact on productivity growth.
Proof. See Appendix B.
These results diverge from the traditional Dutch disease result in one respect:
employment in the non-traded and traded sector remains una¤ected as the resource
abundance expands. The intuition is as follows: The higher the resource abundance,
the larger the gap between production and consumption of the traded good. To
keep budget shares constant, demand for the non-traded good increases, and the real
exchange rate appreciates. This is the e¤ect that traditionally shifts employment
from the traded sector to the non-traded sector. In our model, however, we have
an additional e¤ect. Also demand for the household good increases and the shadow
price of the household good appreciates.17 Indeed, female labor allocation remains
una¤ected since demand and supply of the non-traded good and of the household
good shift equally up. In the new equilibrium, only domestic output prices have
changed.
As the wage rate in the non-traded sector depends upon the real exchange rate,
despite the constant factor allocation, womens wage rate increases. The male wage
rate, on the other hand, is una¤ected by the change in the resource abundance since
the price of the traded good is exogenous and male labor is immobile. Hence, if
male wage rates initially are higher than female, the wage gap between men and
women decreases.
Both man-made output and GDP levels increase since, besides a positive e¤ect
which arises from the resource itself, also a positive e¤ect on output in the non-
traded sector arises from the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Productivity
growth remains una¤ected as the labor allocation and labor supply determine learn-
ing by doing. Hence, in a MiT economy, higher resource abundance merely implies
17To see this, by (50) @p
MiT
3t ()

@ = H2tL
 
 
+




[1 (1+)]2 > 0:
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positive level e¤ects.
5.2 Dutch Disease Symptoms in the WiT Economy
Again, we begin by stating the following results:
Proposition 2. Let 0   < 1 

: In the WiT economy, an increase in resource
abundance, i.e., in :
(i) decreases female labor supply;
(ii) leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate;
(iii) increases the mans and womans wage rate, but the female to male wage ratio
decreases;
(iv) increases man-made output and the GDP level; and,
(v) causes productivity growth to decline.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Similar to the MiT economy, as resource abundance increases; demand for the
household good and for the non-traded good increases. The man cannot supply
more labor to the non-traded sector, but, to meet demand for the household good,
the woman withdraws from the labor force and allocates more labor for household
use. The WiT economy therefore exhibits the classical Dutch disease symptom
of contraction of the traded sector. In our model, however, the reason is that
the female labor force participation declines; not that female labor moves to the
non-traded sector.
As the woman withdraws a share of her labor endowments from the labor force,
production of the traded good goes down. To keep budget shares constant, demand
for the non-traded good also declines. On the other hand, higher resource abundance
imposes a larger gap between production and consumption of the traded good,
which, in turn, increases the price of the non-traded good. As the latter e¤ect is
stronger, the real exchange rate appreciates.
Both mens and womens wage rate increases. The female wage rate increases
as the marginal productivity of female labor goes up concurrently with the woman
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moving out of the labor force, whereas the male wage rate increases as the real
exchange rate appreciates.
A positive level e¤ect on man-made output arises from the appreciation of the
real exchange rate, whereas a negative level e¤ect arises from the contraction of the
traded sector, and the former e¤ect dominates. In addition, the GDP level benets
also from the resource revenue itself.
There is no ambiguity in the growth e¤ects. When learning by doing spillovers
are less than their direct e¤ects ( < 1), productivity growth in the traded sector is
relatively more damaged by increased resource abundance than productivity growth
in the non-traded sector. Since productivity growth is already higher in the non-
traded sector (the male sector), this means that the productivity gap between the
two formal sectors increases further with higher levels of resource inows; i.e., the
productivity ratio, H2t
H1t
; falls. Hence, the real exchange rate appreciates at a rate
faster than prior to the increase in natural resource abundance.
In contrast, when spillovers are perfect ( = 1), the growth rate is equally
a¤ected in the two sectors. In this case, pWiT1t is constant, and the only resource
impact on the real exchange rate is a level e¤ect.
Recall that wage rates, the GDP level, and the shadow price of the household
good all grow at the same rate as productivity growth in the traded sector, gWiT2 :
Therefore, these variables all grow at slower rates in response to the increase in
natural resource abundance.
5.3 Dutch Disease Symptoms in the ML Economy
When labor is mobile, in addition to womens labor supply, we also analyze how
the labor force dispersion between the formal sectors is inuenced.
Proposition 3. Let 0   < 1 

and () < 



: In the ML economy, an
increase in resource abundance, i.e., in :
(i.a) increases the share of the labor force employed in the non-traded sector, but
decreases female labor supply;
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(i.b) increases employment in the non-traded sector;
(ii) has an ambiguous e¤ect on the real exchange rate;
(iii) increases the wage rate;
(iv) has an ambiguous e¤ect on the man-made output and the GDP level; and;
(v) causes productivity growth to decline in the traded sector, but the e¤ect on pro-
ductivity growth in the non-traded sector is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Property (i.a) means that there are two opposite e¤ects on employment in the
non-traded sector: The labor force declines as the woman uses more labor in the
household sector, but a larger share of the remaining labor force is employed in the
non-traded sector. As the latter e¤ect dominates, the non-traded sector enlarges.
The traded sector, on the other hand, contracts, and contracts even stronger than
in traditional Dutch disease models due to the additional e¤ect from the reduced
female labor force participation.
Similar to the gender segregated economies, enhanced natural resource abun-
dance increases the gab between production and consumption of the traded good,
which in turn pushes the real exchange rate upwards. As women withdraw from
the labor force, however, and as the share of the remaining labor force in the traded
sector declines, production of the traded good declines as well. This feedback e¤ect
draws the real exchange rate downwards. Moreover, the change in pML1t ()
 depends
also on the change in employment in the non-traded sector. As this employment
goes up, to keep budget shares constant, pML1t ()
 adjusts downwards. As a result,
despite a contraction of the traded sector, the real exchange rate does not neces-
sarily appreciate. For these reasons, also the man-made output level, as well as the
GDP level, may increase or decline.
It is intuitive that the wage rate increases. As fewer labor resources are employed
in the traded sector, marginal labor productivity increases. As the wage is identical
across sectors in the ML economy, both men and women earn the same - higher -
wage.
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The change in natural resource abundance a¤ects the growth rate through sev-
eral channels. First, as the woman decreases her labor supply, less learning by doing
is generated. Second, the expansion of non-traded sector has a direct positive e¤ect
on learning by doing in this sector and on the spillover to the traded sector. Third,
however, as the traded sector contracts, there is less learning by doing in the traded
sector, and less spillover of learning by doing to the non-traded sector.
When  = 1, the positive learning by doing e¤ect from the non-traded sector onto
growth is smaller than the negative learning by doing e¤ect from the contracting
traded sector. In this case,
@gML1 ()

@
=
@gML2 ()

@
=
()
@
8><>:  



h




() + 1
i2
9>=>; 2L < 0:
When spillovers are completely missing, i.e., when  = 0; then
@gML1 ()

@
=
()
@
"
1




() + 1
#2
2L > 0;
@gML2 ()

@
=
()
@
8><>:  




+ 1h




() + 1
i2
9>=>; 2L < 0:
In this case, increased resource abundance has a positive e¤ect on productivity
growth in the non-traded sector, as it depends only this sectors employment.
When spillovers are not perfect, we notice furthermore that, like the WiT
economy, productivity growth in the traded sector is damaged relatively more
than productivity growth in the non-traded sector. Hence, if () > 1
2
; i.e., if
gML1 ()
 > gML2 ()
; the extra resource revenue makes the real exchange rate depre-
ciate at an even higher rate than prior to the change, whereas if () < 1
2
; i.e., if
gML1 ()
 > gML2 ()
; the extra revenue makes the real exchange rate appreciate at
slower rates.
5.4 Discussion
In terms of resource impact, the previous section demonstrates considerable vari-
ation in the Dutch disease symptoms among the three template economies. Our
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model illustrates, not only how labor market structures inuence the resource im-
pact, but also how, in turn, resource abundance inuences womens labor force
participation.
TheMiT economy has a high level of gender equality in how the natural resource
impacts the economy. High resource abundance does not e¤ect womens labor
supply, and, assuming men earn a higher wage that women, mens and womens
wages become more equal at higher resource abundance levels. In contrast, resources
have an adverse e¤ect on womens labor force participation in both aWiT and ML
economy. Women at work in these two economies, become more isolated the higher
the demand for the home good. One may argue that this isolation is likely to restrain
these womens abilities to further their own interests, and, consequently, leave the
male part of the labor force in power to rule society. This hypothesis is examined
empirically in Ross (2006). Women throughout the Middle East predominantly
work in traded sectors; thus the Middle East economies resemble theWiT economy,
or a modied ML economy in which men can work in all sectors, but women can
only work in trade. Ross nds that women in oil rich Middle East nations hold
fewer seats in parliament and are less represented in the non-agricultural labor force
than women in Middle East nations with fewer oil resources, which is precisely what
our model predicts.
At the same time, our model may also explain why women in OECD-countries
with a large share of GDP in natural resources, such as, e.g., Canada and New
Zealand, despite the resources, comprise above 40 percent of total employment
(Anker 1998). Women in these countries occupy a large portion of jobs in the
non-traded sector, such as in sales and services, as depicted in table 2 above. Ex-
actly this type of economy resembles our MiT economy in which female labor force
participation rates are una¤ected by resource revenues.
In addition, our model can be paralleled to the general literature on female labor
force participation rates. Within this literature, a number of cross country studies
have found a U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation rates
and per capita GDP levels (Goldin 1995; Mammen and Paxson 2000). The down-
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ward sloping section of the U-shaped pattern is in conformity with our analysis of a
WiT economy andML economy, in which, the GDP level e¤ect caused by increased
resource abundance is positive. These scenarios predict exactly a negative relation-
ship between female labor force participation and GDP levels. Women withdraw
from the labor force because, in response to the higher income levels, the household
good is demanded more.
6 Concluding Remarks
By studying labor mobility - and labor immobility - across formal sectors, and en-
dogenous female labor supply, we explain manifold economic adjustment outcomes
to increased resource abundance within a Dutch disease model. In particular, our
analysis shows that labor market patterns are crucial to the adjustment outcome.
When sectors are gender segregated, whether women work in the traded or in
the non-traded sector determines how the economy responds to increased resource
abundance. In both economies, such a change results in higher demand for the
household good as well as the non-traded good. If women work in the traded
sector, they supply less labor to the formal sector to meet increased demand for
the household good. In contrast, if women work in the non-traded sector, factor
allocation and labor supply remains unchanged, since both goods in question are
produced by women. Growth arises from learning by doing and depends on the
size, and the allocation, of the labor force. Thus, growth is una¤ected by increases
in the resource inow when women work in the non-traded sector and adversely
a¤ected when women work in the traded sector. Despite the latter adverse growth
e¤ect, higher resource abundance is, nevertheless, a blessing in terms of improving
the GDP level.
When labor is mobile between formal sectors, i.e., when men and women work in
the same sectors, as resource abundance increases, women withdraw from the labor
force to meet demand for the household good. At the same time, a larger share of
the remaining labor force is allocated to the non-traded sector to meet demand for
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the non-traded good. Due to this complexity of the labor-reallocation adjustment
to changed resource abundance, the GDP level only rises when contraction of the
traded sector is not too large; otherwise it declines, just as the productivity growth
in the non-traded sector increases only when sectoral spillovers are absent. When
sectoral spillovers are perfect, however, productivity growth, which in this case is
identical in the two sectors, declines.
Also the resource impact on the real exchange rate and the wage rates depends
on the gender-grouping of the labor market. The wage rates generally di¤er between
sectors when labor is immobile. Moreover, when men work in trade, only female
wages are boosted by increased resource abundance, whereas, when men work in
the non-traded sector, both female and male wages increase. There is merely one
wage rate when labor is mobile. This wage rate is higher, the greater the resource
abundance.
Our results demonstrate that linking labor market patterns to natural resource
abundance may also explain certain structures of society. In particular, when women
have employment possibilities in the traded sector, abundant natural resources tie
women to the home.
Future work may involve policy and welfare analysis. For this purpose, theoret-
ical work that involves intergenerational considerations seems useful. For instance,
Matsen and Torvik (2005) analyze a Dutch disease model with mobile labor and
exogenously given labor supply and nd that some reduction in growth is optimal.
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A Appendix
A.1 Static Equilibrium of the MiT Economy
Using lMiT1 (; ; ; )
 and l2t = L, from (24), the equilibrium price of the non-
traded good is
pMiT1t (H1t;H2t; )
 =
H2t
H1t
L 





+ 1

(1 + )
1  (1 + ) ; (49)
and, likewise, the equilibrium imputed price of the household good is derived from
(25) as
pMiT3t (H2t; )
 = H2tL 
 




+ 1




!
(1 + )
1  (1 + ) : (50)
Both equilibrium prices are functions of labor allocation and the adjusted budget
shares. The higher the labor share in production in a given sector, the lower the
equilibrium price of the corresponding output due to decreasing marginal produc-
tivity of labor. Moreover, the larger , the larger the adjusted budget share, which
implies a higher equilibrium price.
Due to the segmented nature of the labor market, wage rates generally di¤er
between sectors. As wMiT1t  wft ; and by (18), (28), and (50), the female wage rate
in equilibrium is
wft (H2t; )
 = H2tL 1





+ 1

(1 + )
1  (1 + ) : (51)
The wage rate in the traded sector is paid to men, so wMiT2t  wmt ; and, in equilib-
rium, is given as
wmt (H2t)
 = H2tL 1 (52)
by (20) and (19). We notice that the female wage rate depends directly on the
resource abundance, which is a result of the impact the resource abundance has on
the price of the non-traded good. The male wage rate, on the other hand, depends
on the world market price on the traded good, which is una¤ected by the inow of
natural resources.
Man-made output is the sum of output in the two formal sectors,
yMiTt (H2t; )
 = H2tL
1
1  (1 + ) ; (53)
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and by (23), GDP can be derived as
GDPMiTt (H2t; )
 = H2tL
1 + 
1  (1 + ) : (54)
A.2 Static Equilibrium of the WiT Economy
Using lWiT2 (; ; ; ; )
and l1t = L, The equilibrium price of the non-traded good
can be expressed from (24):
pWiT1t (H1t;H2t; )
 =
H2t
H1t
L 
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
(1 + )
1  (1 + ) ; (55)
and likewise, the imputed price of the household good in equilibrium is by (25):
pWiT3t (H2t; )
 = H2tL 

1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+1


(1+)
1 (1+)


(1+)
1 (1+)


+1
 (1 + )
1  (1 + ) : (56)
The wage rate in the non-traded sector is earned by men: By (18) and (55):
wmt (H2t; )
 = H2tL 1
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
(1 + )
1  (1 + ) : (57)
The wage rate within the traded sector is earned by women, and from (19) and
(31):
wft (H2t; )
 = H2tL 1
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
# 1
: (58)
Man-made output, yWiTt (H2t; )
; is given as
yWiTt (H2t; )
 = H2tL
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
1
1  (1 + ) ; (59)
and, by (23),
GDPWiTt (H2t; )
 = H2tL
"
1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
1 + 
1  (1 + ) : (60)
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A.3 Static Equilibrium of the ML Economy
Using lML3 (; ; ; ; )
; the equilibrium price of the non-traded good is derived
from (24):
pML1t (H1t; H2t; )
 =
H2t
H1t
[2L  l3()]  [1  ()
]
[()]
(1 + )
1  (1 + ) ; (61)
and the equilibrium imputed price of the household good from (25):
pML3t (H2t; )
 = H2t[2L  l3()] [1  ()
]
[l3()]
(1 + )
1  (1 + ) : (62)
By (19), the wage rate is given as
wMLt (H2t; )
 = H2t f[1  ()][2L  l3()]g 1 : (63)
Man-made output is given as
yMLt (H2t; )
 =
1
1  (1 + )H2t[1  ()
][2L  l3()]: (64)
and the GDP level, by (23), is
GDPMLt (H2t; )
 =
1 + 
1  (1 + )H2t[1  ()
][2L  l3()]: (65)
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B Appendix
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove each property (i)-(v) in turn by di¤erentiation.
B.1.1 Proof of (i)
By (28),
@lMiT1t

@
= 0: 
B.1.2 Proof of (ii)
From (49)
@pMiT1t ()

@
=
H2t
H1t
L 





+ 1


[1  (1 + )]2 > 0: 
B.1.3 Proof of (iii)
By (51)
@wft (H2t; )

@
= H2tL
 1





+ 1


[1  (1 + )]2 > 0;
and by and (52)
@wmt (H2t)

@
= 0:
Let the female to male wage ratio be given by t()
  wft ()
wmt ()
 : Then, by (51) and
(52),
() =
+ 



(1 + )
1  (1 + ) ;
and
@()
@
=
+ 




[1  (1 + )]2 > 0: 
B.1.4 Proof of (iv)
By (53),
@yMiTt ()

@
= H2tL
 
[1  (1 + )]2 > 0;
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and by (54),
@GDPMiTt ()

@
= H2tL


1
[1  (1 + )]2

> 0: 
B.1.5 Proof of (v)
From (37),
@gMiT1
@
= 0;
and from and (38),
@gMiT2
@
= 0:
This proves property (v) and completes the proof of proposition 1. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove each property (i)-(v) in turn by di¤erentiation.
B.2.1 Proof of (i)
By (31), @l
WiT
2 ()

@
= lWiT2 ()

h
 

1 (1+)
(1+)+[1 (1+)]
i
< 0. 
B.2.2 Proof of (ii)
From (55),
@pWiT1t ()

@
=
pWiT1t ()

1  (1 + )
" (1+)
1 (1+)


(1  ) + 1
(1+)
1 (1+)


+ 1
#
> 0: 
B.2.3 Proof of (iii)
By (57),
@wmt (H2t; )

@
= H1tL
1 @p
WiT
1t ()

@
> 0:
and by and (58)
@wft (H2t; )

@
= H2t(   1)

lWiT2 ()
 2 @lWiT2 ()
@
> 0:
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Let the female to male wage rate ratio be given by t()
  wft ()
wmt ()
 : Then, by (57)
and (58),
() =
 + 
h
1
1+
  
i

:
and,
@()
@
=
 
 [1 + ]2
< 0: 
B.2.4 Proof of (iv)
By (59),
@yWiTt ()

@
=
H2t

lWiT2 ()

[1  (1 + )]2

  
(1 + ) +  [1  (1 + )]

> 0
and by (60),
@GDPWiTt ()

@
=
H2t

lWiT2 ()

[1  (1 + )]2 (1+)

1
1 + 
  
(1 + ) +  [1  (1 + )]

> 0: 
B.2.5 Proof of (v)
From (39),
@gWiT1 ()

@
= 
@lWiT2 ()

@
< 0
and, from (40),
@gWiT2 ()

@
=
@lWiT2 ()

@
< 0:
This proves property (v) and completes the proof of proposition 2. 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove each property (i.a)-(v) in turn by di¤erentiation.
B.3.1 Proof of (i.a)
By (33),
()
@
= [()]2


1
(1 + )2
> 0;
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and, by (34),
lML3 ()

@
=
()
@



h




() + 1
i22L > 0: 
B.3.2 Proof of (i.b)
As lML1 (; ) = ()[2L  lML3 ()]; it follows that
lML1 ()

@
=
()
@
"
1




() + 1
#2
2L > 0: 
B.3.3 Proof of (ii)
From (61),
@pML1t ()

@
= pML1t ()

8<: 1[1  (1 + )](1 + )  
()
@




() + 1
24
h




+ 1
i
1  () +

()
359=; :
Thus,
@pML1t ()

@
> 0 if
1
[1  (1 + )](1 + ) >
()
@




() + 1
24
h




+ 1
i
1  () +

()
35 ;
otherwise
@pML1t ()

@
< 0: 
B.3.4 Proof of (iii)
By (63),
@wMLt ()

@
= H2t(   1)[lML2 ()] 2

lML2 ()

@

> 0:
Since
lML2 ()

@
=  ()

@




+ 1h




() + 1
i22L < 0: 
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B.3.5 Proof of (iv)
By (64)
@yMLt (H2t; )

@
= yMLt (H2t; )

8<: 1  (1 + ) + 
lML2 ()

@
lML2 ()

9=; ;
where
lML2 ()

@
lML2 ()
 =  
()
@
[1  ()]




+ 1




() + 1
Hence,
@yMLt (H2t; )

@
> 0 if

1  (1 + ) > 
lML2 ()

@
lML2 ()
 ;
otherwise,
@yMLt (H2t; )

@
< 0:
From, (65)
@GDPMLt ()

@
= yMLt ()
 + (1 + )
@yMLt (H2t; )

@
:
Hence,
@GDPMLt ()

@
> 0 if
1
1 + 
+

1  (1 + ) > 
lML2 ()

@
lML2 ()
 ;
otherwise,
@GDPMLt ()

@
< 0: 
B.3.6 Proof of (v)
By (41),
@gML1 ()

@
=
1




() + 1
()
@
(
 




[() + (1  ())]




() + 1
+ 1  
)
2L:
Thus,
@gML1 ()

@
 0 if 1   +




[() + (1  ())]




() + 1
otherwise,
@gML1 ()

@
< 0:
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By (42),
@gML2 ()

@
=
1




() + 1
()
@
(
 








() + 1
[1 + ()(   1)] +    1
)
2L < 0:
This proves property (v) and completes the proof of proposition 3. 
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